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I. INTRODUCTION:  “ARE BEAN COUNTERS TO BLAME?”2 
To read some media reports over the last two years, a recent 
accounting change--the implementation of FAS 157 by the SEC in 
November 2007--seems to have single-handedly plunged the worldwide 
economy into crisis.3  The traditional stock character accountant, however, 
is a mindless bean counter whiling away the hours doing boring, repetitive 
work.4  So are accountants hapless fools oblivious to their roles in 
 
 1. Fellow, Liberty Fund, Inc.; JD, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law (2006); MA 
(economics), The New School for Social Research (2005); BS, University of Tennessee at 
Chattanooga (2001); CPA (State of Tennessee).  Thanks are due Lord Brian Griffiths of 
Fforestfach, Alberto Mingardi, Hans Eicholz, and Elaine Sternberg for invaluable comments 
and discussion on these matters.  Special thanks, also, to Tom Martin and David Alvis, 
whose questions and conversations prompted me to write this piece.  Portions of this paper 
were the basis for a talk at an Instituto Bruno Leoni conference in Rome in July 2009, and 
the paper was also presented at the International Conference of Accounting, Business, 
Leadership and Information Management in Yabuli, China in August 2009; at both events I 
benefited greatly from the discussion. 
 2. Andrew Ross Sorkin, Are Bean Counters to Blame, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK BLOG, 
July 1, 2008, available at http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/07/01/blaming-the-bean-
counters/. 
 3. See id. (discussing role of accountants in the 2008 financial crisis); Louise Store, A 
Values Debate (Not the Political Kind), N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 2008 (“[B]ankers complained 
that they have felt pressured by accountants and regulators to undervalue assets in recent 
months.”), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/16/business/16place.html; Josh 
Fineman & Ian Katz, Robert Rubin Says Mark-to-Market has Done ‘Damage’ (Update2), 
BLOOMBERG.COM, Jan. 28, 2009 (“‘I spent my whole life at Goldman Sachs believing in 
mark-to-market accounting, and having said that, if you look at the experience from the last 
two years, I think mark-to-market accounting has led to terrible vicious cycles in asset 
prices,’ Rubin, the former U.S. Treasury secretary, said . . . .”), available at 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=aeaJxuGtTSbc&refer=home. 
 4. See Melody Petersen, Shortage of Accounting Students Raises Concern on Audit 
Quality, NY TIMES, Feb. 19, 1999, (noting a former accounting firm intern’s complaint that, 
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devastating the lives of millions upon millions around the world, or are 
they Machiavellian masterminds manipulating their friends and foes alike 
to establish their absolute power over the wills of the masses over which 
they lord?  Or are accountants not really to blame at all?  Perhaps 
accounting has been misunderstood and mischaracterized by accountants 
and non-accountants alike?  Has accounting become a harbor in which to 
anchor false hopes of stability and objectivity in the world of finance?  Or 
are public accountants truly culpable and not yet even fully suffering the 
consequences of getting exactly what they asked Congress for:  the 
exclusive franchise to audit SEC-regulated companies?5 
From early twentieth-century power grabs6 by Certified Public 
Accountants (CPAs) through today’s tumultuous environment, accounting 
has become increasingly political.7  Even a standard intermediate 
accounting8 textbook declares in boldface:  “Accounting standards are as 
much a product of political action as they are of careful logic or empirical 
findings.”9  And students are taught that there is a large “expectations gap--
what the public thinks accountants should be doing and what accountants 
think they can do.”10 
Financial accounting exists primarily to convey historical financial 
information to interested parties both inside and outside the reporting 
entity.  The SEC itself recently confirmed that the investor (either current 
 
“‘Accounting is stable’ . . . ‘but it's not exciting because you're doing the same thing over 
and over.’”), available at http://www.nytimes.com/1999/02/19/business/shortage-of-
accounting-students-raises-concern-on-audit-quality.html?pagewanted=1. 
 5. See generally Sean O'Connor, Be Careful What You Wish For:   How Accountants 
and Congress Created the Problem of Auditor Independence, 45 B.C. L. REV. 741, 741 
(2004) (arguing that the lack of true independence by auditors “will be resolved only by 
returning to its origins in the federal securities laws of the 1930s and by restructuring the 
relationships involved in public company audits.”). 
 6. See id. at 775-89 (describing how the desire for professional recognition by 
accountants drove many accounting reforms). 
 7. See generally D. R. MYDDELTON, UNSHACKLING ACCOUNTANTS 128-41 (Chapter 7, 
Political Interference) (2004) (discussing politicians in the U.S., U.K., and EU reacting to 
accounting scandals with laws that do not necessarily address the underlying problems but 
allow for political grandstanding and the illusion of quick and meaningful reform), available 
at http://www.iea.org.uk/files/upld-book241pdf. 
 8. Intermediate accounting is an upper-level undergraduate course often used, at least 
in a de facto fashion, to weed out those who will not finish a degree in accounting.  It is the 
primary course in which financial accounting is dealt with and has expanded to a two or 
even three course sequence at most schools.  As the literature and standards grew, so too did 
the ‘basic’ course in financial accounting--from one semester to one year, or even three 
semesters. 
 9. DONALD E. KIESO ET AL., INTERMEDIATE ACCOUNTING 15 (10th ed., 2001). 
 10. Id. at 17.  See also Richard I. Miller & Michael R. Young, Financial Reporting and 
Risk Management in the 21st Century, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1987, 2016 (1997) (noting “the 
gap between the perception of the professional’s responsibility and the professional’s 
responsibility in fact”). 
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or potential) is the primary user of financial statements and declared:  
“Accounting standards should continue to be established to meet the needs 
of investors.”11    Accountants select the data and data presentation that 
investors use to make decisions.  Exercising judgment is, in part, why some 
characterize the evolution of public accounting as “the rise from technician 
to professional.”12  Contingencies must be disclosed today but are, by 
definition, imprecise and uncertain in nature.13  Beyond financial 
accounting, other branches of accounting are similarly (or perhaps even 
more) forward-looking, such as tax accounting (and planning), managerial 
or cost accounting,14 and business valuation. 
Accounting may not be blameless in the world’s current financial 
woes, but neither can it be the only culprit.  But who or what even 
represents accounting as an institution?  That is, to the extent accounting 
bears blame for current financial problems, what individuals or 
organizations could be found at fault or should even be investigated?  
Many organizations, both public and private, with similar and even 
overlapping authority and responsibilities, exercise simultaneous influence 
and control.  Nor is there much jurisdictional competition, especially within 
the U.S.15  Accounting is regulated by a complex and expanding set of 
 
 11. Report and Recommendations Pursuant to Section 133 of the Emergency Economic 
Stabilization Act of 2008:  Study on Mark-To-Market Accounting 9 (Office of the Chief 
Accountant, Division of Corporation Finance, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 
2008) [hereinafter 2008 SEC Report].  “Beyond meeting the information needs of investors, 
general-purpose financial reporting has secondary uses that may be of additional utility to 
others, such as for prudential oversight.”  Id. at 9-10. 
 12. See generally JOHN L. CAREY, THE RISE OF THE ACCOUNTING PROFESSION:  FROM 
TECHNICIAN TO PROFESSIONAL (Vol. 1, 1896-1936, 1969; Vol. 2, 1937-1969, 1970) 
(discussing the history of the shift from viewing accountants as technicians to viewing them 
as professionals) [hereinafter CAREY, Vol. 1 and CAREY, Vol. 2, respectively]. 
 13. The Financial Accounting Standards Board (“FASB”) says “a contingency is 
defined as an existing condition, situation, or set of circumstances involving uncertainty as 
to possible gain (hereinafter a ‘gain contingency’) or loss (hereinafter a ‘loss contingency’) 
to an enterprise that will ultimately be resolved when one or more future events occur or fail 
to occur.  Resolution of the uncertainty may confirm the acquisition of an asset or the 
reduction of a liability or the loss or impairment of an asset or the incurrence of a liability.”  
ACCOUNTING FOR CONTINGENCIES, Statement of Fin. Accounting Standards No. 5 (Fin. 
Accounting Standards Bd. 1975), available at http://www.fasb.org/pdf/fas5.pdf. 
 14. “Management accounting, which entails use of accounting information for 
planning, decision making, and control, developed to accommodate and support these 
‘profit-seeking activities of entrepreneurs for whom multiprocess, hierarchical, managed 
enterprises were more efficient than conversion processes through continual transactions in 
the marketplace.’”  Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Measuring and Representing the Knowledge 
Economy:  Accounting for Economic Reality Under the Intangibles Paradigm, 54 BUFF. L. 
REV. 1, 33 (2006). 
 15. Although corporate law is commonly discussed in the context of jurisdictional 
competition among states trying to attract businesses, accounting is almost exclusively 
national in character.  One benefit of this is that accounting has avoided the race to the 
bottom or top debates that have divided corporate law scholarship.  For arguments 
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governmental, quasi-governmental, and non-governmental organizations 
which work to further the special interests of CPAs and also struggle 
amongst themselves for greater control, as is discussed in Part II of this 
article.  Accounting’s biggest flaw is found in the way the profession is 
organized.  To say that accounting has too many quasi-regulatory bodies 
does not require a commitment to deregulation, although that is one 
potential solution to accounting’s organizational disaster. 
The legal literature on accounting and accountants is extensive, 
although much of it fails to emphasize the distinctive nature of accounting--
its particular strengths and weaknesses, promise and limits--as compared to 
 
advancing or otherwise discussing the idea that corporate law moves to the lowest common 
denominator (the “race to the bottom” literature), see, e.g. Note, Little Delaware Makes a 
Bid for the Organization Trust, 33 AM. L. REV. 418, 418-19 (1899) (describing Delaware as 
a “little community of truck-farmers and clam-diggers . . . determined to get her little, tiny, 
sweet, round, baby hand into the grab-bag of sweet things before it is too late.”); Louis K. 
Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 558 (1933) (wherein Justice Brandeis coined the term); E. 
Merrick Dodd, Jr., Statutory Developments in Business Corporation Law, 1886-1936, 50 
HARV. L. REV. 27, 57 (1936) (“[T]he states are largely engaged in bidding against one 
another for the favor of the promoters of corporate enterprises and concern themselves only 
to a limited extent with the practical consequences to the investor . . . .”); John C. Coffee, 
Jr., The Future of Corporate Federalism:  State Competition and the New Trend Toward De 
Facto Federal Minimum Standards, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 759, 773 (1987) (suggesting that 
federal legislation might provide minimum standards for state takeover law); Melvin Aron 
Eisenberg, Bad Arguments in Corporate Law, 78 GEO. L.J. 1551, 1551 (1989-1990) (arguing 
that it would be “a fallacy to believe that just because markets are imperfect, mandatory 
rules would necessarily be better”); LYNN M. LOPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE:  HOW 
COMPETITION FOR BIG CASES IS CORRUPTING THE BANKRUPTCY COURTS 24 (2005) (arguing 
that competition among states and resultant forum shopping have negatively impacted 
bankruptcy law). Cf. Ralph K. Winter, Jr., Economic Regulation vs. Competition:  Ralph 
Nader and Creeping Capitalism, 82 YALE L.J. 890, 893 (1972) (arguing that “government 
by its very nature reacts to political pressure, rather than impartial standards, and one should 
anticipate that executive or independent agencies will respond most favorably to those with 
the greatest ability and incentive to organize and press their claims”); Ralph K. Winter, Jr., 
State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 
251, 290 (1977) (concluding that “[a]n expanded federal role in corporate governance would 
almost surely be counterproductive”); Daniel R. Fischel, The "Race to the Bottom" 
Revisited:  Reflections on Recent Developments in Delaware's Corporation Law, 76 NW. U. 
L. REV. 913, 919 (1982) (arguing that the “race to the bottom” thesis is based on a flawed 
theory of the firm); Roberta Romano, Law as a Product:  Some Pieces of the Incorporation 
Puzzle, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 225, 279 (Autumn, 1985) (showing that “Delaware’s success 
cannot be attributed to the tailoring of its code to the tastes of large corporations”); Roberta 
Romano, The State Competition Debate in Corporate Law, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 709, 752 
(1987) (advocating “a view [that] recognizes that shareholders benefit from state 
competition, while granting that, on occasion, competition may well produce laws that 
shareholders in some firms would not choose to adopt voluntarily”); Roberta Romano, THE 
GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 1 (1993) (arguing that “[t]he genius of American 
corporate law is in its federalist organization”); E. Norman Veasey, The Defining Tension in 
Corporate Governance in America, 52 BUS. LAW. 393, 393 (1997) (celebrating the virtues of 
“state-oriented federalism and . . . flexible self-governance” in American corporate law). 
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other “gatekeeping” professions.  The regulation of the profession 
introduces a complicated and very political history, and the promulgation 
of substantive standards can be equally political.  Philosophical pragmatism 
and its influence on Progressivism was important both in providing 
political arguments to bolster increased roles for CPAs and in providing the 
epistemological foundation for accounting’s earliest theorists.  Thus 
pragmatism plays a role in the form and substance of accounting through 
the 1960s. 
Newly created oversight bodies have merely duplicated existing (and 
failing) governance.  Accounting’s organization could be improved 
significantly by either centralizing or decentralizing oversight--that is, by 
relying on either a top-down or bottom-up governance.  But for now I only 
identify the regulatory problem, leaving its resolution to subsequent work. 
Substantively, accounting is inescapably underdeterminate:  its 
standards sometimes, but not always, lead to clear results.  Accounting is 
necessarily subjective and non-scientific, and the rhetoric of “accounting as 
art” has long played an important role in the profession’s self image and its 
marketing to the public.  Building on this tradition and accounting’s 
pragmatist roots, along with legal literature on accounting, this article 
concludes that substantive reforms should incorporate elements of 
judgment and subjectivity by requiring increased disclosure, but not 
prescribing specific accounting treatments. 
The motivation of this article is twofold:  (1) to bring to light the 
disorderly and ineffective system of governance under which the U.S. 
accounting profession has developed and exists today; and (2) 
notwithstanding extensive criticism of the structure of accounting as a 
profession, to largely defend its evolution of substantive standards, even in 
light of popular allegations that accounting played a significant role in 
recent economic turmoil by the adoption of fair value asset valuation.  In 
the course of defending accounting’s substantive posture, however, I also 
endeavor to disabuse common misconceptions about the nature, utility, and 
promise of accounting more generally, both within and outside the 
profession.  This article questions the wisdom of retreating from fair value 
accounting, proposing instead only increased disclosure of the way assets 
and liabilities are valued, including securities and other items, both 
physical and intangible.  Acknowledging accounting’s limits and re-
emphasizing its strengths as compared to other financial “gatekeeping” 
professions would improve accounting’s image and reputation, and also 
improve the quality and utility of financial reporting. 
This article also makes extensive reference to the December 2008 
Report and Recommendations Pursuant to Section 133 of the Emergency 
Economic Stabilization Act of 2008:  Study on Mark-To-Market Accounting 
issued by the Office of the Chief Accountant, Division of Corporation 
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Finance, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.16  As its clumsy title 
suggests, the report was written under congressional demand as part of the 
earliest government intervention of the economic downturn in 2008.17  The 
SEC Report is of landmark importance in both its scope and foundation for 
analyzing the effects of fair value accounting.   
Part III of this article questions whether it is possible for accounting to 
provide the type of accuracy many seem to hope or believe that it can.  The 
notion of objective presentation is certainly consistent with the bean 
counter caricature, the picture of accountants doing repetitive work 
requiring little or no exercise of judgment.  Yet accounting can also be 
described as a fundamentally inchoate effort.18  Even if one were to believe 
that financial data is wholly objective or factual, one must concede that 
accounting is necessarily imperfect in its depiction of those underlying 
facts.19  One goal of accounting is to provide timely information, and that 
necessarily involves quality trade-offs.20  The recognition of inherent 
imperfection between rules and outcomes (or indeterminacy, as in the 
context of law)21 has been largely unacknowledged in the contemporary 
academic literature and policy debates about financial accounting, while it 
should instead be the lodestar of all discussions about the state and 
direction of accounting.  Accounting is necessarily imperfect.  This was 
once well understood and used to underscore the need for accountants’ 
experience and judgment, and to justify their regulatory role. 
Fair value accounting is likewise imperfect, but it is not evil.  The 
 
 16. 2008 SEC Report, supra note 11, at 9. 
 17. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, § 133(a), 112 
Stat. 3765 (enacted October 3, 2008). 
 18. See infra Part III.A. 
 19. “To such accounting choices involving professional judgement [sic] there can never 
be a precisely ‘correct’ solution.”  MYDDELTON, supra note 7, at 47. 
 20. To perfectly report the cost of a contingency, for instance, could take years of 
waiting for the outcome of prolonged litigation.  “Even though no loss has yet occurred and 
so no monetary transaction cognizable under GAAP has transpired, GAAP’s principle of 
conservatism requires that such uncertainties be disclosed in the financial statement . . . . 
The line item for loss contingencies does not usually state a monetary amount, but instead 
makes a cross-reference to the footnotes to the financial statements that contain a narrative 
discussion of the nature of the loss contingencies . . . .”  LAWRENCE A. CUNNINGHAM, 
INTRODUCTORY ACCOUNTING AND FINANCE FOR LAWYERS 117 (3d ed. 2002). 
 21. The indeterminacy debate in law refers to whether competing outcomes resolving a 
case can be derived from the same body of doctrine--whether law dictates particular 
outcomes.  For a discussion of indeterminacy in a variety of forms, from strong to weak, see 
Lawrence B. Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis:  Critiquing Critical Dogma, 54 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 462 (1987).  Similar to Solum’s conclusions about indeterminacy in law, easy cases in 
accounting refute the absolute indeterminacy of accounting, yet difficult cases confirm the 
validity of various weaker formulations of indeterminacy.  This issue is discussed in greater 
detail infra Part III.B.i. 
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history of fair value is extensive,22 and it is also a story of responding to fair 
value’s alternatives and their problems, both theoretical dilemmas and 
implementation obstacles.23  Fair value accounting likely has contributed to 
some to the world’s current economic woes (although the actual amount is 
widely disputed),24 but there exists no clearly better alternative waiting in 
the wings.  Fair value also highlights a fundamental schism between “past-
oriented, stewardship function” academic accountants and regulators, 
versus practitioners “continuing to recognize the value-in-use and 
scorekeeping role of accounting.”25  That depiction of the schism makes 
accounting seem on the verge of regaining its usefulness in spite of 
opposition from the elites.  But others would frame the same debate as a 
conflict over “[o]rthodox versus revolutionary accounting.”26  Transparency 
through disclosure, however, is desirable whether accountants are orthodox 
stewards or current value revolutionaries. 
II. FORM 
Accounting and accountants are often considered gatekeepers of the 
financial world.27  “Market participants need to rely with confidence on 
 
 22. Arewa, supra note 14, at 67.  The industrial revolution brought issues of accounting 
to the fore.  GARY JOHN PREVITS & BARBARA DUBIS MERINO, A HISTORY OF ACCOUNTANCY 
IN THE UNITED STATES:  THE CULTURAL SIGNIFICANCE OF ACCOUNTING 97-98 (1998).  The 
Gilded Age revived these debates and, years later, the debate became most heated following 
World War II.  Id. at 103-74, 305-10. 
 23. As to alternatives to fair value accounting, while other measurement bases certainly 
exist, each alternative also exhibits strengths and weaknesses, as well as implementation 
issues.  Considering evidence regarding the usefulness of fair value information to investors, 
the suspension of fair value accounting to return to historical cost-based measures would 
likely increase investor uncertainty.  However, given the significant challenges encountered 
in practice related to implementing existing standards, additional actions to improve the 
application and understanding of fair value requirements are advisable. Such additional 
measures to improve the application should include addressing the need for additional 
guidance for determining fair value in inactive markets (including examining the impact of 
illiquidity), assessing whether the incorporation of credit risk in fair value measurement of 
liabilities provides useful information to investors, and enhancing existing presentation and 
disclosure requirements.  2008 SEC Report, supra note 11, at 6. 
 24. Id. at 182 n.291 (discussing the lack of “large-scale empirical evidence on the 
potential pro-cyclical effect of fair value accounting”). 
 25. PREVITS & MERINO, supra note 22, at 420. 
 26. MYDDELTON, supra note 7, at 160.  See also D. R. Myddelton, Orthodox versus 
Revolutionary Accounting, 3 J. APPL. ACCT. RES. 17, 17 (1996) (explaining the differences 
between orthodox and revolutionary accounting). 
 27. “Accountants serve a gate-keeping function.”  Jonathan Macey & Hillary A. Sale, 
Observations on the Role of Commodification, Independence and Governance in the 
Accounting Industry, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1167, 1167 (2003); see also JOHN C. COFFEE, 
GATEKEEPERS:  THE ROLE OF THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 108 (2006) 
(noting in Chapter 5 the rise, fall, and redefinition of the auditor from bookkeeper to 
professional to information consultant). 
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accountants so that they can have confidence that public company financial 
statements accurately reflect the financial condition of the companies that 
issue them.  Unfortunately, along with other gatekeepers, the accounting 
industry failed investors during the 1990s.”28  Surely accountants have 
influence over the presentation of financial data, but how are the rules or 
norms of presentation determined and established?  Are they authoritative?  
Are they flexible enough?  Are they correct? 
Accounting’s relationship to other financial institutions and 
professions is critical to understanding the effects and importance of its 
internal structure.  Of late, accounting has been portrayed as adversely 
affecting the rest of the financial world because of accounting’s control 
over the content of financial reporting and the supposed repercussions of 
changes in financial statement representations, an effect called 
“procyclicality.”29  The actual extent of procyclicality from fair value 
accounting has been disputed by detailed study,30 but I do not here dismiss 
its potential effects. 
Beyond procyclicality, accounting’s regulatory framework has long 
been criticized for its ineffectiveness and complexity.31  Too many 
organizations with overlapping jurisdictions, missions, and authority have 
their hands in accounting, yet avoid taking any responsibility for 
accounting’s problems.  This environment makes the profession especially 
prone to egregious rent-seeking32 and further entrenchment of the interests 
of those with the most power already.33 
 
 28. Macey & Sale, supra note 27, at 1167. 
 29. The SEC “refers to the term ‘pro-cyclicality’ generally to mean the amplification of 
otherwise normal cyclical business fluctuations.”  2008 SEC Report, supra note 11, at 182. 
 30. “The Staff observes that fair value accounting did not appear to play a meaningful 
role in bank failures occurring during 2008.”  2008 SEC Report, supra note 11, at 4.  Rather, 
bank failures in the U.S. appeared to be the result of growing probable credit losses, 
concerns about asset quality, and, in certain cases, eroding lender and investor confidence.  
Id.  For the failed banks that did recognize sizable fair value losses, it does not appear that 
the reporting of these losses was the reason the bank failed.  Id. 
 31. As Justice Kennedy has observed, “[t]here are 19 different GAAP sources, any 
number of which might present conflicting treatments of a particular accounting question.”  
Shalala v. Guernsey, 514 U.S. 87, 101 (1995). 
 32. “Some costs [of Sarbanes-Oxley] undoubtedly are deadweight social losses 
associated with the highly inefficient statute.  Another significant portion of the costs, 
however, reflects wealth transfers from widely dispersed, politically weak shareholders to 
well-organized, highly concentrated interest groups—like the biggest auditing firms.”  
JONATHAN R. MACEY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:  PROMISES KEPT, PROMISES BROKEN 163-
64 (2008). 
 33. Macey & Sale, supra note 27, at 1176-77 (arguing that the overwhelming 
concentration of attestation work for SEC-registrants with only four accounting firms is a 
significant contributor to the commodification and devaluation of audits). 
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A. Procyclycality and Accounting’s Relation to Financial Markets 
Part of the magnitude of the current financial crisis may well be a 
result of “procyclicality,”34 which refers to financial policies that magnify 
the impact of fluctuations or problems.35  Although procyclicality may be 
part of the scale of what is going on now, initially in financial markets and 
later repercussing throughout the economy, procyclicality does not explain 
the underlying problem--valuation--at all.36  Fair value accounting was 
previously championed to fight against the overvaluation of large assets on 
the books under historical cost valuation.  Of course, now we are seeing the 
dark side of fair value in the devastating downward adjustments affecting 
some firms.37 
Even by late 2007, securitized loans started becoming “toxic assets”38 
nobody was willing to touch--in part because there was an expectation of 
the federal government stepping in, as has since happened.39  Investors were 
reluctant to trade without knowing what the government was going to do 
and, because everybody was unwilling to buy, the markets for those assets 
in effect shut down, at least temporarily, although we have yet to see 
securitized mortgage markets bounce back substantially since the federal 
government began intervening (through so-called “bailouts”) in September 
2008.40  In the meantime, procyclicality almost certainly did contribute to, 
 
 34. All’s Fair:  The Crisis and Fair-value Accounting, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 20, 2008, 
at 92-93. 
 35. 2008 SEC Report, supra note 11, at 182. 
 36. All’s Fair, supra note 34. 
 37. See infra note 50 and accompanying text. 
 38. See Carrick Mollenkamp, Did UBS Dump Toxic Assets?, WALL ST. J., Feb. 27, 
2008, at C2, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120402238986793439.html 
(“Together with Merrill and Citigroup Inc., UBS was one of the biggest players in the 
business of repackaging mortgage bonds into pools known as collateralized debt obligations, 
or CDOs, and has been among the hardest hit by losses on mortgage investments--more than 
$18 billion in 2007.”). 
 39. See Sarah Turner, Bank Woes Sink European Shares, WALL ST. J., Sept. 29, 2008, 
available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122267412972085241.html (“Investors have 
been waiting anxiously for details of a $700 billion U.S. plan to stabilize the financial 
markets by taking toxic assets off bank balance sheets.”). 
 40. See Posting of Jenny Anderson, Michael J. de la Merced & Eric Dash to The N.Y. 
Times Dealbook blog, http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/09/16/federal-reserve-may-
act-alone-in-rescuing-aig/ (Sep. 16, 2008, 17:24 EST) (discussing the first bailout that 
occurred in September 2008 when the federal government made a loan to save insurance 
giant AIG).  Since that time, the amount and scope of federal intervention has continued to 
grow.  Even AIG has continued to receive additional money.  See, e.g., Brady Dennis, AIG 
Said To Receive Access to More Cash:  Insurer Expected to Report Record Loss, WASH. 
POST., Mar. 2, 2009, page A01, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/03/01/AR2009030101218_pf.html (“American International Group 
will gain access to $30 billion more in taxpayer money as part of another restructuring of its 
federal bailout, sources involved in the negotiations said [on March 1, 2009].”). 
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and might even have caused, the drying up of credit markets, making asset-
trading increasingly difficult as loans were called after taking accounting 
write-downs.  Even if procyclicality has had a minimal impact in current 
conditions,41 it is quite conceivable that it could have greater impact in the 
future, thus it merits discussion here.  Critics say fair value accounting 
inevitably leads to increased procyclical effects, introducing too much 
“noise” into financial data.42 
If the trading price of an asset is zero, many have interpreted FAS 157 
to mean that they must also adjust their books to zero for such assets.43  But 
are such assets truly worthless?  Of course not--and today’s financial 
conditions actually make them potentially attractive investments44 even 
though liquidity problems have made such investment exceedingly 
difficult.  No doubt these assets were overvalued in the past, but even risky 
assets like mortgage-backed securities still have some underlying value, 
often called fundamental or intrinsic value.45  After all, they still represent 
credible claims against debtors, even if some debtors are considerably 
riskier than others.46  Taking write-downs to the book value of such assets 
 
 41. See 2008 SEC Report, supra note 11, at 43-138 (discussing the impact of fair value 
accounting on financial institutions, and especially on failed banks, and concluding that the 
impact was minimal). 
 42. See id. at 141, (quoting comment letter from retired securities analyst Jeffrey B. 
Cross:  “Mark to market, while conceived with the best intentions in mind, causes both too 
much noise in the system and produces a degree of balance sheet variation wholly 
inconsistent with orderly markets, as must now be all too obvious.”). 
 43. See Sorkin, supra note 2 (“Sometimes, there is no market--not for toxic investments 
like collateralized debt obligations, or C.D.O.’s [sic], filled with subprime mortgages.  No 
one will touch this stuff.  And if there is no market, FAS 157 says, a bank must mark the 
investment’s value down, possibly all the way to zero.”).  This is not, however, the only 
interpretation of fair value’s requirements, nor is it that of the SEC, as will be discussed in 
greater detail in infra Part III.C.ii; see also 2008 SEC Report, supra note 11, at 172 (“SFAS 
No. 157 assigns the highest priority within the fair value hierarchy to quoted prices in active 
markets for identical assets or liabilities (i.e., Level 1), with multiple permissible valuation 
techniques (consistent with a market approach, income approach, or cost approach).”). 
 44. See David P. Goldman, Fixing the Bank Crisis is the Easy Part, ASIA TIMES, Jan. 
24, 2009, available at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Global_Economy/KA24Dj02.html 
(“Forced selling by hedge funds has cheapened the price of subprime mortgage bonds, for 
example, to the point that they are highly attractive.  AAA-rated bonds backed by subprime 
mortgages issued in 2007, for example, start to lose principal only after losses reach 35%.  
Losses almost certainly will exceed that number--but will they exceed 50%, or 60%?  That 
is extremely unlikely.”). 
 45. The SEC refers to this as “current value-in-use (e.g., based on discounted expected 
future cash flows).”  See 2008 SEC Report, supra note 11, at 177 (noting that fundamental 
or intrinsic value is often referred to as “current value-in-use”). 
 46. Often misunderstood or ignored, however, is the fact that “subprime” loans are 
made bi-modally, both to applicants that cannot qualify for other loans, but also (particularly 
the largest of the subprime loans) to those who are willing to pay more simply in order to 
not disclose the source or amount of their incomes to lenders.  The latter category includes 
those who might have plenty of income that may not be regular or readily documentable by 
GREENFINAL[1] 6/1/2010  10:37:19 AM 
2010] ACCOUNTING’S NADIR 611 
 
made some firms, e.g., Lehman, unable to get or maintain the credit they 
needed to operate in the short term.  The assets said to be responsible for 
the “meltdown” simply are not worthless today, and were not worthless in 
the past.  They merely are not worth as much as people were once saying 
they were. 
Who was overvaluing these assets?  They were traded primarily by 
sophisticated institutional investors.  The biggest culprits, however, may be 
the ratings agencies that had implausibly given AA and AAA ratings to 
these inherently risky securitized mortgages.47  Jonathan Macey has warned 
of the crucial, though too often neglected, importance of such financial 
intermediaries in other corporate governance contexts.48  We have now but 
one more devastating example of intermediaries’ failures due to their 
conflict of interests--as is being observed, and blamed on the U.S., by 
commentators around the world.49 
The weaknesses of fair value accounting, however, were not unknown 
as accounting slowly transitioned to more of a fair value paradigm.  Fair 
value’s rise came about because, in different circumstances, it has the 
 
sources like a pay stub. 
 47. Even in 2007 ratings agencies were coming under attack for having given AAA 
ratings to bonds of subprime mortgage bundles.  See Vikas Bajaj, Rate Agencies Move 
Toward Downgrading Some Mortgage Bonds, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2007, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/11/business/11lend.html (accurately predicting the 
coming forced selling of bonds:  “Standard & Poor’s, the credit rating firm, said that it 
would tighten the standards it used to rate bonds backed by subprime mortgages, a tacit 
acknowledgment that it might have been too optimistic about the housing market . . . . So 
far, virtually no AAA-rated mortgage bonds have been downgraded.  These bonds, which 
make up about 80 percent of all mortgage securities, are typically protected by several 
layers of lower-rated bonds like the AAs and BBBs that were acted upon by S.& P. [sic] . . . 
Still, analysts note that the expectations for losses have been steadily rising and if S.& P.’s 
[sic] worst case is realized most of the bonds below AA rating will be wiped out.  A 
downgrading of AAA bonds could be significant because it would force large pension funds 
like Calpers to sell bonds.”). 
 48. See Jonathan R. Macey, A Pox on Both Your Houses:  Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley and 
the Debate Concerning the Relative Efficacy of Mandatory Versus Enabling Rules, 81 
WASH. U. L.Q. 329, 332 (2003) (“[I]t is not enough that companies make disclosures of 
financial information.  In addition, it is vital that there be set of financial intermediaries, 
who are at least as competent and sophisticated at receiving, processing, and interpreting 
financial information (and other information about company performance) as the companies 
are at delivering it.”). 
 49. See, e.g., Ashima Goyal, Reducing Procyclicality, ECON. TIMES (INDIA TIMES), Jan. 
19, 2009, 
http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/Comments__Analysis/Reducing_procyclicality/article
show/3998661.cms (citing a recent report from India, declaring:  “[t]he features that 
distorted incentives and encouraged excessive risk-taking are now well understood.  Among 
these were procyclical bonuses, securitisation, uniform mark-to-market accounting rules, 
conflicts of interest for rating agencies, and reliance on risk models based on market prices, 
so that systemic risk and diversity of views were neglected.  Regulation was weakened both 
in law and in practice.”) (emphasis added). 
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potential to counteract the problems of alternative accounting methods--
problems that have had very real effects in recent history.50 
B. Accounting’s Regulatory Web 
In media reports about financial accounting, small details are often 
omitted, neglected, or presented misleadingly, even if inadvertently.  
Accounting regulation is perhaps the murkiest of regulatory backwater, 
existing and evolving amidst a hodge-podge of governmental, quasi-
governmental, and private agencies.  Numerous bodies with some common 
and some opposing interests vie for increased control and influence, even 
while denying that they have or desire singular power over the profession, 
or any concomitant responsibility for its actual or perceived failures, such 
as fair value.  Accounting students are taught this very plainly: 
COMPETING STANDARD SETTING BODIES 
As a prominent accountant noted, “the FASB is literally unique:  
it is a private sector institution performing a public function that 
is defined in the federal statutes.”  It is not surprising therefore 
that the right of the FASB to establish accounting standards 
continues to be challenged. Some of the major challenges come 
not only from outside the profession, but from within as well.51 
In a 2008 op-ed in the Wall Street Journal, John Berlau of the 
Competitive Enterprise Institute talked about “Financial Accounting 
Standard 157, which U.S. regulatory agencies put into effect last November 
. . . .”52  Although the SEC did make FAS 157 mandatory for public 
companies as of November 2007, one would be quite mistaken to take this 
 
 50. Mark to market valuation can be used to fight valuations based on inflated 
appraisals but also, as we see now, can lead to devaluing assets below their actual value, 
adding to uncertainty in markets.  See Bill Donius, Mark to Market Accounting--Time Out?, 
HUFFINGTON POST, Feb. 2, 2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/bill-donius/mark-to-
market-accounting_b_163371.html (“Mark to Market accounting was ushered in in the 
1980's as a solution to the failings of the Savings and Loan Crisis.  A few of these big S+L's 
kept the regulators at bay by carrying big assets (think the Pheonician Hotel) on their books 
for substantially more than their actual market value, due to inflated appraisals.  We find 
ourselves with the inverse problem today.  Banks are having to mark down assets in an 
uncertain market and thereby being forced to mark them to where the market is today, in a 
crisis climate.  This process becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy as it affects other assets in 
the class as the market spirals lower.  Few buyers know where to enter a downward 
spiraling market.”) (emphasis added).  This account does not, however, appreciate the many 
decades of debate over valuation but remains generally accurate.  See generally PREVITS & 
MERINO, supra note 22, at 1-426 (discussing the history of accountancy in the United 
States). 
 51. KIESO ET AL., supra note 9, at 17 (emphasis added). 
 52. John Berlau, Maybe the Banks Are Just Counting Wrong, WALL ST. J., Sept. 20, 
2008, at A15, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122186515562158671.html. 
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to mean that the SEC or any other government agency actually created 
FAS 157, much less that it did so in 2007.53  FAS documents are not 
regulatory--not exactly, anyway--and FAS 157 was promulgated not by the 
SEC in 2007, but by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (“FASB”) 
in September 2006 (after an extended approval process),54 to take effect 
“for financial statements issued for fiscal years beginning after November 
15, 2007,”55 thus for calendar year reporters, as of January 2008.  
Moreover, FAS 157 did NOT make fair value accounting mandatory; it 
merely clarified its applicability and use under limited circumstances.56  
Rolling back FAS 157 does not repeal fair value accounting, but merely 
makes its contours more confusing and ambiguous.57 
FASB issues all Statements of Financial Accounting Standards 
(“SFAS” or “FAS”), but FASB is a private association with no inherent 
legal authority of any kind.58  Accounting, as a profession, does not have an 
 
 53. Berlau does note that “over the past decade, various mark-to-market accounting 
rules became part of the official U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), 
and began to be required by the Securities and Exchange Commission, bank regulatory 
agencies, credit rating agencies and in the Basel II international framework for measuring 
bank solvency.”  Id.  But even this cursory acknowledgment ignores the much longer history 
of the debate over valuation, as discussed in infra Part III.C.i. 
 54. See 2008 SEC Report, supra note 11, at 157-68, for a detailed description of 
FASB’s process of developing and issuing standards. 
 55. FIN. ACCT. SERIES, FASB, STATEMENT OF FIN. ACCT. STANDARDS NO. 157, FAIR 
VALUE MEASUREMENTS, Summary (2006), available at http://www.fasb.org/pdf/fas157.pdf. 
 56. See 2008 SEC Report, supra note 11, at 169 (“Overall, suspending SFAS No. 157 
would not eliminate fair value accounting.  Instead, it would return practice to a state in 
which fair value accounting exists, but without a consistent framework for determining 
those measurements.”). 
 57. See id. (“[T]he suspension or elimination of SFAS No. 157 would merely remove 
the application guidance on the measurement of fair value.”); see also id. at 200-201 
(“SFAS No. 157 establishes a common definition of the term fair value for financial 
reporting and provides for expanded disclosures in cases where preexisting standards 
require (or in some cases permit) the use of fair value.  Accordingly, a suspension of SFAS 
No. 157 would remove the standardized measurement and disclosure requirements without 
removing the requirement (or choice) to account for assets or liabilities at fair value.  As a 
result, the suspension of SFAS No. 157 would not reduce the use of fair value as a 
measurement attribute in financial accounting.  Without SFAS No. 157, issuers would return 
to practices that existed prior to the issuance of the standard.  These practices were based on 
varying definitions of fair value throughout U.S. GAAP and relied upon the limited or 
conflicting guidance available for applying those definitions.  Further, suspending SFAS No. 
157 would reduce the comparability and consistency of fair value measurements currently 
being performed and therefore hinder investors’ ability to obtain decision-useful information 
on a consistent basis from financial statements.”) (emphases added). 
 58. See id. at 163 (“The final product of most technical projects [of the FASB] is a 
SFAS.  The SFAS sets forth the final standards, the effective date and method of transition, 
background information, a brief summary of research done on the project, and the basis for 
the FASB’s conclusions, including the reasons for rejecting significant alternative solutions.  
It also identifies members of the FASB voting for and against its issuance and includes 
reasons for any dissents.”). 
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actual “self-regulating organization” (“SRO”).59  Even in 1999, then-SEC 
Chair Arthur Levitt asked:  “Has the accounting profession become so big 
and complex that we need a full-time SRO? . . . Is the alphabet soup of 
regulatory bodies--the POB, the AICPA PEEC, SECPS, ASB and the ISB--
really workable?”60  And that soup has only gotten thicker in the last ten 
years. 
The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (“AICPA”) is 
interesting in itself, and it is far from obvious that anyone actually expects 
the AICPA to self-regulate the profession, or even believes that it could do 
so effectively.  Again from 1999: 
One of the most important and contentious issues is whether the 
accounting profession needs a new self-regulatory organization 
(SRO), and if it does, whether the AICPA is qualified to fill that 
role.  Asked by a panel member whether the AICPA could 
provide the sort of intermediary services typically rendered by an 
SRO, Levitt replied, “I am skeptical.”  He said it was unrealistic 
to expect the AICPA to focus on an issue that did not concern the 
bulk of its membership, which is composed largely of firms that 
don’t audit public companies.61 
The AICPA in some sense self-regulates the profession of public 
accounting, as even CPAs who are not AICPA members are frequently 
bound to follow AICPA rules,62 even if they work for “non-CPA firms,”63 
 
 59. The New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”) is an example of a self-regulating 
organization in the financial sector, but self-regulation does not mean absolute control.  See 
Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341, 361 (1963) (holding that the NYSE was 
not exempt from antitrust law nor free to deny notice and hearing to those it invoked rules 
against, even if they were non-members). 
 60. Robert Tie, Special Report:  Concerns Over Auditing Quality Complicate the 
Future of Accounting, J. ACCT., Dec. 1999, available at 
http://www.journalofaccountancy.com/Issues/1999/Dec/news_srl. 
 61. Id. (emphasis added). 
 62. See, e.g., TENN. COMP. R. & REGS. 0020-3-.02 (2009) (“A licensee shall comply 
with the AICPA Code of Professional Conduct when these rules are silent on any matter.”).  
Further, “[a] licensee in the performance of professional services, including those who are 
not members of the AICPA, shall conform to the independence standards established by the 
AICPA, and where applicable, the United States Securities and Exchange Commission, the 
General Accounting Office and other regulatory or professional standards setting bodies.”  
Id. at § 0020-3-.03. 
 63. AICPA, Code of Prof’l Conduct And Bylaws ET § 591 (2008), 
http://www.aicpa.org/download/about/Code_of_ConductBylaws.pdf [hereinafter AICPA 
Code and Bylaws].  The AICPA Code and Bylaws note: 
3.  Employment by Non-CPA Firm 
.005  Question--A member is considering employment with a public accounting 
firm made up of one or more non-CPA practitioners.  If he is employed by such 
a firm, what are his responsibilities under the Rules of Conduct? 
.006  Answer--A member so employed must comply with all the Rules of 
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or outside of public accounting.64  Even breaches of AICPA rules by non-
CPAs associated with them may create liability for members.65 
The AICPA, however, makes rules about the profession; they 
generally do not create substantive accounting standards in the same way 
(or at least not to the same degree) FASB does.  Yet CPAs are licensed not 
by the AICPA or FASB, but by individual states and are thus ostensibly 
subject primarily to state regulators, not to national associations or federal 
regulators.  But neither are the state licensing boards an absolute or 
ultimate authority, for they are themselves deeply intertwined with other 
interests and organizations.  If the state boards are licensing members of a 
national profession--but have little control over standards--then it is unclear 
why the duplicative structures of AICPA, the National Association of State 
Boards of Accountancy (NASBA), and independent state boards exist.  
Individual CPAs are not required to be AICPA members, and they cannot 
be members of NASBA, whose only members are institutional (the state 
boards).66  The only mandatory interaction between a CPA and a governing 
 
Conduct.  If he becomes a partner in such a firm, he will then in addition be 
held responsible for compliance with the Rules of Conduct by all persons 
associated with him. 
Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 64. See id. at Introduction:  Composition, Applicability, and Compliance (“The Code of 
Professional Conduct was adopted by the membership to provide guidance and rules to all 
members--those in public practice, in industry, in government, and in education--in the 
performance of their professional responsibilities.”). 
 65. See id. at § 591.263.  The AICPA Code and Bylaws note: 
141. Responsibility for Non-CPA Partner 
.281  Question--Is a member who has formed a partnership with a noncertified 
public accountant ethically responsible for all the acts of the partnership? 
.282  Answer--Yes.  If the noncertified partner should violate the Code, the 
member would be held accountable.”). 
Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 66. See National Association of State Boards of Accountancy, 2007 ANNUAL REPORT 
50 (2007), 
http://www.nasba.org/862571B900737CED/BC9B76A2F454CE808625739F005727AE/$fil
e/NASBA_Annual_Report_2007.pdf (“The National Association of State Boards of 
Accountancy, Inc. (the “Association”) is a voluntary membership association of the boards 
of accountancy (or their equivalent) in the fifty states of the United States, the District of 
Columbia, Guam, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, and the 
U.S. Virgin Islands.  The Association’s assets are limited to use or distribution in 
accordance with its Articles of Incorporation.  The Association’s Examination related 
activities include programs and services related primarily to the testing and licensing of 
Certified Public Accountants in compliance with the requirements of boards of accountancy.  
Examination related activities also include the programs and services of Professional 
Credential Services, Inc. (PCS).  PCS is a wholly-owned, for-profit subsidiary that offers 
testing, including examination development, licensing and certification services to various 
professions and occupations.  Communication programs provide information, facilitate 
discussion and determine appropriate actions related to issues that concern boards of 
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body is with the state board, but the state boards largely defer to the 
guidance of AICPA and NASBA.  Why should CPAs not thus be subject 
directly to NASBA and the AICPA (or just one), instead of to state boards? 
Even NASBA’s own interests in the licensing and practice of public 
accounting are complex and multi-faceted, going far beyond serving as a 
mere association for state regulators.  For example, NASBA also earns 
substantial revenue from a wholly-owned for-profit subsidiary that largely 
controls the Uniform CPA Examination, administered across all U.S. 
jurisdictions, as well as licensing exams for other professions.67  The 
AICPA, however, develops the content and questions for the CPA exam, 
even while NASBA serves as the “clearinghouse” for the exam.68 
 
accountancy.  Also included in these programs are the activities of the NASBA Center for 
the Public Trust (NCPT), a related nonprofit, public benefit corporation whose mission is to 
spotlight ethical business practices and to foster the public’s trust in American institutions 
and the professions that serve them.  Other programs consist primarily of activities related to 
assisting boards of accountancy and licensees in identifying quality continuing professional 
education providers that meet nationally accepted standards for development, presentation, 
measurement and reporting of educational programs.”). 
 67. See id. (stating that the association’s activities include testing and licensing of 
accountants and other professions). 
 68. See UNIF. CPA EXAM CANDIDATE BULL. 1 (2007), 
http://www.aicpa.org/download/members/div/career/mini/candidate_bulletin_200712.pdf.  
The Bulletin states: 
Examination Partners 
The 55 Jurisdictions:  The CPA license is issued at the jurisdiction level.  To 
become a CPA, you must be declared eligible for the examination, and 
subsequently licensed, by the board of accountancy in one of the 55 US 
jurisdictions.  The United States Constitution grants each state or territory the 
power to regulate the practice of the professions within that jurisdiction’s 
borders.  In most jurisdictions, these powers are carried out by a “board of 
accountancy.”  These boards of accountancy are made up of appointed 
individuals and staff (many of whom are CPAs) who are charged with the 
responsibility of carrying out the laws promulgated by the legislatures and 
providing an appropriate examination for licensure.  The board of accountancy 
is an administrative agency that handles the day-to-day operations relative to 
regulating the practice of accountancy including activities involved with entry 
into the profession.  In some cases, the board of accountancy contracts out 
certain examination-related tasks such as the review of applications and 
collection of examination fees. 
The National Association of State Boards of Accountancy (NASBA):  The 55 
United States and territorial boards of accountancy are the members of NASBA.  
NASBA exists to serve its members by providing numerous services that 
encourage common understanding and practices to promote uniformity across 
the country to facilitate interstate practice.  NASBA takes on the role of a 
central clearinghouse where all jurisdictions submit information on eligible 
candidates and from which all jurisdictions receive advisory scores and other 
examination data. 
The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA):  The AICPA 
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Who “governs” accounting is really quite ambiguous and, as a result, 
no organization is willing to take responsibility when things go awry.  The 
SEC and other regulators rarely issue their own rules about accounting.69  
Instead, they typically have occasional mandatory implementation of a 
specific FASB standard, as in the case of FAS 157.  The vast majority of 
these FAS statements, however, have not been explicitly adopted by the 
SEC, and FASB has no enforcement authority of its own.  FASB likewise 
assures the public it is not a regulator, and thus cannot be held accountable 
for oversight failures.70  The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board 
(PCAOB) further confuses matters, as it is a private organization, created 
by Congress, privately funded by publicly-collected funds, but it also has 
enforcement authority.71 
Accounting’s “governance” is more like a web of private and public 
institutions which influence accounting in different ways, at different times, 
and with different degrees of overlap.  All of them point at each other 
whenever anything goes wrong. 
i. What is Professional Accounting? 
CPAs, since their earliest organization as a profession, have struggled 
to distinguish themselves from bookkeepers and accountants not holding a 
license.  The AICPA offers the public this explanation of the difference: 
AREN’T CPAS AND ACCOUNTANTS THE SAME THING? 
 
is the largest national, professional organization for CPAs.  The AICPA 
provides members with the resources, information and leadership that will 
enable them to provide valuable services, in the highest professional manner, to 
benefit the public as well as employers and clients.  For the Uniform CPA 
Examination, the AICPA determines the content of the examination, prepares 
the examination questions, determines the method of scoring, prepares advisory 
scores and conducts statistical analyses of examination results. 
Prometric:  The global leader in technology-enabled testing and assessment 
services for information technology certification, academic admissions and 
professional licensure and certifications.  Prometric operates a network of 
computer-based test centers around the world.  Among its many clients are the 
professional licensure examinations for physicians, architects and pharmacists, 
as well as educational examinations such as the Graduate Record Examination 
(GRE). 
Id. (emphases added) (emphases omitted) (footnote omitted). 
 69. The SEC does, however, continue to restate its authority to do so.  See 2008 SEC 
Report, supra note 11, at 16 (“However, despite the Commission’s recognition of the 
FASB’s financial accounting and reporting standards as ‘generally accepted’ for purposes of 
the federal securities laws, the Commission retains the authority to require U.S. issuers to 
apply accounting other than that set by the FASB to ensure compliance with the securities 
laws and the protection of investors.”). 
 70. See the discussion of FASB in infra Part II.B.vii. 
 71. See infra Part II.B.viii. 
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All CPAs are accountants but all accountants are not CPAs.  In 
many states, anyone can call himself/herself an “accountant.”  In 
order to become a CPA, almost all states require that an 
individual meet educational, experience and ethical requirements 
and pass the Uniform CPA Examination.  Only then are 
individuals granted licenses to practice by state boards of 
accountancy.  Also, only CPAs can perform the mandatory audits 
of all publicly traded U.S. companies.72 
Some say that accountants have struggled for the “acknowledgement 
of the ‘arrival’ of accounting as an important profession, in the same league 
as law and medicine,” and the tension between CPAs and other accountants 
certainly does not lessen that struggle.73 
Accounting encompasses a vast range of professional roles.  From 
clerks and bookkeepers to controllers, CFOs, auditors  and consultants, 
professional accountants fill a large variety of financial positions.  
Accountants have a wide range of education qualifications (from high 
school diploma holders through PhDs) and hold a variety of possible 
licenses or certifications.74  Accounting and auditing credentials include not 
only the CPA, but CMA,75 CFE,76 and CIA,77 among many others.  There 
 
 72. Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Acct., Frequently Asked Questions, 
http://aicpa.org/MediaCenter/FAQs.htm#cpa_answer7 (last visited Jan. 29, 2010). 
 73. O’Connor, supra note 5, at 755. 
 74. Originally, even CPAs only needed to have a high school education, but this soon 
gave way to higher and more formal requirements.  PREVITS & MERINO, supra note 22, at 
198-99, 201.  The first PhD in accounting was granted by the University of Illinois in 1939.  
THOMAS A. KING, MORE THAN A NUMBERS GAME:  A BRIEF HISTORY OF ACCOUNTING 90 
(2006).  The Doctor of Business Administration (“DBA”) is a PhD-equivalent given by 
some business schools.  Id.  There is currently a large shortage of PhD and DBA qualified 
accountants, mostly affecting the academic market in business schools, with estimates that 
less than 50% of the demand for new accounting PhD holders is being met by the supply of 
graduates.  REPORT OF THE AAA/AAPLG AD HOC COMMITTEE TO ASSESS THE SUPPLY AND 
DEMAND FOR ACCOUNTING PH.D.S, 11, (Am. Acct. Assoc. and The Acct. Programs 
Leadership Group (2005)), http://aaahq.org/about/reports/FINAL_PhD_Report.pdf.  The 
Association to Advance Collegiate Schools of Business (“AACSB”), the primary 
accrediting body of business schools, places a limit on the percentage of faculty without 
doctorates, but there is no requirement that any portion of the accounting faculty be 
licensed, either as CPAs or that they hold any other non-academic accounting credential.  
PREVITS & MERINO, supra note 22, at 342.  Until the late 1960s, accounting faculty were 
allowed to have “a master’s degree with a CPA” in lieu of the terminal doctorate required by 
other business school faculty, although there were “no substantive changes” to accounting 
education, which had remained unchanged since the 1930s, that accompanied this move.  Id. 
 75. See Inst. of Mgmt. Acct., Certification Providing You a Pathway to Success, 
http://www.imanet.org/certification.asp (last visited Jan. 29, 2010) (defining CMA as a 
Certified Managerial Accountant, administered by the Institute of Management 
Accountants:  “The CMA designation represents a broad business competency and mastery 
of the management-level skills required to add value, drive business performance, and build 
quality financial practices within organizations.  The program objectively tests and validate 
[sic] expertise in areas essential to analyzing, managing and evaluating business solutions 
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are also potential additions to the CPA credential, such as CPA ABV,78 
CITP,79 CFF,80 all administered by the AICPA to those who are already 
CPAs and AICPA members.  Beyond these choices, there are also cognate 
 
that contribute to the success of an organization.”); see also PREVITS & MERINO, supra note 
22, at 412 (discussing the rise and potential threat to CPAs of the CMA credential, which 
reflects an increase in the stature and maturity of management accounting). 
 76. See Assoc. of Certified Fraud Exam’r, The CFA Credential, 
http://www.acfe.com/about/cfe-designation.asp (last visited Jan. 29, 2010) (“The Certified 
Fraud Examiner (CFE) credential denotes proven expertise in fraud prevention, detection 
and deterrence.  CFEs are trained to identify the warning signs and red flags that indicate 
evidence of fraud and fraud risk.  CFEs around the world help protect the global economy 
by uncovering fraud and implementing processes to prevent fraud from occurring in the first 
place.”). 
 77. See The Inst. of Internal Auditors, Certified Internal Auditor, 
http://www.theiia.org/certification/certified-internal-auditor/ (last visited Jan. 29, 2010) 
(“The Certified Internal Auditor® (CIA®) designation is the only globally accepted 
certification for internal auditors and remains the standard by which individuals demonstrate 
their competency and professionalism in the internal auditing field.  Candidates leave the 
program enriched with educational experience, information, and business tools that can be 
applied immediately in any organization or business environment.”); see also PREVITS & 
MERINO, supra note 22, at 413 (noting that, “[i]nternal auditors’ increasing stature reflects 
the demand for internal control aspects of corporate operations.”). 
 78. See Amer. Inst. of Certified Pub. Acct., Mission and Objectives of the ABV 
Program, 
http://fvs.aicpa.org/Memberships/Mission+and+Objectives+of+the+ABV+Credential+Progr
am.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2010) (“The ABV Credential program allows credential holders 
to brand or position themselves as CPAs who are premier business valuation service 
providers.  ABV Credential holders differentiate themselves by going beyond the core 
service of reaching a conclusion of value, by also creating value for clients through the 
strategic application of this analysis.”). 
 79. See Amer. Inst. of Certified Pub. Acct., Overview of The Certified Information 
Technology Professional Credential, 
http://infotech.aicpa.org/Memberships/Overview+of+The+Certified+Information+Technolo
gy+Professional+Credential.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2010) (“A Certified Information 
Technology Professional (CITP) is a Certified Public Accountant recognized for his or her 
unique ability to provide business insight by leveraging knowledge of information 
relationships and supporting technologies.  Unlike other certifications that recognize on a 
wide scope of skills, the CITP credential is an accounting professional that focuses on 
information assurance and management, making a CPA among the most trusted business 
advisor.”). 
 80. See Amer. Inst. of Certified Pub. Acct., Overview of Certified in Financial 
Forensics (CFF) Credential, http://aicpa.org/cff (last visited Jan. 29, 2010) (“The credential, 
Certified in Financial Forensics (CFF), combines specialized forensic accounting expertise 
with the core knowledge and skills that make CPAs among the most trusted business 
advisers.  The CFF encompasses fundamental and specialized forensic accounting skills that 
CPA practitioners apply in a variety of service areas, including:  bankruptcy and insolvency; 
computer forensics; economic damages; family law; fraud investigations; litigation support; 
stakeholder disputes and valuations.  To qualify, a CPA must be an AICPA member in good 
standing, have at least five years of experience in practicing accounting, and meet minimum 
requirements in relevant business experience and continuing professional education.”). 
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certifications such as CFA,81 ASA,82 and securities licenses.  Still, the CPA 
is generally considered the most rigorous and prestigious of accounting 
credentials.  Additionally, CPAs have certain grants of exclusive privilege, 
such as performing financial statement audits for SEC-registered 
corporations and, in most states, financial statement audits of any entity. 
It is important to keep in mind that “accountants” in the context of 
publicly-traded corporations regulated by the SEC are but a tiny part of 
professional accounting, though a segment of great importance.83  Even 
most CPAs are not part of this elite subclass of professional accountants.84  
While this article also focuses primarily on this very narrow part of 
professional accounting, keeping in mind the broader context may go far in 
explaining why accounting is so heterogeneous in its sources of 
organization and governance. 
The passage of the Securities Act of 1934 “conferred upon CPAs a 
legally defined social obligation:  to assist in creating and sustaining 
investor confidence in the public capital markets.  Accountants now had an 
acknowledged social obligation that justified their claim to professional 
status.”85  For more than seventy years, both the profession and the public it 
has pledged to serve have struggled to learn the limits and delimit the 
meaning of this change.  During this time, legislation (most notably 
Sarbanes-Oxley86) has occasionally redefined this relationship, and often 
been very critically received.87  The endurance of this social obligation 
 
 81. See CFA Institute, The CFA Program, at 3, 
https://www.cfainstitute.org/cfaprog/pdf/cfaprogram_brochure.pdf (last visited Mar. 14, 
2010) (“Anchored by a practice-based curriculum, the CFA Program is based on the 
knowledge identified by professionals as essential to the investment decision-making 
process.  This Candidate Body of Knowledge™ covers 10 general topic areas ranging from 
equity and fixed-income analysis to portfolio management to corporate finance.”).  The ten 
general topic areas are:  Ethical and Professional Standards, Quantitative Methods, 
Economics, Financial Reporting and Analysis, Corporate Finance, Equity Investments, 
Fixed Income, Derivatives, Alternative Investments, Portfolio Management, and Wealth 
Planning.  Id. 
 82. Accredited Senior Appraiser certification, administered by the American Society of 
Appraisers (also “ASA”), is especially attractive to those in financial fields for the credential 
in business valuation.  See Amer. Soc’y of Bus. Appraisers, Business Valuation, 
http://www.bvappraisers.org/ (last visited Jan. 29, 2010) (providing information on 
American Society of Appraisers). 
 83. See Tie, supra note 60 (noting that the AICPA’s membership “is composed largely 
of firms that don’t audit public companies.”). 
 84. Id. (discussing comments by former SEC-chair Arthur Levitt explaining that 
auditing public companies is “an issue that d[oes] not concern the bulk of [the AICPA’s] 
membership.”). 
 85. PREVITS & MERINO, supra note 22, at 274. 
 86. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 15 U.S.C. 7201 (2002) [hereinafter SOX] 
(mandating accounting and auditing rules in the wake of the Enron scandal). 
 87. See e.g., Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack 
Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1521 (2005) (expressing criticism of SOX’s 
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suggests public accounting still serves an important role, even if its present 
performance leaves much to be desired.88 
ii. Licensing:  Entry into the Profession of Public Accounting 
The Uniform CPA Examination is notorious for its difficulty.  Even 
the famously difficult bar exams of New York and California have majority 
pass rates.89  The CPA Exam, however, deliberately maintains very low 
pass rates, often no more than twenty to thirty percent.90  Also unlike bar 
admissions, most states have practice requirements for licensing.91 
NASBA and the AICPA have a deeply vested interest in keeping tight 
control, even if jointly, of the CPA exam and the revenue associated with 
it.  The process of merely registering for and taking the exam is rather 
complicated.  The would-be candidate must first choose a jurisdiction; they 
might or might not have to live in, work in, or have some other tie to that 
jurisdiction to be a candidate there.92  In some cases, states offer different 
credentials:  a “certificate” (for those wishing to have certification but not 
actually practice public accounting) or a license (to practice), with 
somewhat different requirements for each.93  Although most states retain 
 
effect on corporate governance). 
 88. See MACEY, supra note 32, at 155 (“Accounting is, in my view, not particularly 
important to investors, except to the extent that accounting information is useful in the 
formation of share prices and in the allocation of economic resources that share prices 
facilitate.”) (emphasis added). 
 89. See Press Release, N.Y. State Bd. of Law Exam’rs (Nov. 13, 2008), 
http://www.nybarexam.org/press/1108%20press%20release.pdf  (announcing New York’s 
July 2008 pass rate of ninety-one percent); Press Release, State Bar Announces Results for 
July 2008 Cal. Bar Examination (Nov. 21, 2008), available at 
http://www.calbar.ca.gov/state/calbar/calbar_generic.jsp?cid=10144&n=94705) (noting that 
in California, first-time takers of the bar exam in July 2008 had a seventy-five percent pass 
rate). 
 90. See AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCT., THE UNIFORM CPA EXAMINATION ALERT, 
WINTER/SPRING (2008), http://www.cpa-
exam.org/alerts/download/cpaalertwinterspring08.pdf (explaining that the Exam is no longer 
said to be “curved” since it is now administered by computer).  Results, however, are 
“psychometrically adjusted” to maintain the desired pass/failure rate.  Because the 
examination can be taken one to four sections at a time, i.e., within one quarter, it is difficult 
to compare pass rates.  Id.  Even for candidates taking just one section, though, there is a 
majority failure.  Id.  For candidates taking multiple sections in one quarter, single section 
pass rates range from 15.4-26.3% and complete failure averages more than forty percent.  
Id. 
 91. See Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Acct., CPA Certificate and Permit to Practice 
Requirements, http://www.aicpa.org/download/states/require_pract.pdf (providing a 
summary of these and other practice requirements by jurisdiction). 
 92. See Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Acct., supra note 91 (describing the process for 
registering for the CPA exam). 
 93. See id. (describing the different credentials available for interested accountants). 
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some sort of experience requirement, the nature, duration, and exemptions 
for experience vary substantially.94  The push to establish and extend 
minimum experience requirements began prior to World War I,95 although 
experience requirements are generally being relaxed somewhat today.96 
Every jurisdiction also maintains its own educational requirements to 
qualify as a candidate; most states now require 150 semester-hours of 
college credit,97 an amount that approaches (or even reaches in many 
programs) the minimum number of credit hours to earn a master’s degree.98  
Debate over the nature of modern accounting education, however, also 
dates back substantially: 
The “first” accountants, who reached maturity and position by 
1900, believed in the concept of broad, general, and liberal 
education.  The accounting educators of the next generation were 
influenced by John Dewey and his followers, who stressed 
practicality and relevance.  Unfortunately, “progressive” 
education became interpreted to mean a kind of vocationalism 
with little sympathy or use for so-called classical subjects.99 
Today’s debates and disagreements about educating future CPAs, 
including the push for professional (post-graduate) accounting schools,100 
merely echo longstanding disagreements. 
 
 94. See id. (noting the variance in experience requirements amongst the states). 
 95. See PREVITS & MERINO, supra note 22, at 201 (narrating the rise of experience 
requirements). 
 96. See Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Acct., supra note 91 (commenting that most states 
now require only one year of public accounting experience, although the specific 
requirements vary significantly). 
 97. See id. (describing the majority of states’ use of the 150 hour requirement). 
 98. Many accounting programs have, in response, fully integrated their undergraduate 
and graduate programs to ensure that students wishing to do so may complete both a 
bachelor’s and master’s degree in five years.  This increase in education requirements is 
commonly called the “150-hour rule” or the “fifth-year rule” and has received almost 
universal enactment.  Florida was the first state to adopt the 150-hour rule, effective August 
1, 1983, and saw a dramatic rise in the number of master’s degrees, and also in the funding 
for them, through both college- and employer-based initiatives.  John Cumming & Larry J., 
Rankin, 150 Hours:  A Look Back, J. ACCOUNTANCY (April 1999), available at 
http://www.journalofaccountancy.com/Issues/1999/Apr/cumming.htm.  Some have seen this 
as a favorable development:  “Students get a ‘value-added’ master’s degree--they and their 
firms will find this adds up to more over the years than just a mere accumulation of 30 
additional hours.”  Id.  Though, this rule has also come under increasing scrutiny.  
According to some, the supply of master’s degrees greatly exceeded demand from public 
accounting employers even before the widespread enactment of 150-hour rule requirements, 
with a supply of master’s degrees at 265% that of the demand by 1994.  Paul B. W. Miller, 
The Five-Year Program Debate Continues:  An Updated Analysis of the Supply of and 
Demand for Master's Degrees in Accounting, 18 ISSUES IN ACCT. EDUCATION 211 (2003). 
 99. PREVITS & MERINO, supra note 22, at 200-01. 
 100. See id. at 201 (describing the disagreements over the education requirements for 
future CPAs). 
GREENFINAL[1] 6/1/2010  10:37:19 AM 
2010] ACCOUNTING’S NADIR 623 
 
In part, criticism of the fifth year of education stems from the fact that 
the vast majority of these 150 hours can be in any subject from an 
accredited school, with most states only requiring twenty four to thirty 
hours of credit in accounting.101  Of course, some would laud a requirement 
for a “full course in general subjects, followed by post graduate work in 
accounting.”102  This remains the model at many elite private universities in 
the U.S., with the undergraduate accounting programs at the University of 
Pennsylvania’s Wharton School and New York University’s Stern School 
notable (but also historical) exceptions.  Wharton was, in 1883, the first to 
develop and offer “what would be a sustained accounting course series at 
the collegiate level,” only two years after the school opened.103  Along with 
Wharton, the University of Chicago, Dartmouth, and New York University 
“provided important first steps in collegiate education in accounting.”104  A 
century ago, “educating investment bankers was the preserve of the Ivy 
League, while accounting education was largely a Big Ten production,”105 
and this may continue to be true today.  State schools, as well as less elite 
private universities, produce the vast majority of CPAs, mostly graduates 
of their undergraduate--and, increasingly, integrated master’s--programs. 
This difficult path to gaining a public accounting license is 
intimidating and discourages many.  Perhaps, though, it is appropriate that 
candidates learn early on, before even getting their licenses, that they will 
have obligations to a variety of organizations, for the examination process 
only foreshadows the complex structure of accounting they will face as 
practitioners. 
iii. The Regulators:  Public and Private, Formal and Informal 
Although the fifty-five U.S. jurisdictions (including the fifty states, the 
District of Columbia, Guam, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana 
Islands, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands) all require an identical 
licensing exam for CPAs, they maintain individual licensing requirements 
in addition to the exam.106  State boards, which issue all public accounting 
licenses, also govern the other responsibilities affecting the entire career of 
a CPA, including Continuing Professional Education (“CPE”) 
requirements, CPA discipline, and firm licensing. 
The state boards, however, are heavily dependent upon two private 
 
 101. See Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Acct., supra note 91 (noting that the 150 hour 
requirement does not require those hours to be in accounting subjects). 
 102. PREVITS & MERINO, supra note 22, at 201. 
 103. Id. at 151. 
 104. Id. at 152. 
 105. KING, supra note 74, at 90. 
 106. See NASBA, supra note 66, at 50 (noting the divergent licensing requirements 
amongst the states). 
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organizations, NASBA and AICPA, for the administration of the 
credentialing process as well as development of professional standards for 
those already licensed.  State boards are concerned, almost exclusively, 
with the membership, i.e., licensing, of the profession, not substantive 
accounting positions.  As a result, the only required association of a CPA 
with a governing body is as licensee of the state, yet state boards have no 
appreciable impact or influence on the substantive debates in accounting.  
This contrasts starkly with law, where attorneys are admitted to the bar of 
particular courts, which are also the ultimate arbiters of state law.  
Accounting has no analogous structure to a state court system, thus state 
licensing becomes purely administrative in nature, wholly detached from 
the substantive aspects of the profession. 
On the surface, NASBA might seem like little more than something of 
a trade association for state regulatory bodies.  NASBA’s actual influence, 
though, is far greater.  In addition to serving as the “clearinghouse” for all 
exam-related activities,107 NASBA also has a wholly-owned for-profit 
subsidiary, Professional Credential Services (PCS),108 which “was 
established in 1998 . . . to further expand service opportunities developed 
through NASBA’s CPA Examination Services Division into non-
accounting disciplines.”109  Through PCS, NASBA provides services to 
professions including tattooing, body piercing, cosmetology, and 
auctioneering, and provides examination services in twelve states to ninety-
three different professions and occupations and several national 
associations.110 
More closely related to its mission, NASBA also has a substantial role 
in CPE.  NASBA does not directly offer many CPE courses, but it does 
accredit providers.  NASBA accreditation is not mandatory for CPE 
providers, but it does make any courses offered by an accredited provider 
automatically eligible for credit in every jurisdiction.  States also 
independently certify CPE providers or individual courses, particularly 
where the provider is not regularly serving large numbers of CPAs from 
multiple jurisdictions.  One small movement away from NASBA’s 
 
 107. See supra notes Error! Bookmark not defined.-96 and accompanying text 
(discussing the credentialing process for accountants). 
 108. See NASBA, supra note 66, at 50 (describing the Professional Credential Services). 
 109. Professional Credential Services, About Us, 
http://www.pcshq.com/pcsweb/pcspages.nsf/LKL/BEC8D13A22843E0B86256C76006AE6
1E?OpenDocument (last visited Jan. 28, 2010). 
 110. Id. (“PCS is headquartered in Nashville, Tennessee and currently provides clients 
exceptional performance in the delivery of services in the professions of engineering, land 
surveying, geology, landscape architecture, tattooing and body piercing, cosmetology, 
barbering, chiropractic, nursing home administration, funeral services, occupational therapy, 
professional planning, nursing, pharmacy, waste water management, veterinary medicine, 
psychology, auctioneering, fire protection, radiology, interior design and podiatry.”). 
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influence on CPE, however, has been the recent state-specific ethics 
requirements (2 of approximately 40 hours of CPE required annually), 
courses which are only certified by state boards, not NASBA. 
In addition to all of these other interests and activities, however, 
NASBA also purports to be something of a watchdog, through the 
“NASBA Center for the Public Trust (‘NCPT’), a related nonprofit, public 
benefit corporation whose mission is to spotlight ethical business practices 
and to foster the public’s trust in American institutions and the professions 
that serve them.”111  One must wonder, though, if a group so invested in the 
interests of the profession’s regulation can be an effective source of 
oversight. 
The AICPA is a voluntary association CPAs may, but are not required 
to, join.  However, all CPAs, whether AICPA members or not, are 
potentially subject to certain of the AICPA’s rules, most importantly, the 
Code of Professional Ethics.  Accounting firms, too, can be members of the 
AICPA, but firms may only use the phrase “members of the AICPA” if all 
CPA-owners of the firm are individual members of the AICPA. 
AICPA’s mission is to “provide members with the resources, 
information, and leadership that enable them to provide valuable services in 
the highest professional manner to benefit the public as well as employers 
and clients.”112  Considering the AICPA’s formal role in the development 
of the Uniform CPA Exam, the AICPA has a tremendous influence on 
entry into the profession.  The AICPA “determines the content of the 
examination, prepares the examination questions, determines the method of 
scoring, prepares advisory scores and conducts statistical analyses of 
examination results.”113  AICPA passes these “advisory scores” on to 
NASBA, which forwards them on to the state boards, which issue final 
score reports.114  The AICPA’s influence over entry into the profession of 
public accounting affects all CPA applicants, regardless of whether or not 
they are, or ever become, members of the AICPA. 
Notwithstanding its lack of formal regulatory authority or full 
membership by the body of practitioners, the AICPA remains the primary 
standard-setting body for rules governing the profession through the almost 
universal adoption of the AICPA Code of Professional Conduct by the 
licensing jurisdictions.  The widespread adoption of AICPA’s code has 
given the body an imprimatur of authority that it had long-struggled to 
 
 111. 2007 NASBA ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 66, at 50. 
 112. The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Mission Statement, 
http://aicpa.org/About+the+AICPA/AICPA+Mission/. 
 113. THE UNIFORM CPA EXAM CANDIDATE BULLETIN, supra note 68, at 1. 
 114. “When advisory scores become available, the AICPA forwards them to NASBA for 
processing, which involves matching the scores to individual candidates. NASBA then 
forwards the scores to boards of accountancy for approval and subsequent release to 
candidates.”  Id. at 18. 
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obtain.115  After the American Association of Public Accountants (AICPA’s 
predecessor116) first promulgated formal ethical standards in 1907,117 it 
faced numerous obstacles:  (1) opposition from within the profession;118 (2) 
“external criticism from those who thought CPAs were trying to create a 
monopoly by stifling competition;”119 (3) “the lack of power vested in the 
national body”120; (4) a lack of enforcement capability, even indirectly, by 
publicizing its sanctions against members;121 and (5) vast criticism of the 
vagueness of the “wide latitude in condemning actions”122 under the power 
 
 115. Even today, the AICPA is cautious in the way it describes its authority:  
“Compliance with the Code of Professional Conduct, as with all standards in an open 
society, depends primarily on members’ understanding and voluntary actions, secondarily 
on reinforcement by peers and public opinion, and ultimately on disciplinary proceedings, 
when necessary, against members who fail to comply with the Rules.”  The American 
Institute of Certified Public Accountants, CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT AND BYLAWS 
4269 (2008), http://www.aicpa.org/download/about/Code_of_ConductBylaws.pdf (emphasis 
added). 
 116. PREVITS & MERINO, supra note 22, at 138 (after several reorganizations and 
mergers, AAPA ultimately became the AICPA); see also The American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants, History of the AICPA, 
http://www.aicpa.org/About+the+AICPA/Understanding+the+Organization/History+of+the
+AICPA.htm (AICPA and its predecessors have history dating back to 1887, when AAPA 
was formed). 
 117. PREVITS & MERINO, supra note 22, at 203, 206. 
 118. Id. at 203. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. (emphasis added).  “No one body had the power to mandate compliance with 
professional standards, a problem that was equally perplexing in early efforts to develop a 
conceptual framework for the discipline.”  Id. at 206. 
 121. Id.  Previts and Merino note: 
Unfortunately, the only power that the institute might have had—publicity—
was unavailable.  There has always been a strong tendency among professionals 
for “guild selfishness” and “group bias.”  Within the national organization, a 
very influential group believed that accountants should not censure their 
colleagues. A concession made to these opponents of self-policing, which many 
considered unwise but unfortunately necessary, was that the names of persons 
or firms found guilty of professional misconduct not be published in the 
Journal.  Only the facts of the case and its determination would be reported. 
Id.  This, however, is no longer the norm, and the AICPA regularly publishes the outcomes 
of disciplinary proceeding, in accordance with their bylaws: 
Notice of disciplinary action pursuant to section 7.3 or 7.4 or of termination of 
enrollment of a member or a member's firm in an Institute-approved practice-
monitoring program, together with a statement of the reasons therefore, shall be 
published in such form and manner as the Council may prescribe. Council also 
may prescribe any additional disclosures regarding any matter within the 
jurisdiction of the professional ethics executive committee. 
The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Bylaws Section 760.01, 
http://www.aicpa.org/About/bylaws/sec700/bl_760.html. 
 122. PREVITS & MERINO, supra note 22, at 206. 
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to find members “guilty of an act discreditable to the profession.”123  In 
some form, all of these criticisms continue to plague the organization 
today. 
If the AICPA largely does not make substantive standards, though, 
who does?  Although the SEC has statutory authority to set accounting 
standards, it rarely does so, relying instead on private bodies, typically the 
Financial Accounting Standards Board.  This policy of relying on 
“independent” standards bodies is not new, even if it remains controversial:  
“[W]hile academics continue to argue the propriety of the SEC’s de facto 
delegation of standard setting to the private sector in ASR [Accounting 
Series Release] No. 4 (1938) and No. 150 (1973), the process has been long 
accepted but continually challenged.”124  And even the SEC has 
acknowledged the need to clarify the relationship and roles of FASB and 
the SEC “regarding the issuance of interpretive and/or implementation 
accounting guidance to avoid overlap and potential confusion by 
constituents.”125 
From its founding, the actual regulators of accounting came from 
within the ranks of the regulated: 
The establishment of the SEC in 1934 had initially sent tremors 
through the financial community, but the concern of the business 
sector diminished significantly when Roosevelt named Joseph P. 
Kennedy as the first chairman of the SEC.  Kennedy’s 
appointment was considered acceptable to the financial 
community because he was “one of their own.”  Reformers 
lamented the choice, so typical of Roosevelt, who sponsored 
reform and then modified its impact by making conciliatory 
appointments.”126 
This blurring between the regulators and the regulated has dogged 
financial regulation from its origins through today. 
Government regulation is also highly segmented.  Instead of being 
generally applicable, SEC accounting standards apply only to those falling 
under its specific regulatory authority, i.e., publicly traded corporations, 
and this is, more precisely, part of Regulatory Accounting Principles 
(“RAP”).127  RAP, however, is not solely a creation of the SEC, but of 
many government agencies.128  Generally Accepted Accounting Principles 
(“GAAP”), promulgated by private FASB, is generally accepted, not just 
by SEC-registrants but also (though less rigidly) by privately-held entities. 
 
 123. Id. at 206. 
 124. Id. at 274. 
 125. 2008 SEC Report, supra note 11, at 167. 
 126. PREVITS & MERINO, supra note 22, at 274. 
 127. Id. at 375. 
 128. Id. at 374-75. 
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Within five years of its creation, the SEC had formally delegated its 
accounting standard setting authority primarily to two private 
organizations:  the Committee on Accounting Procedure (“CAP”) and the 
Accounting Principles Board (“APB”).129  Inflation before, during, and 
following World War II “had eroded the usefulness of accounting 
numbers,” yet the CAP and the SEC continued to insist upon historical cost 
accounting.130  This dogmatism was not without a high political price, 
however.  Both the CAP and APB would soon be replaced as the SEC’s 
source of standard setters due, “in part, to the failure of the profession to 
appreciate the extent to which both income determination and standard 
setting had become politicized.”131 
The FASB is part of the Financial Accounting Foundation (“FAF”), a 
private association created in 1972 to be the independent standard setter for 
accounting in the U.S.132  Over the years, FASB’s role has evolved into a 
quasi-regulatory body, creating standards adopted not only by the SEC but 
also other regulators.133  Moreover, Sarbanes-Oxley was written in such a 
way that FASB qualified as the primary oversight body for accounting 
under the new legislation without any changes to its operations.134  
 
 129. Accounting Series Release (“ASR”) No. 4 (April 25, 1938); PREVITS & MERINO, 
supra note 22, at 276. 
 130. Id. at 305. 
 131. Id. at 303-04. 
 132. The Financial Accounting Foundation provides an overview of the organization on 
its website: 
Organized in 1972, the Financial Accounting Foundation (FAF) is the 
independent, private-sector organization with responsibility for: 
Establishing and improving financial accounting and reporting standards; 
Educating constituents about those standards; 
The oversight, administration, and finances of its standard-setting Boards, the 
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and the Governmental 
Accounting Standards Board (GASB), and their Advisory Councils; 
Selecting the members of the standard-setting Boards and Advisory Councils; 
and 
Protecting the independence and integrity of the standard-setting process. 
Financial Accounting Foundation, FAF Overview, http://fasb.org/faf/faf_info.shtml 
(emphasis omitted). 
 133. FASB’s “Conceptual Framework,” developed in the 1970s and 1980s, had a 
profound influence on U.K. and IASC regulators, too, both of which “more or less followed 
its conclusions” in 1999 and 1989, respectively.  MYDDELTON, supra note 7, at 37. 
 134. SOX § 108 discusses the formulation and recognition of accounting standards, and 
amends parts of the Securities Act of 1933, in part as follows: 
“(b) Recognition of Accounting Standards.— 
“(1) In General.--In carrying out its authority under subsection (a) and under 
section 13(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the Commission may 
recognize, as ‘generally accepted’ for purposes of the securities laws, any 
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Interestingly, this parallels the fact that Sarbanes-Oxley’s board 
independence standards established in 2003 only created requirements to 
compose a board of directors exactly as Enron’s looked when it was 
celebrated as among the best in 2000, just a year before its collapse.135  Just 
like board requirements, accounting oversight requirements enacted over 
the past few years may be more rhetoric to keep and expand the power of 
the hegemony than they are genuine reform.136 
Although a private organization, FASB’s parent, FAF, has both 
private and public arms:  FASB and the Governmental Accounting 
Standards Board (“GASB”).  Thus, a private body not only sets the 
accounting standards for private businesses, often eventually adopted by a 
government regulator, but also formulates the standards applicable to 
accounting by governmental bodies.137  In a federalist system, 
 
accounting principles established by a standard setting body— 
“(A) that— 
“(i) is organized as a private entity; 
“(ii) has, for administrative and operational purposes, a board of trustees (or 
equivalent body) serving in the public interest, the majority of whom are not, 
concurrent with their service on such board, and have not been during the 2-year 
period preceding such service, associated persons of any registered public 
accounting firm; 
“(iii) is funded as provided in section 109 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002; 
“(iv) has adopted procedures to ensure prompt consideration, by majority vote 
of its members, of changes to accounting principles necessary to reflect 
emerging accounting issues and changing business practices; and 
“(v) considers, in adopting accounting principles, the need to keep standards 
current in order to reflect changes in the business environment, the extent to 
which international convergence on high quality accounting standards is 
necessary or appropriate in the public interest and for the protection of 
investors; and 
“(B) that the Commission determines has the capacity to assist the Commission 
in fulfilling the requirements of subsection (a) and section 13(b) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, because, at a minimum, the standard setting 
body is capable of improving the accuracy and effectiveness of financial 
reporting and the protection of investors under the securities laws. 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 108, 15 U.S.C. § 7218.  These changes, however, have not 
affected pre-existing FASB’s role, and it has continued as the standard setter for the 
industry. 
 135. MACEY, supra note 32, at 79, 81; see also Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 301. 
 136. SOX, for instance, has increased annual compliance costs by approximately $2 
million per company.  MACEY, supra note 32, at 97.  The total estimated cost approximates 
$1.4 trillion and “[s]ome costs undoubtedly are deadweight social losses associated with the 
highly inefficient statute,” including redistribution from “politically weak shareholders to 
well-organized, highly concentrated interest groups--like the biggest auditing firms.”  Id. at 
163-64. 
 137. GASB applies to all government accounting, including state and local governments, 
along with municipal business, such as airports, but also has some overlap with sister 
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intergovernmental competition in financial and corporate matters may be 
an important and valuable feature.138  On the other hand, it is not clear that 
the FAF is not, to borrow a Federalist term, a “faction” itself.139  
Additionally, by virtue of its privileged status with the SEC, FASB has no 
real competitor, nor do states or other organizations promulgate 
comprehensive standards sufficient to offer an alternative to FASB-
centered GAAP, even for use by companies that are not SEC-regulated. 
FASB’s links to the profession of public accounting, like the other 
organizations discussed here, are very strong, despite the fact that FASB 
affects accounting far beyond the scope of practicing public accountants or 
publicly traded firms.  FASB promulgates GAAP, and GAAP is the law of 
the land for all of accounting.140  Before FASB’s creation in 1973, GAAP 
came mostly from the AICPA141 and, together, FASB and (to a lesser 
extent) the AICPA continue to develop GAAP, under explicit sanction by 
the SEC.142  Other sources of GAAP are sometimes important, but their role 
is increasingly minimal, particularly in light of the new codification of 
GAAP.143  Although FASB works, to a limited degree, with other 
institutions,144 its relationship is clearly centered on cooperating with the 
 
FASB’s jurisdiction, such as accounting at universities and other non-profits.  PREVITS & 
MERINO, supra note 22, at 403, 408.  The federal government also has an agency, the 
Government Accountability Office (GAO), which works more closely with federal 
government departments and agencies in accounting, as well as broader issues of public 
“accountability.”  Id. at 409-10. 
 138. See generally ROBERTA ROMANO, THE ADVANTAGE OF COMPETITIVE FEDERALISM 
FOR SECURITIES 172 (2002) (arguing that competition among governing agencies serves the 
same functions as our federalist government structure). 
 139. “By a faction, I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority 
or minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, 
or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate 
interests of the community.”  THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison). 
 140. As the “chief legal authority having jurisdiction over accounting rules and practice . 
. . the SEC has adopted a strong deferential stance towards the rulemaking power of FASB 
and tends to sanction, as a matter of law, the GAAP rules FASB promulgates.”  
CUNNINGHAM, supra note 20, at 6 (emphasis added). 
 141. Id. at 5. 
 142. Id. at 6. 
 143. See generally Bruce Pounder, Framing the Future:  A First Look at FASB’s GAAP 
Codification, J. ACCOUNTANCY, May 2008, 
http://www.journalofaccountancy.com/Issues/2008/May/FramingtheFuture.htm (providing 
an overview of the codification project and its implications). 
 144. For instance, trustee nominations come from a variety of sources and backgrounds: 
Trustees 
The Foundation’s Board of Trustees is an independent body of leaders in their 
professions with diverse backgrounds and expertise in areas of business, 
finance, investment, accounting, government, investor advocacy, education, and 
other professions involved in the activities of the financial and capital markets.  
The Board is currently comprised of 16 members and, other than the chairman, 
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AICPA, SEC, and, more recently, the PCAOB. 
The PCAOB (often pronounced by transposing the last two letters and 
being generally freewheeling, phonetically, to say "peek-a-boo")145 further 
muddies things.  PCAOB is the newest national accounting body in the 
U.S.  It was created as part of Sarbanes-Oxley’s accounting reforms in the 
wake of Enron and other accounting scandals in the late 1990s and early 
2000s.  It too has been criticized as part of “[t]he mad rush to pass Sarbox 
in 2002 [which] was less about keeping business honest than it was about 
keeping Congressmen in office.”146  If PCAOB were an actual government 
agency, Sarbanes-Oxley would be PCAOB’s “organic statute,” although it 
is doubtful that term applies since PCAOB is not actually a federal 
administrative agency.  PCAOB is not part of the government, but a private 
non-profit created by congressional charter.  Some have called it a “quasi-
private agency,”147 but it might also be called “quasi-public.”  It has an 
enormous amount of regulatory power (hence the “oversight” part of the 
name) yet remains private, and it is unclear the full extent of PCAOB’s 
overlap, competing or complimentary, with the SEC. 
Since PCAOB’s creation, it has been engaged in an extensive turf war 
with the SEC, and the SEC appears to be winning.148  Still, PCAOB is not 
part of the SEC or an independent government agency (like the SEC), 
 
Trustees serve a single five-year term and until their successors are elected and 
qualified.  To provide for appropriate continuity of leadership, the Trustee 
serving in the capacity as chair may be re-elected to successive terms without 
limitations on the number of terms he or she may serve.  The Trustees, in their 
capacity as the members of the Foundation, have sole authority to elect all 
Trustees.  Three Trustees must have extensive experience as financial officers 
or as elected officials of state or local governments and candidates for these 
positions are nominated by the nine governmental organizations that helped 
form the GASB under the Foundation.  Nominations for the remaining at-large 
Trustee positions are solicited from a broad array of market participants. 
Financial Accounting Standards Board, Facts About FASB, http://www.fasb.org/facts/ 
(second emphasis added). 
 145. “Everyone is frustrated with the PCAOB.  It certainly doesn’t roll off the tongue 
when spoken as a list of initials; however, I don’t want to call it the ‘Pi-Cowb.’  That’s the 
universal sound effect for a laser gun.  Some members of our profession have bestowed 
upon the PCAOB the far-too-cutesy nickname ‘Peek-a-Boo.’”  Greg Kyte, Alphabet Soup, J. 
ACCOUNTANCY, Apr. 2009, 
http://www.journalofaccountancy.com/Issues/2009/Apr/AlphabetSoup.  See also Peekaboo 
Powers, WALL ST. J., Feb. 8, 2006, at A16, available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB113936823813968017.html (criticizing the scope of powers 
and alleged constitutional violations of PCAOB). 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Although under appeal, in third party litigation between a public interest group and 
PCAOB, PCAOB and its officers have been deemed “inferior officers,” subject to the 
authority of the SEC.  Free Enter. Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 537 F.3d 
667 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
GREENFINAL[1] 6/1/2010  10:37:19 AM 
632 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 12:3 
 
notwithstanding any control that the SEC might be able to exert over 
PCAOB, nor is the Board accountable to any part of the executive branch.  
PCAOB does not report to the attorney general, or even the President, but 
(at least nominally) reports to the SEC, an independent government agency, 
even though, “[t]he Board shall not be an agency or establishment of the 
United States Government. . . . [and no] member or person employed by, or 
agent for, the Board shall be deemed to be an officer or employee of or 
agent for the Federal Government by reason of such service.”149 
While PCAOB is not a government agency, it has been granted 
enforcement authority and has, in the last several years, already brought 
disciplinary actions against at least 12 public accounting firms and 19 
individuals.150  The Board has also been mired in controversy with other 
bodies, including a public interest group’s extensive litigation challenging 
PCAOB’s constitutionality, a case now granted certiorari before the U.S. 
Supreme Court.151 
Whether one wishes accounting to be regulated by the government or 
not, one should be very concerned about the government in effect 
outsourcing essential government (regulatory) functions to private 
organizations directly accountable to no single person or group.152  It 
should be of even greater concern when that power includes criminal153 as 
well as civil actions.  The fact that PCAOB appears to have been created 
explicitly as a “fifth branch” of government, free from democratic 
accountability, is even more troubling.154 
 
 149. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 101(b), 15 U.S.C. 7211 (2002) (emphasis added). 
 150. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, Board Actions to Date (Sept. 2008), 
http://www.pcaobus.org/About_the_PCAOB/PCAOB_Actions_to_Date_Update.pdf (last 
visited Jan. 27, 2010). 
 151. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Free Enter. Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight 
Bd., 537 F.3d 667 (2009) (No 08-861), available at http://law.du.edu/documents/corporate-
governance/fef-v-pcaob/cert-petition.pdf. 
 152. See generally Paul R. Verkuil, Public Law Limitations on Privatization of 
Government Functions, 84 N.C. L. REV. 397, 397 (2005-2006) (concluding that certain 
essential government functions cannot be outsourced to the private market). 
 153. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 802, 18 U.S.C. 1519, 1520 (2002) (instituting 
criminal penalties for alteration of documents). 
 154. In a Petition for Writ of Certiorari, it was noted: 
In creating the Board, Congress deliberately sought to test the outer boundaries 
of its ability to reduce Presidential power, by establishing a “‘Fifth Branch’ of 
the Federal Government” . . . . over which the President has markedly less 
control than he exercises over traditional “Fourth Branch” independent agencies 
like the SEC . . . . As the court below acknowledged, the only reason for this 
additional diminution of the “level of Presidential control” over executive 
officers was “Congress’ intention to insulate the Board from partisan forces” 
that the President (and perhaps Congress) was purportedly able to somehow 
exert on a traditional independent agency like the SEC. . . . . Thus, Congress 
rejected proposals to lodge the Board’s enforcement function in the SEC . . . 
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PCAOB, like other bodies, cannot be considered an SRO for public 
accounting because PCAOB’s work is not binding on all accounting or 
accountants, or even all public accountants, but only the very small portion 
of CPAs performing attestation work for public companies.155  Moreover, 
PCAOB’s CPA membership is intentionally kept low; thus, to the extent it 
does regulate the profession, it is not self-regulation, i.e., CPAs regulating 
CPAs.  Exactly two of the five members of the PCAOB must be, or have 
been, CPAs.156 
Additionally, the cost and efficacy of the PCAOB has been challenged 
since its inception.  PCAOB gets its funding through the SEC, but the SEC 
ultimately functions merely as a single-payer for PCAOB’s budget.  
PCAOB writes and submits its budgets to the SEC for approval, which 
assesses and collects fees from publicly traded corporations in order to 
meet PCAOB’s budgetary needs.157  Thus, a federal agency (the SEC) 
collects fees from private associations and gives them to another private 
association (PCAOB), which the SEC perhaps supervises, and which 
performs essential government functions.158 
To summarize, PCAOB is:  (1) a private non-profit; (2) created by 
Congress; (3) funded by fees assessed on other private (for-profit) 
organizations, i.e., publicly traded corporations; (4) receives those funds 
from a government regulatory body; and (5) has been delegated, directly by 
Congress, federal enforcement authority.159 
The big question with respect to PCAOB is not “What’s wrong?” but 
“What could possibly be right?”  Every bit of PCAOB’s mission and power 
was already part of the existing, if broken and failing, structure of 
accounting oversight.  Sarbanes-Oxley, in creating PCAOB, in no way 
 
and instead designated the Board a private corporation with the same autonomy 
from Presidential control as private “self-regulatory-organizations (SROs) . . . 
such as the New York Stock Exchange,” upon which it was explicitly 
“modeled.” 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 151, at 8 (citations omitted). 
 155. See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text (stating that no SRO currently exists 
for the accounting profession). 
 156. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 101(e)(2), 15 U.S.C. 7211 (2002) (“Limitation.--
Two members, and only 2 members, of the Board shall be or have been certified public 
accountants pursuant to the laws of 1 or more States, provided that, if 1 of those 2 members 
is the chairperson, he or she may not have been a practicing certified public accountant for 
at least 5 years prior to his or her appointment to the Board.”). 
 157. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 109(b)-(d), 15 U.S.C. 7219 (2002). 
 158. See generally PAUL R. VERKUIL, OUTSOURCING SOVEREIGNTY:  WHY PRIVATIZATION 
OF GOVERNMENT FUNCTIONS THREATENS DEMOCRACY AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT 
(Cambridge Univ. Press 2007) (arguing that government outsourcing of essential 
government functions threatens democracy by making such actors unaccountable for their 
actions). 
 159. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 105, 15 U.S.C. 7215 (2002) (outlining 
investigative authority and disciplinary proceedings for and by board). 
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remedied any flaws.  PCAOB is instead merely duplicative of the existing, 
and already inefficient and self-interested, framework, and this duplication 
comes at a very high price:  a direct cost in excess of $157 million in 
2009.160 
The mixing of public and private in PCAOB seriously calls into 
question the ultimate source and nature of PCAOB’s authority.  Where 
does PCAOB’s authority come from?  Can government legitimately 
delegate authority to non-governmental agencies?  Although PCAOB is a 
private organization, it has been granted the imprimatur of government and 
law’s most explicitly coercive aspect:  enforcement, or police power.  Put 
more concretely, the question is over the constitutionality of Congress’ 
giving PCAOB “far reaching executive power while completely stripping 
the President of the authority to appoint or remove those members or 
otherwise supervise or control their exercise of that power.”161 
Beyond the U.S., however, there is a growing call for global 
convergence, not only of accounting standards, but also of oversight.  Some 
have declared that “[o]ur economic world is no longer directed chiefly by 
geographically defined nations, but by twin transgeographic entities:  the 
multinational corporation and its companion, the institutional portfolio 
investment fund.”162  A dramatic statement, but such sentiment has led to 
the call for increasing international convergence.  Yet convergence remains 
a heated and complicated debate. 
“The Norwalk Agreement” was the product of a meeting between 
FASB and IASB in September 2002, in which: 
[E]ach acknowledged their commitment to the development of 
high-quality, compatible accounting standards that could be used 
for both domestic and cross-border financial reporting.  At that 
meeting, both the FASB and IASB pledged to use their best 
efforts to (a) make their existing financial reporting standards 
fully compatible as soon as is practicable and (b) to coordinate 
their future work programs to ensure that once achieved, 
compatibility is maintained.163 
The SEC has announced formal plans to cooperate with the IASB 
(International Accounting Standards Board) and, in December 2007, also 
issued Final Rule 33-8879, allowing financial statements of U.S.-traded 
foreign firms to be filed in compliance with IASB’s International Financial 
 
 160. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, 2009 PCAOB Budget (2009), 
http://pcaob.com/About_the_PCAOB/Budget_Presentations/2009.pdf (last visited Jan. 27, 
2010). 
 161. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 151, at i. 
 162. PREVITS & MERINO, supra note 22, at 362. 
 163. AICPA and IASB Memorandum of Understanding, 
http://www.fasb.org/news/memorandum.pdf (last visited Jan. 27, 2010). 
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Reporting Standards (“IFRS”) without reconciliation to U.S. GAAP.164  
NASBA, however, has been increasingly vocal in its opposition to such 
measures.  The FAF and FASB have also been quite critical of the SEC’s 
planned roadmap for IFRS adoption.165  More generally, IASB has come 
under intense pressure to reform its structure from countless groups, 
including the AICPA and G-20 national leaders.166  The IASB has 
responded to this criticism by announcing its plans to increase membership 
and geographic diversity, as well as establishing a new Monitoring 
Board.167 
The problems of accounting’s governance are not unique to the U.S., 
and international concerns only add to existing disorder.  Still, these 
changes are imminent and must be taken into account as international 
dynamics already manifest in the U.S. regulatory structure, and this will 
only increase.  In addition to the many interests already described, there are 
state CPA societies in each jurisdiction lobbying at the state level.  There 
are many additional national accounting organizations other than the 
AICPA.  There is the federal Governmental Accountability Office 
(“GAO”) which “investigates how the federal government spends taxpayer 
 
 164. See 17 C.F.R. § 210, 230, 239, 249 (2007), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2007/33-8879.pdf (modifying, inter alia, Final Rule 33-
8879). 
 165. FASB and its parent organization, the FAF, are calling on the SEC for additional 
study of “strengths, weaknesses, costs, and benefits of possible approaches” to a U.S. shift 
to IFRS: 
In a 134-page comment letter, the FAF and FASB reaffirmed support for the 
development of a single set of high-quality global accounting standards but 
called for a thorough analysis of issues identified by the SEC in its proposed 
road map as well as other issues outlined in their comment letter. The study 
should include analysis of possible conversion approaches, the letter states, such 
as convergence through continuation of the joint standard-setting efforts of 
FASB and the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) over a longer 
period of time, as advocated by some investors and other parties. 
FAF and FASB Call for Additional Study of IFRS Conversion, J. ACCT., Mar. 13, 2009, 
http://www.journalofaccountancy.com/Web/20091542.htm. 
 166. See IASB Oversight Body Responds to Call for Accountability, J. ACCT., Feb. 3, 
2009, 
http://www.journalofaccountancy.com/Web/IASBRespondstoCallforAccountability.htm 
(reporting constitutional amendments by the IASB aimed at enhancing public accountability 
and increased monitoring); G-20 Addresses Accounting Issues at Financial Summit, J. 
ACCOUNTANCY, Nov. 17, 2008, 
http://www.journalofaccountancy.com/Web/G20AddressesAccountingIssues.htm (reporting 
agreement of G-20 nations on common principles to guide financial market reform and 
accounting). 
 167. Press Release, IASC Foundation, Trustees enhance public accountability through 
new Monitoring Board, complete first part of Constitution Review, Jan. 29, 2009, 
http://www.iasb.org/NR/rdonlyres/6A31C6E6-423D-4C6D-A18C-
D82DFEBE8FD9/0/PRTrusteesenhancepublicaccountability.pdf. 
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dollars,”168 but is also an agency made up largely of accountants and 
advises Congress on a wide array of issues.  The FTC, CASB, OSHA, IRS, 
ICC, FCC, DOE, and DOD all “directly interact or influence financial and 
management accounting practice and policy, thereby shaping the economy 
and accounting’s environment,” and create Regulatory Accounting 
Principles (“RAP”).169  Many more organizations once wielded power and 
influence but are now defunct. 
Beyond the U.S., there is more to international accounting than just 
the IASB.  Most nations have independent standards bodies which work 
with the IASB to varying degrees.  The U.S., however, has traditionally had 
a great influence on global standards, as “[s]tandard-setters around the 
world all broadly follow the FASB’s conceptual framework.”170  One may 
question, however, how much longer and to what degree this will continue 
to be true. 
There is also proposed legislation in the U.S. to duplicate PCAOB’s 
model for the standard-setting process.171  Just as PCAOB monitors CPA 
firms and companies, the new Financial Accounting Oversight Board 
(“FAOB”) would monitor the standard setters--primarily FASB, but also 
the AICPA and other GAAP promulgators. 
C. Models of Regulation 
One may approach regulation from a variety of perspectives and, 
particularly in the second half of the twentieth century, regulation has been 
marked by an exponential increase in cooperation between the regulators 
and the regulated.172  This has happened by a variety of means, and has 
involved both formal and informal cooperation.  “Negotiated rulemaking” 
is the most formal cooperation, where regulators establish venues in which 
interested parties can discuss the needs for, and effects of, regulations 
before they are promulgated.173  In this way, the regulators are still arms of 
the state, not of the profession, but it is believed that regulation benefits 
everyone (the regulator, the regulated, and third parties) by allowing 
increased discussion and cooperation before promulgation, and the final 
rules are “the product of agreement among representatives of all affected 
interests at the end of a negotiating process.”174  However, the presence of 
interest groups also means increased politicization. 
 
 168. About GAO, http://www.gao.gov/about/index.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2010). 
 169. PREVITS & MERINO, supra note 22, at 374-75. 
 170. MYDDELTON, supra note 7, at 119. 
 171. H.R. 1349, 111th Cong. (2009). 
 172. See RICHARD J. PIERCE, SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & PAUL R. VERKUIL, ADMINISTRATIVE 
LAW AND PROCESS 342-43 (4th ed. 2004) (discussing the rise of negotiated rulemaking). 
 173. Id. at 342-43. 
 174. Id. at 343. 
GREENFINAL[1] 6/1/2010  10:37:19 AM 
2010] ACCOUNTING’S NADIR 637 
 
The increasingly political nature of accounting may be troubling, but 
political pressures emanate from a variety of sources, both public and 
private.  In both the U.S. and the U.K., the government sometimes 
intervenes directly in accounting through the enactment of law specifying 
certain actions or standards.175  More often, governments act through 
agencies that have the authority to impose rules.176  In other instances, 
private bodies serve as standard setters, officially designated so by 
government regulators, as in the case of the FASB.  Private industry, 
however, can be instrumental in affecting these processes, frequently 
procuring large benefits by so doing, and undermining the spirit and 
efficacy of standard setting.177 
Many recent criticisms point to the “unregulated” or “deregulated” 
financial industry as being responsible for the current state of the global 
economy.  Such concerns, however, are far from unanimous, with some 
reminding us that crises are likely to come notwithstanding the strength 
and content of regulation.178  More importantly, we should be careful about 
the way in which we characterize regulatory schema.  In the modern 
regulatory context, even famous instances of “deregulation,” e.g., airlines 
and telephones, are more aptly characterized as “re-regulation” because 
although the nature of the regulation of those industries changed 
considerably, they certainly did not end up in a state of no regulation. 
Both “regulation and deregulation [are] destined to be . . . dynamic 
process[es].”179  The mere fact that an industry “is ‘regulated’. . . does not 
itself reveal how extensive the regulation is.”180  Indeed, as Professors 
Harrison, Morgan, and Verkuil elaborate in their regulation casebook: 
[T]he distinction between regulation and deregulation can be 
[narrow].  For example, when you think of deregulation, it is 
tempting to assume the government has stepped aside entirely 
and allowed competitive forces to take over.  In fact, a great deal 
of what legislators call “deregulation” is not that at all.  
Sometimes, “deregulation” is used to describe situations in which 
 
 175. See MYDDELTON, supra note 7, at 104 (citing instances of government interjection 
into accounting standard development in the U.S. and U.K.). 
 176. See id. at 104 (noting that setting standards for accounting is to some extent a 
political process that may come from a government agency imposing rules, citing railroad 
accounting in the U.S. as an example). 
 177. See id. at 104-05 (discussing the treatment of goodwill accounting in the U.K.). 
 178. See, e.g., Giampaolo Galli and Alberto Mingardi, Lax Regulation Didn't Cause This 
Crisis, WALL ST. J., Jan. 29, 2009, available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123317869729325843.html (suggesting that “the crisis is, so 
to speak, regulation-blind, i.e. it wasn't caused by the alleged laxity of U.S. regulators nor 
would it be necessarily ‘solved’ if we now introduced different rules”). 
 179. JEFFREY L. HARRISON, THOMAS D. MORGAN & PAUL R. VERKUIL, REGULATION AND 
DEREGULATION:  CASES AND MATERIALS 4 (2d ed. 2004). 
 180. Id. 
GREENFINAL[1] 6/1/2010  10:37:19 AM 
638 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 12:3 
 
the pervasiveness of regulation has been reduced.  Other times, 
however, new regulation will be adapted to ease the industry 
toward competition.  Thus, even with more “deregulation,” our 
economy is likely to continue to be highly regulated.  One should 
be as wary of taking deregulatory efforts at face value as of 
embracing regulatory proposals.181 
The absence of any type of regulation in a market might be 
worrisome, but we do not often have to face that because even 
“unregulated” markets or industries generally give rise to other private 
bodies that have the interest and power, created by demands of actors in the 
market, to pressure reform.  Thus, we might better describe this state as 
“market regulation” rather than a lack of regulation. 
i. Market Regulation 
Market regulation is founded on the idea that there exist incentives 
sufficient to stimulate the spontaneous creation of private institutions which 
will profit from contributing to the regularization, standardization, and 
rising quality of an industry or profession.  In the case of financial markets, 
public accounting (and, more specifically, auditing) itself emerged as one 
of these institutions.  With the grant of an exclusive government franchise 
and the mandatory employment of those services though, audits were 
commodified.182  When audits were a signal voluntarily provided to attest 
to quality, their value was quite high.  When mandated for all publicly 
traded firms, however, the audit eventually became a commodity service--a 
fungible service of less value, no longer providing the same reputational 
consequences for its providers.183  Auditing remains, to some degree, a 
matter of reputation for CPA firms, but “opinion shopping,” premised on 
the idea that one can always find some CPA firm willing to give a clean 
opinion on the financial statements, is rampant.184 
While financial markets are no longer purely market-regulated (if they 
ever were), it is possible that certain professions within financial markets 
 
 181. Id. at 19. 
 182. See Macey & Sale, supra note 27, at 1167 (arguing that modern corporate 
governance model is flawed due to regulatory commodification). 
 183. See id. at 1167 (“[A]udits no longer serve the economic purpose--providing 
information that protects investors and leads to efficient pricing of securities--that they once 
served.”). 
 184. See Dale R. Rietberg, Auditor Changes and Opinion Shopping – A proposed 
Solution, 22 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 211, 214 (1988) (noting instances of firms changing 
accounts because of a desire to frustrate the reporting of the true economic substance of the 
transaction or firm).  Of course, some might counter that opinion shopping is not all bad.  
See, e.g., MYDDELTON, supra note 7, at 100 (“But why should the accounting profession 
resist competition in ideas?  In some professions ‘second opinions’ can save lives:  should 
we prohibit opinion-shopping among doctors or barristers?”). 
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may remain primarily market-regulated.  That is, even if a particular 
regulatory actor is now providing a commoditized service, the rules 
governing that profession could be provided by the competitive pressures 
of other actors within or external to the system.  In the case of accounting, 
one could argue that users of financial statements, and institutional 
investors and other intermediaries in particular, could make effective 
demand of auditors to ensure adequate financial statement presentation if 
the SEC had not taken this role. 
Chartered Financial Analysts (“CFAs”) are a contemporary example 
of a market regulatory body.  The CFA credential, started in 1963, has 
become quite prestigious.185  The CFA charter, however, is not a license, 
just a signal of one’s competence in financial analysis.  The CFA Institute 
has no government-granted monopoly to provide any sort of service, thus it 
relies exclusively on its reputation as an organization represented by highly 
qualified professionals holding the CFA credential around the world.  
Although CFAs may not audit financial statements, they represent a strong 
source of competition to many financial services professionals, including 
CPAs.  Despite their increasing prominence, though, CFAs remain a 
market regulatory institution, operating independently of governments and 
even self-regulators. 
ii. Self-Regulation 
Self-regulation differs from market regulation because the self-
regulating industry or profession takes on an affirmative duty to police 
itself, generally under the threat (implied or explicit) that ineffective self-
regulation will prompt government regulation instead.186  Self-regulation 
generally occurs through the establishment of an independent group, a self-
regulatory organization.  The SRO then promulgates its own rules and 
 
 185. Business news has for some years highlighted the increasing importance of the CFA 
credential.  See Louise Story, Bye, Bye B-School, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2007, at 31 
(suggesting that the CFA credential has become more valuable than an MBA); Phil Wahba, 
While Ivy League MBAs Impress, Hottest Three Letters Are CFA, N.Y. Sun, Sept. 26, 2006, 
available at http://www.nysun.com/business/while-ivy-league-mbas-impress-hottest-
three/42355/ (noting that “[a]t the latest gathering at the New York Society of Security 
Analysts, the buzz isn't about getting an Ivy League MBA or taking the CPA examination.  
It's the CFA.”).  More rigorous research, however, has also suggested that the CFA 
credential both serves as an effective signal of quality (“credentialism”) and, through the 
accreditation process itself, actually tends to improve the performance of those who 
undertake the course of study and examination leading to the charter.  Gus De Franco & 
Yibin Zhou, The Performance of Analysts with a CFA Designation:  The Role of Human-
Capital and Signaling Theories, 84 THE ACCOUNTING REV. 383, 383 (2009). 
 186. The threat of government regulation if a self regulator does not meet government 
expectations is sometimes called “enforced self regulation.”  HARRISON, MORGAN, & 
VERKUIL, supra note 179, at 495-96. 
GREENFINAL[1] 6/1/2010  10:37:19 AM 
640 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 12:3 
 
guidelines, often developing credentials and certifications available to 
members.  SROs may also be, or closely resemble, trade associations, 
although such a dual mission (both regulating and advancing the interests 
of the profession) might be thought to erode an SRO’s claim of authority 
and independence as a regulator.  Self-regulators, however, may face 
difficulty in establishing authority where there is not an exclusive right 
(and therefore control) of holding a professional credential.  In accounting, 
for instance, many practitioners are not and need not be CPAs, thus the 
AICPA’s scope of authority has very complicated boundaries, as discussed 
earlier.187 
By the 1930s, self-regulation in accounting shifted from an economic 
concept to a political one, steeped in the language of political reform.188  
Since that time, accounting has become even further politicized, often 
advancing the interests of the profession more than proper regulatory 
objectives.189  As Jonathan Macey has observed: 
“Strangely, the policy debates about accounting tend to confuse 
concerns about the proper way to format and package accounting 
information with concerns about the actual content of 
information. . . . To a large extent, the obsession with form over 
substance in American accounting reflects the relative power of 
the accounting industry.”190 
Important examples of SROs in today’s financial markets are formal 
securities and commodities exchanges, including the NYSE, NASDAQ, the 
Chicago Board of Trade, and many others around the world.  These 
markets are independent associations with great autonomy over their 
operations.  Importantly, they also provide important competitive pressures 
against one another--a fact that is increasingly true in an age of 
 
 187. See supra Part II.B.iii. 
 188. Previts and Merino note: 
From the crash until the end of World War II, political reformers were 
attempting to integrate capitalism and administrative theory.  At first it was 
assumed that regulation could not be reconciled with capitalism because 
regulation rejected the fundamental belief in the efficacy of competition in the 
marketplace.  But it soon became apparent that administrative theory did not 
negate the need for a self-regulating mechanism; it simply shifted the focal point 
from the individual to groups—from self-regulation through economics to self-
regulation through politics.  Political leaders did not look to accountants 
initially to implement reforms; the profession had to convince politicians, and 
later regulators, that independent audits could provide protection for investors.  
Accountants found support from businessmen and the leaders of the stock 
exchanges, who preferred private sector audits to direct government oversight. 
PREVITS & MERINO, supra note 22, at 270 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
 189. See infra note 202 and accompanying text (discussing politicization following 
World War II). 
 190. MACEY, supra note 32, at 156. 
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multinational corporate operations and great technological capability to 
communicate globally. 
Accounting cannot truly be said to be self-regulated for a variety of 
reasons.  First, there is no clear definition of a professional accountant,191 
thus no organization can possibly police those within the boundary of the 
profession.  More importantly, even CPAs who audit public companies 
have professional obligations to a variety of organizations.192  Even setting 
aside the government regulators (the SEC and state accountancy boards), 
some accounting oversight bodies importantly lack the “self” part of self-
regulation.  That is, because their leadership is not necessarily part of the 
public accounting profession, as in the case of the PCAOB, they cannot be 
considered self-regulating institutions. 
iii. Government Regulation 
Government regulation is the most coercive form of regulation, but 
also the most powerful.  Government regulation is frequently criticized for 
actual and perceived waste, yet it also brings with it the most enforcement 
power to effect regulatory change.  The strongest benefits of government 
regulation may be its uniformity and enforceability, but these attributes also 
entail trade-offs in flexibility.193 
Accounting is not genuinely government regulated, as evidenced by 
the fact that the FASB, a private organization, is the primary standard-
setter.194  The SEC, a government agency, does have statutory authority to 
regulate accounting, at least in the context of publicly traded companies, 
but has largely delegated this authority back to the FASB.195  Except for the 
IRS in the case of income taxation, the federal government generally has 
very little to say about accounting (including public accounting services 
performed by CPAs) in privately held businesses.  Even with public 
companies, the PCAOB now has jurisdiction virtually identical to the SEC, 
yet is explicitly a private, non-governmental entity.196 
 
 191. See supra Part II.B.i. 
 192. See supra Part II.B.iii. 
 193. “Corporate law’s fiduciary duty principles may be superior to rule-like approaches 
to managerial decision-making because promulgators cannot envision all future 
circumstances in which discretion is necessary to enable operational flexibility.”  Lawrence 
A. Cunningham, A Prescription to Retire the Rhetoric of “Principles-Based Systems” in 
Corporate Law, Securities Regulation, and Accounting, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1411, 1424 
(2007). 
 194. See supra Part II.B.iii. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Although the PCAOB’s jurisdiction--the entities over which it has authority--is 
much like the SEC’s, PCAOB’s mission and operation is vastly narrower, as it is not a 
clearinghouse for all public company information, as the SEC is.  See supra Part II.B.iiii.  
Moreover, the SEC has been rather successful in asserting its authority or at least de facto 
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iv. Hybrid Models 
In reality, to a large extent, none of the three regulatory paradigms just 
discussed (market, self, or government) actually dominate any industry.  
Although some areas may exhibit more or less of a particular influence, 
virtually all fields are regulated by a variety of public and private 
institutions, formal and informal alike.  Some of this may be the product of 
competing evolutionary paths under different administrations, but much of 
it is deliberate. 
Negotiated rulemaking is one type of hybrid model, in that it 
incorporates the voice of institutions which might have emerged as market- 
or self-regulating organizations into the formal process of government 
rulemaking.  This is done in a substantial and meaningful way in the 
negotiated rulemaking process, and goes far beyond the mere notice and 
comment provisions required of all federal regulation.  Even hybrid 
models, however, remain essentially market, self, or governmental in their 
regulatory outlook.  In the case of negotiated rulemaking, for all the 
increased voice and flexibility, it is essentially governmental in its 
perspective. 
Securities, for instance, are regulated by both federal regulators (the 
SEC) and SROs (like the NYSE).  Yet while SROs are given broad leeway 
in their individual operations, the SEC is clearly the dominant regulator of 
the industry.  In other cases, private and public producers exist 
simultaneously, and the private producer must meet the performance 
standards set by the public competitor.197  Although this type of “yardstick 
competition” is mostly a relic of the early twentieth century, the Tennessee 
Valley Authority still serves in this role.198 
D. What is Accounting’s Regulatory Model? 
If only because of the sheer number and constitution (private, 
governmental, and quasi-governmental) of organizations involved in the 
regulation of accounting, the profession follows none of the traditional 
regulatory paradigms.  Multiple organizations, both public and private, 
share in the oversight and regulation of financial accounting standards and 
practice.  Itself originally an institution of market regulation, public 
accounting’s audit function has become increasingly quasi-governmental in 
its structure, with private institutions being given authority by government 
agencies and even by Congress.  In the case of the PCAOB, a private non-
profit has been created by congressional charter and is funded by fees 
 
control over the PCAOB.  Id. 
 197. HARRISON, MORGAN, AND VERKUIL, supra note 179, at 495-96. 
 198. Id. 
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assessed and collected by the federal government on other private 
organizations, i.e., publicly traded corporations).199  Yet this private 
organization has also been granted enforcement authority by Congress, 
raising substantial questions about process and other issues of 
constitutionality.200 
State boards of accountancy appear to serve little independent 
purpose.  They collect licensing revenues for the state, but rely on the 
national organizations (the AICPA and NASBA) for the bulk of their 
regulations.  NASBA exhibits a mix of public and private interests, and the 
AICPA is non-obligatory for CPAs and thus suffers from a lack of actual 
authority over all CPAs.  The FASB, as a private association, has only de 
facto authority, except as pertains to SEC-registrants, because the SEC has 
delegated its standard setting authority to the FASB.  These organizations 
neither wholly complement nor wholly compete with each other, but 
distribute amongst themselves complex and overlapping responsibilities. 
I agree with the many critics who believe that accounting is in 
desperate need of a fix, but recent “reforms” like the creation of the 
PCAOB have only been further duplicative of accounting’s already 
redundant and ineffective oversight mechanisms.  Instead of competitive 
jurisdictional and substantive overlap, which might result in better 
governance, accounting’s oversight bodies have very effectively delegated 
their functions amongst each other, creating lucrative niches for oversight 
professionals.  If accountants are gatekeepers, their own gate is in desperate 
need of mending. 
Structurally, accounting may be a mess, but how good is professional 
accounting at its ultimate purpose--fairly presenting financial conditions?  
That is the question taken up in Part III. 
III. SUBSTANCE 
If, as argued in Part II, accounting’s form and organizational structure 
is chaotic and ineffective, how does accounting stand up in an evaluation of 
its substantive rules?  Better; not perfect, but better.  Not perfect, however, 
is not necessarily wrong.  The underlying transactions of accounting are 
sometimes impossible to represent objectively; choosing among equally 
imperfect methods and demanding detailed disclosures is likely the best we 
can expect.  Accounting, like a photograph, is simultaneously a literal and 
selective (or subjective) depiction of an event or condition.  Both 
accounting and photography memorialize that which has actually 
happened, often in great detail.  Both may also distort or obscure that image 
 
 199. See supra Part II.B.viii. 
 200. Id. 
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or event, intentionally or not. 
Accounting is flexible, as it should be, and reformers should be careful 
to make sure that any accounting reforms recognize and retain accounting’s 
inherent flexibility and need for discretion.  Section A of this Part discusses 
various aspects of the imprecision and imperfection of accounting data and 
practice.  Section B shifts to a more philosophic grounding of these issues.  
Accounting, and particularly early twentieth century accounting theory in 
the U.S., had an animating recognition of its epistemological foundations, 
assumptions, and obstacles.  U.S. accounting theory was greatly influenced 
by concurrent movements in philosophical pragmatism, and particularly 
that of John Dewey. 
Accounting has also often been compared to and discussed as an art.  
A common trope in this vein is to discuss financial statements as a 
photograph.  Discussing artistic and pictorial dimensions of accounting, 
however, also taps into accounting’s epistemological background and 
foundations, and promotes further discussion of accounting’s limits and 
challenges that are overarching, not specific, questions to the discipline.  
Many criticize those engaged in “earnings management” for smoothing out 
irregularities to make earnings appear healthier, yet surely we encourage 
photographers to do just that when making our portraits.  Is “truth” 
different in these examples as a matter of kind or degree? 
Section C returns to questions about contemporary accounting 
practice, particularly the heated discussion of fair value accounting, 
including FAS 157 and mark-to-market accounting.  Both fair value and its 
alternatives can be problematic under different circumstances, and no 
depiction of financial data is, or ever can be, perfect.  To direct policies and 
laws under the mistaken notion that financial statement presentation can be 
perfect is reckless and only sets the public up for feelings of mistrust and 
betrayal against accounting and accountants when inevitable problems 
arise. 
To admit that accountants are engaged in a fundamentally 
indeterminate task is not, however, to make them unaccountable, or even to 
suggest that they should not always strive toward a better representation.  
Accounting may be improved, but it will never be a panacea to the woes of 
financial reporting, corporate governance, or the economy. 
A.  The Myth of Objective Valuation 
GAAP is not the lucid or encyclopedic set of pre-existing rules 
that the dissent might perceive it to be.  Far from a single source 
accounting rulebook, GAAP “encompasses the conventions, 
rules, and procedures that define accepted accounting practice at 
a particular point in time.”  GAAP changes and, even at any one 
point, is often indeterminate.  "[T]he determination that a 
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particular accounting principle is generally accepted may be 
difficult because no single source exists for all principles."  There 
are 19 different GAAP sources, any number of which might 
present conflicting treatments of a particular accounting question.  
When such conflicts arise, the accountant is directed to consult an 
elaborate hierarchy of GAAP sources to determine which 
treatment to follow.201 
Even the Supreme Court of the United States has weighed in on the 
objectivity and determinacy of accounting.  GAAP provides guidance, but 
it is also constantly changing and difficult to navigate.  Accounting in any 
form--rules or principles--is not neutral.  Accounting rules set the agenda 
for management by creating or changing incentives in the presentation of 
financial statements and disclosures.  And accounting is political.202 
Accounting rule changes do not merely influence financial statement 
presentation, but may also change incentives and behavior in ways both 
foreseen and unforeseen.  This is equally true of fair value and historical 
cost accounting.  “Historical-cost-based financial statements . . . allowed 
financial institutions to engage in ‘gains trading’” to manage earnings by 
either selling or holding securities whose book and market values varied 
drastically, in order to manipulate reported earnings.203  Importantly, fair 
 
 201. Shalala v. Guernsey, 514 U.S. 87, 101 (1995) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
 202. See, e.g., supra note 188 and accompanying text.  By 1952, some leaders in the 
profession believed that “if accounting income had not already become a political 
phenomenon, it was well on its way to becoming one.”  PREVITS & MERINO, supra note 22, 
at 302.  Much of the theoretical foundation for accounting as developed in the early 
twentieth century was a direct result of political pressure and the emerging profession’s 
desire to justify its control over financial reporting: 
Corporate abuses had given accountants a clear mandate from the political 
sector.  Demands for corporate publicity to protect both investors and creditors 
accelerated throughout the period, and it became clear at the Industrial 
Commission hearings that secrecy would no longer be tolerated.  While 
proprietary theorists welcomed the call for publicity, they also recognized the 
potential threat if the stockholder/owner were not kept at center stage. 
Id. at 210 (footnotes omitted).  Moreover, the development of specialized governmental 
accounting was a pressing need well before the Civil War to combat corruption and the 
spoils system in politics around the nation, although reform would come only a generation 
later.  Id. at 97. 
 203. 2008 SEC Report, supra note 11, at 36 (footnote omitted).  The report continues: 
With the greater interest rate volatility in the 1980s, financial institutions were 
increasingly in the position of holding assets or liabilities where the current 
market values of these financial instruments differed markedly from their 
historical cost values shown in their financial statements.  In this situation 
management could opportunistically choose which assets to sell, or which 
liabilities to settle, in order to realize gains (or losses) in particular accounting 
periods.  This afforded management a powerful income statement management 
tool.  In addition, for financial institutions short of capital, this created an 
incentive for the management to sell their well-performing assets in order to 
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value accounting often works to keep assets on the balance sheet valued 
realistically, particularly in light of asset devaluation.204  Historical cost 
accounting created a different set of incentives--incentives which also gave 
rise to some of the misrepresentations at Enron. 
“Judgment is certainly not new to accounting or auditing” and fair 
value is no exception to that.205  But neither is fair value the lone cause of 
what some would characterize as an increase in accounting subjectivity.  
Accounting struggles to faithfully reflect business realities, and the 
increasing complexity of financial instruments has increased the role and 
need for the exercise of judgment by accountants and auditors to fairly 
represent an entity’s condition to outsiders.206  Further, complexity also 
increases the scope and impact of fair value accounting within an entity.207 
Fair value and its pro-cyclicality might have created a type of market 
hysteria,208 but the traditional alternative of historical cost makes credit 
harder to obtain for a lot of firms taking entrepreneurial risks, because it is 
difficult for them to leverage the value of appreciating assets.  This in turn 
creates more incentives to hide details in the financial statements, or 
attempt to get around reporting values altogether, as at Enron.209  Financial 
accounting rules, “in addition to having a goal of presenting a fair and 
accurate picture of a company’s finances and operations . . . may be used 
legitimately in such a way as to obscure underlying economic reality,” as in 
so-called “off balance sheet financing.”210 
Neither is accounting insulated from political realities and influences.  
While fair value is being attacked in today’s political discourse, its specific 
forms may themselves be political creations.  One important argument in 
favor of fair value accounting is its ability to combat the effects of 
inflation.211  To fight the distortions of inflation, one might reasonably value 
accounts in either current cost or current purchasing power (both are types 
of ‘fair value’ accounting), among other choices.212  In the U.K., however, 
the government made “not an accounting choice but a political one,” 
 
realize gains to boost their capital, but retain their poorly-performing assets 
(which had unrealized losses). 
Id. 
 204. Donius, supra note 50. 
 205. 2008 SEC Report, supra note 11, at 189. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. at 104. 
 208. See supra Part II.A. 
 209. Arewa, supra note 14, at 23 (discussing “synthetic” leases and the notorious 
“special purpose entities” used by companies, including Enron, to appear less leveraged). 
 210. Id. at 28. 
 211. See MYDDELTON, supra note 7, at 131; PREVITS & MERINO, supra note 22, at 304-
06. 
 212. MYDDELTON, supra note 7, at 132-36. 
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insisting upon current cost methodology instead of current purchasing 
power.213  Because accounting is subjective and subject to shifting 
incentives as a result of external actions, politicians often end up 
complaining about problems, such as overstated earnings, that are 
themselves a product of political decisions, as with the choice of current 
purchasing power in the U.K.214 
Much of the criticism of fair value accounting (and, equally, of 
historical cost accounting) somewhat misses the point:  all accounting rules 
have inherent problems and bring with them incentives which may create 
additional problems.  Any systematic method of representing financial data 
is going to have these types of problems with over-breadth and 
imperfection.  “[T]he balance sheet necessarily omits many items that are 
of financial value to the business but cannot be recorded objectively,” with 
respect to both assets and liabilities.215  “Principles-based accounting” 
advocates, who want financial statements to “present fairly” using an 
appropriate method, but not have fixed rules, do not often take into account 
that relying on judgment is at least as flawed as fixed rules.  Even if there 
are ways, e.g., liability rules, to keep poor judgment about “principles” in 
check, the enforcement costs of standards or principles may be high.  On 
the other hand, penalizing those who follow what many would call the 
letter, but not the spirit, of accounting rules may also be very costly.  
“Promulgation and compliance costs vary.  In general, rules are more costly 
than principles to create, while principles can impose higher compliance 
costs.  When rules enable relatively cheap compliance, compliance is more 
likely.  In contrast, when compliance with principles is relatively costly, the 
risk of non-compliance rises.”216 
Lawrence Cunningham has leveled a needed and convincing criticism 
against this binary debate over the supposed principles-versus-rules nature 
of accounting systems.  Cunningham concludes that any system of 
accounting is somewhere along a continuum which necessarily includes 
both rules and principles.217  Our search for the perfect system of 
accounting may be utopian folly at best, but it is further obscured by the 
binary terms of the debate.218  Cunningham is correct when he concludes:  
 
 213. Id. at 135. 
 214. Id. at 138. 
 215. KIESO ET AL., supra note 9, at 190. 
 216. Cunningham, supra note 193, at 1424 (footnotes omitted). 
 217. “All these systems contain a blend of provisions ranging from the particular to the 
general, from those providing precise ex ante instruction to those defined after the fact.”  Id. 
at 1413. 
 218. “These classifications are too crude to describe or guide the design of corporate law, 
securities regulation, or accounting systems.  Inquiry concerning the nature of rules and 
principles demonstrates how these labels invariably require sorting individual legal or 
accounting provisions onto a continuum rather than precisely fitting them into two neat 
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“If it is infeasible to establish a principles-based system of corporate law, 
securities regulation, or accounting, then it is misleading to promote the 
possibility.”219  Moreover, Cunningham also rightly emphasizes the 
evolving nature of accounting, and the fact that managers will always seek 
to bend, stretch, or work outside the framework, calling this “creative 
compliance” unavoidable.220  Perfection is impossible if only because 
accounting will always be a moving target.  Sometimes it is obvious that 
one method of accounting is best, but most of the time it is not. 
i. Stock Options, for Example 
A startup firm is unlikely to be successful and ever have any 
significant costs related to the options they grant.  However, if the company 
actually survives and prospers, and people exercise the options to cash out, 
we then know conclusively that the options were in fact costly, and by just 
what amount.  Of course, this knowledge is realized only years after the 
options are granted and their contingent liabilities incurred.  Thus we often 
cannot know what actually is fair until the future; yet, we also demand 
financial reporting of today’s circumstances while that information is still 
relevant to making decisions in the near future.  U.S. GAAP now requires 
the current expensing of options and valuation on the financial statements 
according to options pricing models.221  The debate over the topic is often 
said to have lasted from 1972 through 2004,222 but the problem had actually 
been identified and discussed for decades prior to 1972, with the first 
accounting standard on the subject issued in 1948.223  In fact, the “long 
history of the theory of option pricing began in 1900 when the French 
mathematician Louis Bachelier deduced a simple option pricing 
formula.”224  The 1972 date refers to the formal revisiting of the issue, just 
months before the publication of the Black-Scholes option pricing model,225 
 
categories.”  Id. 
 219. Id. at 1492 (emphasis added). 
 220. Id. at 1478.  “True, in corporate law, equitable principles can police mere technical 
compliance, and in securities regulation, the broad-gauged anti-abuse principles contribute.  
But, in general, regulatory pursuit of creative compliance is Quixotic—except perhaps 
through rhetoric.”  Id. at 1478-79 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). 
 221. Share-Based Payment, Fin. Acct Series:  Statement of Fin. Acct. Standards No. 123 
(Fin. Acct. Foundation) Dec. 2004, at ¶ 22, available at 
http://www.fasb.org/pdf/fas123r.pdf. 
 222. Nicholas G. Apostolou & D. Larry Crumbley, Accounting for Stock Options:  
Update on the Continuing Conflict, CPA JOURNAL, Aug. 2005, available at 
http://www.nysscpa.org/cpajournal/2005/805/essentials/p30.htm. 
 223. KING, supra note 74, at 162. 
 224. Robert C. Merton, Theory of Rational Option Pricing, 4 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. 
SCI. 141, 141 (1973). 
 225. See Fisher Black & Myron S. Scholes, The Pricing of Options and Corporate 
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which would forever change the valuation of options.226  Yet there remain 
many critics, even today, as to the appropriateness of options price 
modeling in financial accounting:227 
Smaller high-tech companies were very vocal [in opposing 
expensing], arguing that offering stock options was the only way 
they could hire top professional management.  Furthermore, they 
claimed that the losses that would result from forcing them to 
recognize stock options as compensation expense would impair 
their stock price and put them at a disadvantage compared to 
larger corporations better able to absorb the expense of stock 
options.228 
For firms that are not successful and never have conditions sufficient 
to make exercising options attractive, the modeled expense has added 
greatly to the cost of issuing options. 
None of this discussion is to say that expensing options is unmitigated 
evil, but merely to note that the rule to expense stock options when granted 
does more than simply compel truthful presentation, and it may not even do 
that.  While I do not question the relative accuracy of options pricing 
models, I do question their place in issuers’ financial statements.  They are 
a valuable tool for economics and finance, but their place in accounting is 
less clear.  For someone trading in options, sophisticated pricing models 
showing discounted values of a diverse portfolio of options are ideal.  
Options pricing models are excellent at representing expected future value 
of a stock option, but expected values are statistical depictions of 
 
Liabilities, 81 J. POL.ECON. 637, 637 (1973) (arguing that the “equilibrium condition can be 
used to derive a theoretical valuation formula.”).  See also Merton, supra note 224, 141 
(discussing the model and its implications and coining the term “Black-Scholes theory”). 
 226. KING, supra note 74, at 163. 
 227. Statement of Fin. Acct. Standards No. 123, supra note 221, at ¶ B59.  The Statement 
further stated that: 
Critics generally asserted that available valuation techniques, especially the 
Black-Scholes-Merton option-pricing formula and similar closed-form models, 
do not adequately take account of unique features of employee share options.  
They also pointed out that closed-form models may not be the best way to 
estimate the fair values of long-term options, even those without the unique 
features of employee share options, because those models are limited to single 
weighted-average assumptions for expected volatility and expected dividends.  
Some recommended deferring required recognition of compensation cost from 
employee share options until a better valuation technique for those instruments 
is developed.  They contended that recognizing compensation cost based on fair 
value estimated using currently available valuation techniques would add an 
unacceptable level of measurement error to financial statements and impair their 
reliability and comparability. 
Id. 
 228. Apostolou & Crumbley, supra note 222. 
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expectations about the future, not reports of the past or current condition.  
The issuer of options, however, is not looking at a diverse portfolio, but a 
potentially large, if also remote and unpredictable, contingent expense 
arising from the option grant, likely in the fairly distant future. 
If options are exercised, their discounted cost in prior years’ financial 
statements may be understated.  For unexercised options, though, an 
artificial expense was created.  In either case, the particular period or 
periods in which the expense should be debited is of further concern, 
because the “matching principle” of accounting says that expenses should 
appear in the financial statements in the period they were incurred.229  
Arguments based on matching can easily be formulated either in support 
of, or opposed to, the immediate expensing of stock options, even setting 
aside the problems of valuation.230  But, really, when was the expense 
incurred for an option held for ten years while a company transformed from 
start-up to behemoth? 
A simple illustration might best make the point.  Imagine that Startup 
Company gives me, an employee, a promise of a $100 bonus if the 
company is profitable for each of the next five years, but nothing 
otherwise.  The odds of this happening, let’s say, are 50/50.  Startup 
Company will either owe me $100 or $0 in five years.  One way to model 
this cost today is to expense the discounted present value of $50, the 
probabilistic cost of the bonus promise in five years.  The problem is 
obvious:  under no circumstance will that be the actual cost to Startup 
Company of the bonus promise, which will owe me either $0 or $100, but 
not $50.  If these bonus promises are tradable (like some stock options), 
then someone might develop a portfolio of bonus promises from many 
firms, in which case the probabilistic cost is a critical number:  buy at any 
price under the present value of $50 in five years.  For Startup Company to 
expense either $0, $50, or $100 (or any other amount) when the promises 
are made is an imperfect representation of this contingent liability, but to 
 
 229. “[T]he matching principle . . . dictates that efforts (expenses) be matched with 
accomplishment (revenues) whenever it is reasonable and practicable to do so.”  KIESO ET 
AL., supra note 9, at 46.  “In recognizing expenses, the approach to be followed is ‘let the 
expense follow the revenues.’”  Id.  Generally, matching means that expenses are booked 
when the revenues associated with them are recognized.  See also MYDDELTON, supra note 
7, at 115-16 (noting that revenue recognition practices have evolved in the U.K. over years, 
following the matching principle, even in the absence of formal accounting standards on 
specific recognition practices). 
 230. “Expenses are recognized not when wages are paid, or when the work is performed, 
or when a product is produced, but when the work (service) or the product actually makes 
its contribution to revenue.”  KIESO ET AL., supra note 9, at 46.  Allocation policies, e.g., 
depreciation are formulated and used “[f]or those costs for which it is difficult to adopt 
some type of rational association with revenue,” but items “may be expensed immediately” 
when periodic allocation “does not seem desirable,” including period costs such as 
executive compensation and administrative expenses.  Id. 
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say that $50 is the mandatory treatment implies an element of precision 
that simply does not exist. 
Any of these presentation alternatives merely constitutes a choice 
among imperfections, not the one and only path to ensure statement of an 
objective truth.  The truth is that, often, virtually nothing about the eventual 
cost of stock options is known when they are granted.  That does not give 
license to ignore options in financial statements, but it should at least give 
pause.  And, under any valuation, all known and relevant information 
(including modeled prices) should be disclosed. 
ii. Perspective and the Entity Theory of Accounting 
Accounting offers a distinct and highly individualized perspective of 
the data it presents, a perspective quite different from, and more subjective 
than, that of economics or finance.  One person’s debit is another person’s 
credit--literally.  It is striking that so many Americans today use “debit” 
cards, since each transaction actually represents a credit to the holder’s 
cash account, although it is a debit to the bank’s account.  Credit cards, on 
the other hand, do represent a credit to the user (an increase in liabilities), 
as well as a debit (increase in receivables) to the issuer.  These are but 
trivial examples, albeit instructive ones, of the inherently individualistic 
perspective of the language and practice of accounting. 
I noted in the discussion of stock options that, while pricing models 
are an imperfect (even if necessary) representation for financial statements, 
they are accurate and extremely useful for certain groups or individuals, 
notably actual and potential investors.  Investors have a different 
perspective than those running a corporation.  To expect that accounting 
data has--or should, or even could have--the same perspective as finance or 
economics is misguided.  One school of accounting thought, “entity 
theory,” is the most explicit in recognizing this. 
“Berle and Means (1932) . . . argued that separation of ownership and 
control had rendered traditional accounting profit measurement useless as a 
means of allocating economic resources.”231  Entity theory sought to depose 
the Berle and Means “challenge” by asserting “that managers sought to 
maximize returns to the firm, not to any particular user group, such as 
stockholders.”232  One of its advocates and formulators, A. C. Littleton, 
asserted that entity theory’s origins dated to the sixteenth century, but only 
in the twentieth century, after its full exposition, did it start to significantly 
affect accounting debates.233  Today, the impact of entity theory is minimal 
at best, and has been largely forgotten.  Yet, it still points to sources of 
 
 231. PREVITS & MERINO, supra note 22, at 281. 
 232. Id. (emphasis added). 
 233. Id. at 222. 
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significant disagreement about the nature and evolution of accounting. 
“The first comprehensive statement of entity theory”234 appeared in 
1922, ten years before the publication of Berle and Means’s The Modern 
Corporation and Private Property, in William Paton’s Accounting 
Theory.235  Later, in 1940, Paton would team up with Littleton to 
specifically respond to Berle and Means in Paton and Littleton’s An 
Introduction to Corporate Accounting Standards, published by the 
American Accounting Association (“AAA”).236  This later book further 
developed the entity theory of accounting, but did not differ significantly 
from Paton’s own 1922 version.  Of note, the 1940 jointly-authored 
“monograph was the only AAA publication ever to be read widely by 
practitioners.”237  Their work, however, along with that of other “early 
giants of accounting research,” was eschewed by the 1960s, in a move 
within the academy to more “scientific” accounting research.238  “Their 
work had focused on issues such as whether goodwill is an asset, whether 
to measure balances at cost or value, or whether an accounting unit should 
be considered a proprietorship or an entity”239--issues of tremendous 
importance even today.  This research was replaced with the “[u]se of 
integral calculus, algebraic transformation, and words like submartingale 
model [which] scared away common readers.”240  However useful and 
important the latter tools might be, we are left, decades later, facing the 
direst of consequences from not having settled the questions with which 
Paton et al. were concerned. 
Paton was conscious of the importance of perspective, and sought to 
reform accounting with that in mind: 
It is hoped that this discussion may help to unravel the confusion 
of accounting and economic ideas and terminology in which 
many accountants (and perhaps some economists) appear to have 
lost themselves.  The accountant naturally looks upon the 
business world through the eyes of the individual enterprise; the 
economist views the situation primarily from the standpoint of an 
entire industrial community, a whole market situation.  
Consequently concepts and terms extremely valid in one field 
cannot be transferred to the other without, at any rate, very 
careful qualification.  Yet . . . the accountant has often made 
unwarranted use of certain concepts of the economist.  Similarly 
 
 234. Id. at 260. 
 235. WILLIAM ANDREW PATON, ACCOUNTING THEORY:  WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE 
CORPORATE ENTERPRISE iv (Scholars Book Co. 1973) (1962). 
 236. PREVITS & MERINO, supra note 22, at 281. 
 237. KING, supra note 74, at 92. 
 238. Id. at 92-93. 
 239. Id. at 93 (emphasis added). 
 240. Id. 
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some economists have attempted to make dubious applications of 
the point of view of the business enterprise to the problems of 
economic theory.241 
Valuation of most any asset or liability is complicated and, perhaps, 
rather different based on your point of view.  If I have a large and diverse 
portfolio of investments, then discounting each one by its risk makes 
perfect sense, as already discussed regarding stock options.  And it also 
makes perfect economic sense that an insurance company is willing to sell 
me a life insurance policy that will pay someone $X upon my death.  But it 
seems terribly odd to think (either myself or for my beneficiary to do so) 
that my life today is simply worth $X, even if I am ‘fully’ insured for $X.  
Even setting aside loss of life, it seems pretty strange to say that I am 
indifferent to sustaining home or auto damage simply because I am insured 
against such harm, for there are other costs (both intangible and indirect 
financial ones) incurred when any such tragedy befalls.  Even if the 
economic costs are identical, the actual (total, tangible and intangible) costs 
of a tragedy are much higher than the insured value.  This difference is 
difficult to quantify, but it is important to remember that it exists. 
In accounting, it seems similarly strange to expect that a company can 
and will make “objective” valuations about their own condition instead of 
making representations in light of subjective factors, including their hopes 
and expectations.  This is information which the company has a bias in 
representing, but also information that they are in the best position to know, 
or at least to give evidence of.  Even when individuals are honest it may not 
be true that their memories clearly or accurately depict their intentions.242  
And “independent” audits do not necessarily foster an environment where 
auditors are necessarily privy to this information, nor are they in such a 
position as to demand such knowledge from their clients.243 
For me to value my own life as priceless while an insurance company 
assigns a tradable value to that same life can still seem like logically 
consistent positions; we can see the matter from different perspectives.  But 
talking about an abstract hypothetical is far different from expecting people 
(and companies) to look objectively at their own circumstances from 
different perspectives.  So why should we expect, and build rules around 
the assumption, that companies are going to (or even should) value their 
 
 241. PATON, supra note 235, at xv-xvi (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
 242. See Daniel Austin Green, Intention and Interpretation, (draft Jan. 11, 2010) 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1404203 (discussing the debates about whether mental 
states, including memories, are relevant to determining intentions).  See generally G.E.M. 
ANSCOMBE, INTENTION (1957) (rejecting the relevance of mental states to intentions). 
 243. See Daniel Austin Green, Whither and Whether Auditor Independence, 44 
GONZAGA L. REV. 365, 379 (2009) (discussing clients’ incentives to hide information from 
auditors). 
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own interests exactly as an outsider would? 
Unrealistic managerial optimism (even if honest) is an obvious 
problem, yet pessimism is not something most principals want inculcated 
in, or by, their agents.  Ceteris paribus, stockholders want savvy but 
bullish, not bearish, managers.  One cannot blindly trust firms (or auditors) 
to make these kinds of judgments; yet, one cannot rely solely on formulaic 
rules either.244  Although we are right to care about accuracy, accounting is 
not scientific; accounting is at least as much about judgment (“art”) as it is 
about scientific measurement.245  This is true of all asset valuation, but even 
more so as we move away from the tangible. 
iii. The Intangibles Haze 
In a 2006 law review article, Olufunmilyo Arewa called accounting in 
the age of today’s “intangibles paradigm” the “intangibles haze.”246  The 
term, she said, “refers to the fact that current accounting treatment of 
intangibles often results in financial statements that are unclear and not 
reflective of underlying economic reality.”247  There remains no consensus 
and, today, both market and historical values are regularly used in financial 
statements’ representation of the value of intangible assets.248  Nor is this a 
twenty-first century issue:  “Debates over the accounting treatment of 
intangibles are certainly not new and date back more than a century.”249  
Lack of consensus, however, may be a virtue, leading to an interrelated set 
of financial statements that do not put too much emphasis on either 
historical cost or fair value accounting. 
Arewa focuses in part on the fact that internally generated intangibles 
are considered current period costs and appear as operating expenses on the 
income statement, while purchased intangibles are capitalized and appear 
as assets on the balance sheet.250  The significance of this treatment is that 
“[i]t tends to result in distortions of reported financial statements because 
such financial statements do not accurately reflect the true economic value 
of many business enterprises.”251  Accounting for intangibles in the same 
manner as tangibles, where many costs are capitalized as assets, would 
 
 244. “The precise trade-off between certainty and context is not always clear.”  
Cunningham, supra note 216, at 1424. 
 245. See Green, supra note 243, at 376-79 (detailing the importance of judgment to 
performing independent audits). 
 246. Arewa, supra note 14, at 66. 
 247. Id. 
 248. Id. at 67. 
 249. Id. 
 250. Id. at 68-69.  See also Business Combinations, Fin. Acct. Series:  Statement of Acct. 
Standards No. 141, (Fin. Acct. Foundation) Dec. 2007, at ¶¶ 47-51. 
 251. Arewa, supra note 14, at 70. 
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affect companies in different ways.  Particularly, in the case of firms with 
increasing amounts of research and development (like startups), their 
income would rise and they might appear (more) profitable.252  On the other 
hand, firms with large and relatively stable research and development 
expenses (like large pharmaceutical companies) would appear to have a 
lower return on capital (“ROC”),253 an important number to many investors. 
Accounting’s current method of accounting for intangibles, then, 
results in a clear reporting advantage for large incumbents benefiting from 
high ROC ratios.254  (And one wonders whether most investors realize that 
this ROC calculation at such firms does not include R&D costs as capital 
investments.)  Moreover, not only do upstarts not receive this advantage, 
but their research and development costs are not capitalized at all, i.e., they 
have no research and development assets on their balance sheets, because 
they have not acquired other firms.  This contrasts with capitalized research 
and development assets for their large, established competitors that have 
purchased other firms whole.  These startup firms likely have low or 
negative net income in any event, but their overall financial condition 
appears substantially worse than it might be fairly stated were research and 
development capitalized as assets. 
As in the case of stock options, perfect presentation of intangibles 
might be impossible.  Neither full current expensing nor complete 
capitalization perfectly represents economic reality.  But “[t]he rise of 
intangibles has highlighted potential deficiencies in existing accounting 
rules as is evident in the fact that U.S.  GAAP has essentially not fully 
confronted the reality of this new paradigm.”255  This is especially relevant 
because of the intangibles backdrop with which so many recent corporate 
scandals have taken place.256  The increasing role of intangibles in the 
economy,257 coupled with lagging accounting treatments, “has enabled 
 
 252. Arewa, supra note 14, at 71. 
 253. Id. 
 254. This is standard, “generally accepted,” or canonical accounting practice.  Recall, 
though, that “off-balance sheet” financing through SPEs is used for the same purpose of 
improving ratios important to investors.  Arewa, supra note 14, at 23.  Intangibles and SPEs 
might be on different sides of the line between fair presentation and manipulation, but that 
line is often blurry. 
 255. Id. at 72 (citing Steven M.H. Wallman, Remarks at the International Intellectual 
Property Institute Presentation:  Intangible Assets, Valuation and Accounting Standards 5 
(May 1, 2002), available at 
http://www.iipi.org/confrences/Accounting_Standards/transcript.pdf. 
 256. Id. 
 257. Even setting aside conventional intangibles--things that might be capitalized as 
asset--it has been estimated that a full twenty-five percent of U.S. gross domestic product 
arises from “the persuasive and judgmental part of transactions costs, that is, to sweet talk,” 
and that this amount will only increase because “[t]he machine-like part can get better and 
better, yet leave the human part still requiring persuasion.”  Donald McCloskey & Arjo 
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certain companies to obfuscate their financial reporting, and has increased 
their capacity to engage in fraud.”258 
Goodwill is a particularly, and increasingly, important intangible.  We 
speak of goodwill, colloquially, in a variety of ways.  Trade amongst 
individuals is often greased by, or even arises from, “goodwill” between 
them.259  A special customer might be the beneficiary of “goodwill.”  And 
the large and popular non-profit Goodwill Industries helps train people 
with special needs for future employment.260  In the context of branding, we 
often hear that companies like Coca-Cola, Nike, Procter & Gamble, and 
countless others, have a substantial reserve of “goodwill” among 
consumers.261  This use of the word is closest to, yet still distinct from, the 
modern accounting definition of goodwill. 
To the contemporary accountant, goodwill is:  “The excess of the cost 
of an acquired entity over the net of the amounts assigned to assets 
acquired and liabilities assumed.”262  The value of Coca-Cola is not simply 
its shareholders’ equity, i.e., assets minus liabilities.  Goodwill, then, seeks 
to represent the difference between the true economic value of a company 
 
Klamer, One Quarter of GDP Is Persuasion, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 191, 192-93 (1995). 
 258. Arewa, supra note 14, at 80 (footnote omitted). 
 259. As Adam Smith wrote: 
When an animal wants to obtain something either of a man or of another 
animal, it has no other means of persuasion but to gain the kindness and favour 
of those whose service it stands in need of. A puppy fawns upon its dam, and a 
spaniel endeavours, by a thousand attractions, to engage the attention of its 
master who is at dinner, when it wants to be fed by him.  Man sometimes uses 
the same arts with his bretheren, and when he has no other means of engaging 
them to act according to his inclinations endeavours by every fawning attention 
to obtain their goodwill.  He has not time, however, to do this upon every 
occasion.  So necessitous is his natural situation that he stands at all times in 
need of the cooperation and assistance of great multitudes, while his whole life 
is scarce sufficient to gain the friendship of a few persons. 
ADAM SMITH, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 571 (R.L. Meek, D.D. Raphael & P.G. Stein 
eds., Liberty Fund 1982) (1762) (emphasis added). 
 260. “We are North America’s leading nonprofit provider of education, training, and 
career services for people with disadvantages, such as welfare dependency, homelessness, 
and lack of education or work experience, as well as those with physical, mental and 
emotional disabilities.”  Goodwill Industries, 
http://goodwill.org/page/guest/about/whatwedo. 
 261. See PATON, supra note 235, at 313 (“Managerial ability, methods and processes, 
territorial location, trade-name—these and numerous other factors may contribute to 
financial success. . . . With respect to these collateral factors and conditions some 
enterprises are more favorably situated than their representative competitors.  Such 
businesses may be said to have goodwill.”). 
 262. FIN. ACCT. STANDARDS BD., Goodwill and Other Intangible Assets, in STATEMENT 
OF FIN. ACCT. STANDARDS NO. 142, 105, available at www.fasb.org/pdf/fas142.pdf.  An 
earlier definition was “the estimated value of future excess income.”  PATON, supra note 
235, at 313. 
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and its equity.  Just like accounting for other intangibles, goodwill is not 
(for accounting purposes) generated internally, but is realized only when 
other entities are acquired.263  Moreover, goodwill is no longer amortized, 
but remains on the books indefinitely--potentially forever, subject to annual 
tests for impairment.264  One interesting argument for amortizing goodwill 
is that “acquired goodwill is an asset that is consumed and replaced with 
internally generated goodwill and that the acquired goodwill therefore must 
be amortized (even though the internally generated goodwill that is 
replacing it cannot be recognized as an asset).”265  The Financial 
Accounting Standards Board decided not to require amortization after 
making the following acknowledgement: 
“[N]ot all goodwill declines in value and . . . goodwill that does 
decline in value rarely does so on a straight-line basis.  Because 
the Board agreed with respondents who stated that straight-line 
amortization of goodwill over an arbitrary period does not reflect 
economic reality and thus does not provide useful information, 
the Board reconsidered its decision to require amortization of 
goodwill.”266 
The intangibles haze, like stock options and the entity theory of 
accounting, reminds us of the practical problems of representing financial 
reality.  Stock options, intangibles, threatened or pending litigation, and 
countless other situations present circumstances full of contingency and 
uncertainty.  These attributes render perfect representation impossible and 
may suggest financial data should be reported in multiple ways, with robust 
disclosure requirements, instead of through monolithic universal mandates 
of accounting treatments.  These practical problems, however, have 
theoretical roots, and section B takes up discussion of them. 
 
 263. See id. at 19-42 (discussing how goodwill is generated). 
 264. See id. at 12 (“Goodwill shall not be amortized.  Goodwill shall be tested for 
impairment at a level of reporting referred to as a reporting unit. . . . Impairment is the 
condition that exists when the carrying amount of goodwill exceeds its implied fair value.”). 
 265. Id. at 48 (emphasis added).  Discussion of the changes to the 1999 Exposure Draft 
continues:  “Another argument was that the useful life of goodwill cannot be predicted with 
a satisfactory level of reliability, nor can the pattern in which goodwill diminishes be 
known.  Hence, in the 1999 Exposure Draft the Board concluded that amortization over an 
arbitrary period of time was the only practical solution to an intractable problem and was 
preferable to the alternative of writing off goodwill immediately because that would be even 
less representationally faithful.”  Id.  This discussion of goodwill, then, further illustrates the 
imperfection and imprecision of accounting. 
 266. Id. at 49. 
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B. Accounting and Epistemology:  Impossibility, Indeterminacy, 
Pragmatism, and Artistry 
Accounting students generally learn that financial statements are a 
picture of the company’s financial condition.  Some statements are time-
lapsed pictures and show the changes within a period, like the income 
statement.  The balance sheet, however, is a “snapshot,” for it merely 
shows assets, liabilities, and equity as of the last day of the period.  The 
picture metaphor for accounting, I suggest, is more telling than it seems, 
though its consequences are seldom discussed. 
The ultimate problem of financial accounting and valuation, 
increasingly important given the complexity of modern transactions, is one 
of knowledge itself.  How do you represent “facts” or “truth” about 
financial conditions when every conceivable way to observe and present 
those facts is inherently flawed?  If accounting does have its own, internal 
perspective (as the entity theory asserts),267 a perspective different from 
economics’ or finance’s systemic perspective, then accounting need also 
have its own theoretical framework.  Is accounting an art or a (social) 
science?  Many would argue it is something of both.  Moreover, there is a 
strong link between pragmatism and art with respect to accounting and its 
influences, which also supports this claim.  “Both pragmatism and 
economic conditions in the United States appear[] to support the . . . 
position that accountancy [i]s an art.”268 
Impossibility and indeterminacy, two concepts related to problems of 
knowledge and uncertainty, have come to greatly influence the social 
sciences, law, and political philosophy, yet remain largely untouched in the 
contemporary context of accounting.  Impossibility rejects the very idea 
that there are, or can be, “right” answers, while indeterminacy suggests that 
the same facts can be used to equally support different opinions or 
outcomes--that the given facts (including precedent) do not always compel 
particular outcomes.  Is accounting plagued by impossibility, 
indeterminacy, or underdeterminacy? 
After discussing impossibility and indeterminacy in section i, section 
ii turns to philosophical pragmatism’s influence on accounting.  Section iii, 
then, focuses on accounting as an art.  More specifically, section iv looks at 
accounting as the art of photography.  Section v builds on the relevance of 
both the still photography and cinema metaphors to suggest ways in which 
accounting can become more dynamic in its approach, particularly with 
respect to accounting for intangibles, and ways in which such approaches 
would confront accounting’s problems of determinacy. 
 
 267. See supra notes 235-241 and accompanying text. 
 268. PREVITS & MERINO, supra note 22, at 208. 
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Remembering and working within accounting’s limitations, not 
forgetting or ignoring them, is the best way to make certain that we best 
employ accounting in corporate governance.  Instead of trying to hide 
accounting’s questions of determinacy, we should confront them by 
emphasizing the knowledge we do have.  Publication and utilization of this 
knowledge, however, is best promoted by broad disclosure requirements 
and expectations, not by narrow treatment prescriptions. 
i. Impossibility and Indeterminacy 
A strong formulation of “impossibility” rejects the very existence of 
truth or objectivity, of right and wrong.  Narrower (or weaker) formulations 
of impossibility indentify circumstances, general or specific, under which 
the desired result is impossible to obtain.  Perhaps the most famous such 
example is Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem, writing about social welfare 
maximization.269  U.S. debates over accounting during the early twentieth 
century seem to have been grappling with a rather strong formulation of 
impossibility, especially in the wake of the 1929 stock market crash: 
During the thirties, the profession developed an argument that 
could be called the ‘accounting impossibility theorem.’  
Conflicting user interests made it impossible to be ‘fair’ to all 
users when preparing general purpose financial statements.  
There simply was no ‘right’ answer to accounting questions; the 
appropriateness of any method was determined by the intended 
use of the financial report.  The committee [of the American 
Institute of Accountants (‘AIA’)] concluded that ‘for the present’ 
various methods must be tolerated, a position the AIA reiterated 
to the SEC a year later.270 
Although any “truth” in accounting is subject to qualifications and 
conditions, there is general agreement over how to account for “easy” 
transactions.  For a $10 cash sale on Jan. 1, 20XX, we expect that the year-
end financial statements will reflect a $10 debit to cash and $10 credit to 
 
 269. KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (1951); Kenneth J. 
Arrow, A Difficulty in the Concept of Social Welfare, 58 J. POLITICAL ECON. 328, 328 
(1950).  The theorem Arrow developed in these two works identifies general conditions 
under which social welfare cannot be maximized through democratic voting.  Social Choice, 
supra note 270; Concept of Social Welfare, supra note 270, at 328.  “[T]here are preference 
patterns which, if held by the individual members of the society, will give rise to an 
inconsistent pattern of social choice. . . .  [And t]he aim of the present paper is to show that 
these difficulties are general.  For any method of deriving social choice, by aggregating 
individual preference patterns which satisfies certain natural conditions, it is possible to find 
individual preference patterns which give rise to a social choice pattern which is not a linear 
ordering.”  Concept of Social Welfare, supra note 270, at 330. 
 270. PREVITS & MERINO, supra note 22, at 277 (footnote omitted). 
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sales reflected on the income statement, regardless of the fact that $10 on 
Jan. 1, 20XX is (because of the time value of money) likely worth more 
than $10 on Dec. 31, 20XX, and numerous other implicit or trivial 
conditions pertaining to the transaction.  Thus, an absolute form of 
impossibility in accounting cannot be readily defended without contesting 
the truth and accuracy of even this, the simplest of transactions to account 
for.  But, as section III.A discussed above, many accounting transactions 
today are impossible to perfectly represent.  We might retrench a bit on the 
matter and instructively update and reinterpret accounting’s impossibility 
debate with the language of law’s indeterminacy debate. 
Lawrence Solum, writing in a 1987 law review article, clarified the 
issues at stake in discussion of law’s determinacy by offering the following 
definitions: 
The law is determinate with respect to a given case if and only if 
the set of results that can be squared with the legal materials 
contains one and only one result. 
 
The law is indeterminate with respect to a given case if and only 
if the set of results in the case that can be squared with the legal 
materials is identical with the set of all imaginable results. 
 
The law is underdeterminate with respect to a given case if and 
only if the set of results in the case that can be squared with the 
legal materials is a non-identical subset of the set of all 
imaginable results.271 
For the reasons discussed in Part III.A, accounting, even under strong 
“rules-based” systems, cannot be truly determinate, especially with respect 
to intangibles, and in light of “creative compliance.”272  Yet neither can 
accounting be said to be indeterminate, because certainly “all imaginable 
results” would not equate to accounting’s ultimate, if somewhat intractable, 
goal of “fair” presentation.  Accounting must, therefore, be 
underdeterminate, where the supportable outcomes are “a nonidentical 
subset of the set of all imaginable results.”273  Important to a comparison of 
law’s indeterminacy debate to accounting, Solum also likens these 
distinctions to being rule-bound, unbound, and rule-guided.274  This 
certainly comports with Lawrence Cunningham’s discussion of accounting 
as necessarily existing on a continuum of rules and principles.275  Rules can 
 
 271. Lawrence B. Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis:  Critiquing Critical Dogma, 54 
U. CHI. L. REV. 462, 473 (1987) (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). 
 272. Cunningham, supra note 216, at 1478.  See also supra note 220 (providing the 
quotation and its context). 
 273. Solum, supra note 271, at 473. 
 274. Id. 
 275. Cunningham, supra note 216, at 1478. 
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guide, but they cannot be fully determinate. 
If accounting is underdeterminate, then it will always present issues of 
uncertainty.  Statistical representations are one way to present uncertainty 
and, increasingly, accounting relies on such methods, as in the case of stock 
options.  Traditionally, however, accounting’s answer to uncertainty was 
the experience and judgment--the artistry--of the accountant.  The language 
of both experience and art led accountants to pragmatism. 
ii. Pragmatism’s Influence 
In the early twentieth century, both business and government began 
demanding that accounting be more “scientific,” advocating a “rule book” 
and that accounting be “amenable to definite axioms, and capable . . . of 
producing definite and exact results.”276  In their defense of accounting as a 
profession requiring judgment,277 accountants turned to philosophical 
pragmatism and, in turn, to pragmatism’s notion of the artistic.278  “Truth 
was perceived as phenomenally relative; ideas must be tested for 
practicality and attainability; experience enabled each individual to judge 
the validity of ideas according to specific circumstances.”279  If this was 
true, then it was among professional accountants and auditors that 
experience and judgment was to be found.280  Accountants embraced 
pragmatism’s idea of “adaptive theory”--the notion that theory, when 
rooted firmly in experience, could offer further insight into practical 
problems.281 
Accounting, however, was not the only place of pragmatism’s 
influence, but merely part of the redefinition of “truth in relation to its 
practical consequence,” which offered a justification for much of the time’s 
progressive activism, in which accountants and other professionals would 
be given the important role of “disinterested expert.”282  Part of the reason 
accounting was attracted to pragmatism is simply that the leaders of the 
 
 276. PREVITS & MERINO, supra note 22, at 207 (citing Alexander Smith, The Abuse of 
Audits in Selling Securities, in AAPA YEAR BOOK 169, 170 (1912)). 
 277. See PREVITS & MERINO, supra note 22, at 207 (“[C]ircumstances must rule, you 
have to have experience, that is why we are professional accountants.” (quoting Arthur 
Lowes Dickinson)) (emphasis added). 
 278. See PREVITS & MERINO, supra note 22, at 208 (“Early practitioners believed that, 
because of the vastly different circumstances encountered in the business world, accounting 
practice was best viewed as an art”). 
 279. Id. 
 280. See Green, supra note 243, at 376 (discussing the need for experience and the 
definition of expertise, including the minimal amount of experience required to be an 
expert). 
 281. See PREVITS & MERINO, supra note 22, at 208-09 (discussing the emergence of the 
“adaptive theory”). 
 282. Id. at 177 (citing JOHN DEWEY, HUMAN NATURE AND CONDUCT (1922)). 
GREENFINAL[1] 6/1/2010  10:37:19 AM 
662 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 12:3 
 
profession realized they were in desperate need of a theoretical grounding 
for their profession, especially as they sought to formalize accounting’s 
educational requirements.  The important works in accounting, until 1908-
09, were of English origin, and as one accounting teacher observed:  “We 
not only do not possess a body of accounting literature that could be called 
American, but if we enquire in some of our libraries or book stores for 
accounting books we generally receive the answer, ‘You mean 
bookkeeping books.’”283  This, of course, confirmed that their progress in 
influencing the public about the need for, or even distinction or existence 
of, professional accountants had not been great.  Even as accounting 
struggled to find a theoretical basis, it also found political means through 
which accountants could secure the success and distinction they had been 
seeking. 
Most accountants of the time were deeply opposed to government 
intervention in financial matters.284  Some, including the very influential 
and formidable Elijah Watt Sells, were very outspoken about their 
opposition.285  Apparently seeing no irony, however, these same 
accountants had long sought to become “an accredited profession,” 
succeeding with the 1896 passage of the first state CPA law in crucial New 
York State, followed by eight other states over the next decade.286  The 
passage of the New York CPA law led to efforts to secure “similar 
legislation in the remaining states [that] would preoccupy accountants” for 
twenty-five years.287 
Just like today, various financial crises spurred criticism of 
accountants even as they were emerging as a profession.  Failures of large 
“trusts” (holding companies) provoked “outcry for more direct government 
supervision of corporations,”288 but proposed legislation to pass a federal 
corporate law, and a right to inspect books, was repeatedly defeated in 
numerous congressional years between 1903 and 1930.289  The panic of 
1907, when New York banks lost over $12 million in just three days, 
presented itself as an opportunity for accountants to seize upon “a political 
environment favorable to further regulation,” and a Journal of Accountancy 
editorial declared:  “Publicity [of financial statements] is a safe and 
conservative remedy for most corporate abuses.  The certified public 
accountant is the authorized agent of publicity.”290  Thus, for all of 
 
 283. CAREY, Vol. 1, supra note 12, at 101-02. 
 284. PREVITS & MERINO, supra note 22, at 186. 
 285. See id. at 186-87 (discussing Watt Sells’s pamphlet that was hostile to government 
intervention in the free market). 
 286. CAREY, Vol. 1, supra note 12, at 44-45. 
 287. PREVITS & MERINO, supra note 22, at 188. 
 288. Id. at 183. 
 289. Id. at 186. 
 290. CAREY, Vol. 1, supra note 12, at 54-55. 
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accounting’s anti-government rhetoric, they were not so principled as to not 
join in criticism, or seek to secure their own interests, especially following 
crisis.291 
In an era of progressive political change, “[a]ccountants had to 
provide an institutional framework if the profession was to respond 
effectively to contemporary demands.”292  Pragmatism was the intellectual 
bridge between progressive government and progressive accounting:  
“Pragmatism gave philosophic justification to political reforms and had a 
decided impact on the evolution of accounting theory, educational 
standards, and ethics.”293  The need for a theoretical foundation--replacing 
“rationalization” with logic--led to “integrative theory.”294  In formulating 
an overarching theory of the nature of accounting, “[a]ccounting theorists 
faced a formidable task:  they had to reconcile traditional accounting profit 
measurement, based on individualistic economic theories, with an 
emerging corporate economy.”295 
Pragmatism has lost much of its influence and appeal in accounting 
today, but a return to pragmatism’s emphasis on experience and perspective 
may again be helpful to debates about accounting.  There are multiple ways 
to see the world, and multiple methods may be “generally accepted.”296  
“[G]eneral acceptance,” then, “may be a necessary though not a sufficient, 
requirement for accounting principles.”297 
One area outside business and political debates that pragmatism also 
influenced was art.  Accountants had long asserted that their craft was an 
art, so it made perfect sense for them to also embrace this side of 
philosophic pragmatism. 
iii. Accounting as an Art 
If pragmatism’s ultimate lesson was that even truth was phenomenally 
relative, then art was surely relative.  And if accounting was an art then it, 
too, was relative.  To the accountant a single definition, borrowed from the 
pragmatists, could be used to describe both art and accounting since, they 
 
 291. See generally, PREVITS & MERINO, supra note 22, at 183-87 (discussing 
accountants’ demands for more corporate oversight in the 1890s and early 1900s); CAREY, 
Vol. 1, supra note 12, at 53-70 (discussing accountants’ reactions to federal regulation 
during times of panic). 
 292. PREVITS & MERINO, supra note 22, at 187. 
 293. Id. 
 294. Id. at 209. 
 295. Id. at 210. 
 296. See MYDDELTON, supra note 7, at 114 (asking two rhetorical questions:  “Does the 
desire for general acceptance mean that accounting standards allow too many alternatives;” 
and “But is there only one way to interpret the world?”). 
 297. Id. 
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essayed, accounting is an art:  “[T]he power of performing certain actions 
especially as acquired by experience, study or observation.”298 
Specialized knowledge and experience, along with educational 
standards and requirements, were areas where professional accountants had 
already been trying to establish widespread acknowledgement among the 
public of their superiority.  These are also said to be elements which 
distinguish “a true profession . . . from other pursuits.”299  A former AICPA 
officer, writing the history of the organization, claimed that “certified 
public accountants can fairly claim to be the only true profession in the 
field of finance and management.”300  If experience and study were 
elements of both professionalism and art, then accountants had found the 
philosophy that they wanted in pragmatism. 
Even today’s accountants face difficult decisions in which judgment, 
not economic or financial modeling, guides them to recognize events in 
particular periods, and to decide where and how to classify events in the 
financial statements, and under what type of valuation method.301  Some 
have even suggested that there are no errors in accounting, just estimates 
that lead to inevitable misstatements, to be reversed in response to new 
information.302  Most would contend that judgment has an important role in 
the process of making estimates and adjustments, even if they have a 
somewhat narrower view of accounting generally.  “Accounting is an art 
not a science, and trying to outlaw thinking and imagination would cripple 
the profession.  Restricting company accountants and auditors to checking 
compliance with rules is like requiring real artists, childlike, to paint by 
numbers.”303 
Every entity faces different circumstances which affect its operating 
environment and its outlook.  Because of the need to choose between 
alternatives in light of these circumstances, early practitioners were 
adamant in their portrayal of accounting as an art.304  Even though 
accounting has experienced a significant modern transformation to more 
scientific valuation techniques,305 at least some vestige of “accounting as 
art” has completely permeated the way we conceive the field:  financial 
statements as pictures (photographs and cinema), the subject of the next 
two sections. 
 
 298. PREVITS & MERINO, supra note 22, at 208. 
 299. CAREY, Vol. 1, supra note 12, at 3. 
 300. Id. 
 301. KING, supra note 74, at 101. 
 302. See Id. at 1-2 (attributing these statements to King’s first accounting professor, the 
highly influential George Sorter at NYU). 
 303. MYDDELTON, supra note 7, at 99 (emphasis added). 
 304. PREVITS & MERINO, supra note 22, at 208. 
 305. See generally KING, supra note 74, at 89-101 (describing the history of accounting). 
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iv. Financial Reporting as a Picture:  Accounting and Photography 
“The balance sheet presents a snapshot of a company’s financial 
position at a point in time.”306  “The balance sheet is like a snapshot of an 
entity at a specific date.  It is intended to reflect the financial condition of 
that entity as of that specific date.”307 
We certainly may be right to expect the accountant to present 
blemishes, but is “touched up” financial data any less a true representation 
of a corporation than a portrait is of its subject, where the portrait made the 
person look slightly better than they actually did at the time?  Is accounting 
of greater importance than a portrait, or is there a difference in kind when 
making this comparison?  I do not intend to defend here the removing of 
blemishes from either financial statements or portraits, and I also realize 
that I am stretching the accounting-is-photography metaphor to its extreme-
-indeed, I intend to.  But the fundamental issue is the same in each case:  at 
what point do superficial changes distort the truth of the representation?  
And, importantly, “while ‘smoothing’ is now out of fashion it does allow 
managements to give some emphasis to longer-term trends.”308  Thus, while 
earnings management may be a deliberate manipulation, it is not 
necessarily nefarious and may reflect a more accurate long-term vision 
which “contrasts with the short-termism of annual accounts (and the even 
shorter-termism of quarterly reports).”309 
Like financial statements, “[p]hotographs furnish evidence.  
Something we hear about, but doubt, seems proven when [we are] shown a 
photograph of it.”310  Just like the photograph, we may let accounting’s 
seeming accuracy and precision allure us into believing its absolute truth: 
While a painting or a prose description can never be other than a 
narrowly selective interpretation, a photograph can be treated as a 
narrowly selective transparency.  But despite the presumption of 
veracity that gives all photographs authority, interest, 
seductiveness, the work that photographers do is no generic 
exception to the usually shady commerce between art and 
truth.311 
Under this description, then, accountants risk exposing their own 
“shady commerce between art and truth” by insisting on the science of their 
enterprise.  Even if accounting were able to be scientific and objective, it 
 
 306. PAUL D. KIMMEL, JERRY J. WEYGANDT, & DONALD E. KIESO, FINANCIAL 
ACCOUNTING:  TOOLS FOR BUSINESS DECISION MAKING 52 (2d ed., 2000). 
 307. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 20, at 10 (emphasis added). 
 308. MYDDELTON, supra note 7, at 117. 
 309. Id. 
 310. SUSAN SONTAG, ON PHOTOGRAPHY 5 (1977). 
 311. Id. at 6. 
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would not be free from the problems of perspective. 
Perspective is an important element of both photography and 
accounting.  Paton’s entity theory of accounting was built around the idea 
that accounting and accountants have a definite point of view:  “The 
accountant looks upon business operations essentially through the eyes of 
the particular group of managers and owners.”312  How much of a practical 
difference does perspective make in reporting on business operations?  A 
lot, at least according to Paton:  “It is a point of view in marked contrast to 
that of the economist . . . and in this contrast lies the chief explanation of 
the difference between accounting and economic categories.”313  Susan 
Sontag’s description of photographs’ point of view applies, in the spirit of 
Paton, equally to financial statements: 
Photographs had the advantage of uniting two contradictory 
features.  Their credentials of objectivity were in-built.  Yet they 
always had, necessarily, a point of view.  They were a record of 
the real—incontrovertible . . . since a machine was doing the 
recording. . . . The truth is they are not “simply” anything, and 
certainly not regarded just as facts.314 
So what of this link, this metaphor, this similarity between accounting 
and photography?  And what of this matter of perspective and objectivity?  
I would suggest that accountants, in trying to appear reputable and 
unbiased, have placed too much emphasis on creating and maintaining a 
façade of objectivity, effectively eschewing the inescapable influence of 
perspective.  Accountants used to emphasize the need for judgment, along 
with their expertise in providing it.  Today, though, both accountants and 
photographers315 purport to be mere reporters, conveying a simple truth.  
Like photographers, who often purport to “take” (passively, instead of 
“make”) photographs,316 too many accountants today wish to be--or at least 
claim to be--engaged in a similarly passive enterprise.  Yet snapshots can 
be misleading precisely because their accuracy, however great it may be, is 
fleeting.  “The balance sheet is a ‘snapshot’ at a moment in time.  But in 
most ongoing businesses annual accounting bears no relation to the 
business cycle.”317 
Perspective, however, may be of even greater importance to 
accounting today than in Paton’s time.  Intangibles, as discussed in section 
III.A.iii, supra, present true dilemmas for financial statement presentation.  
 
 312. PATON, supra note 235, at 17 (emphases added). 
 313. Id. 
 314. SUSAN SONTAG, REGARDING THE PAIN OF OTHERS 26 (2003). 
 315. This is especially true in news media depiction of graphic and violent acts.  See 
generally id. (discussing the portrayal of war through photographic images). 
 316. Id. at 46. 
 317. MYDDELTON, supra note 7, at 119. 
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Accountants’ judgment, then, is presumably even more important in this 
context, yet accountants seek ever more “objective” presentation, 
notwithstanding its dissonance with economic reality.318  The U.S. Supreme 
Court recognizes that “GAAP . . . does not necessarily parallel economic 
reality."319  Or as Olumfunmilayo Arewa said:  “As a result of the 
intangibles paradigm shift, financial statements have become less 
informative from an accounting and economic perspective.”320 
Perspective (or subjectivity) in accounting was not always considered 
a bad thing.  Allowing for multiple, competing visions actually makes 
accounting more vibrant.  Plurality leads to evolution that facilitates 
accounting keeping up with an ever-changing business environment.321  
Experience and judgment can properly lead accountants to new and 
different presentation of information, and “deviation from conformity with 
existing norms sometimes reflects useful innovation rather than harmful 
obfuscation.”322 
How then, in the wake of accounting scandals and economic crises, 
might accounting reclaim the good of perspective, the need for judgment?  
That is the topic of the next section. 
v. Disclosures:  Can Accounting be More Cinematographic than 
Photographic? 
“The income statement is like a motion picture of the enterprise over a 
defined period of time, such as one year, and is intended to reflect the 
financial performance of the entity during that period of time.”323 
The “photographic paradox” is its simultaneous literalness and the 
added meaning (“message”) of what it shows us.324  But the photograph is 
also bounded, framed by a border.  Cinema, however, allows the viewer to 
transcend, at least to some degree, such limitations: 
The photographic image is full, crammed:  no room, nothing can 
be added to it.  In the cinema, whose raw material is 
photographic, the image does not, however, have this 
completeness (which is fortunate for the cinema).  Why?  
 
 318. See supra Part III.A.i (discussing the expensing of stock options). 
 319. Shalala v. Guernsey, 514 U.S. 87, 100 (1995). 
 320. Arewa, supra note 14, at 45. 
 321. See MYDDELTON, supra note 7, at 111 (“More than one accounting practice may be 
‘generally accepted’ at any one time.  If it were not so, how could accounting evolve?”). 
 322. MACEY, supra note 32, at 156. 
 323. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 20, at 11 (emphasis added) (emphases omitted). 
 324. See ROLAND BARTHES, IMAGE, MUSIC, TEXT 17 (Stephen Heath trans., 1977) (“By 
definition, the scene itself, the literal reality.  From the object to its image there is of course 
a reduction--in proportion, perspective, colour . . . . [I]t is a message without a code . . . . 
[T]he photographic message is a continuous message.”). 
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Because the photograph, taken in flux, is impelled, ceaselessly 
drawn toward other views; in the cinema, no doubt, there is 
always a photographic referent, but this referent shifts, it does not 
make a claim in favor of its reality, it does not protest its former 
existence; it does not cling to me:  it is not a spector.325 
Thus the cinema allows us--forces us--to recall that there is more to 
the scene, that there is action outside the frame, and this makes it less likely 
that we are fooled by the literalness of the photographic paradox. 
What does all this talk of photography and cinema have to do with 
accounting?  If we see financial statements as photographs, why not as 
cinema?  Like photography, accounting has sought, in many ways, to 
present its subject as literal truth, passively captured, and free of bias.  Yet 
again, just like photography, this is simply half-truth, and one half of the 
literal-subjective paradox that is inherent to photography.  Accounting’s 
precision belies its fallibility.  If cinema is advantageously lacking the 
“completeness” of the still photograph, forcing us to acknowledge its 
limits, then why could--or should--accounting not do likewise?  In fact, 
financial statements have long done just that, through disclosures--notes to 
the financial statements. 
Notes to the financial statements should remind us of the statements’ 
own, sometimes steep, limitations.  Financial statements are generally 
accompanied, on each page, with “notes are an integral part of the 
financial statements” boilerplate, but this generic statement truly ought to 
remind us that the notes after the statements are part of the story, and 
maybe a very big (or even the largest) part of the financial condition.  We 
might think of this financial statement boilerplate as the equivalent of the 
“this movie is a dramatization of actual events” boilerplate in docudramas 
and biopics.  Both types of messages remind us that we are seeing one 
version of the story, but that certain facts may be omitted, disputed, glossed 
over, or subject to different interpretation than with which we are 
presented.  On the whole, this is a useful and important reminder. 
Olufunmilayo Arewa has previously advocated increased disclosure 
standards, writing about accounting for intangibles: 
Current accounting practices and procedures as embodied in 
GAAP do not adequately measure intangibles or sufficiently 
contemplate the implications of the intangibles paradigm for 
existing measurements. . . . Additional disclosure about 
intangibles would, however, improve the accuracy of financial 
statements’ representations of economic reality and provide 
additional information that may help minimize opportunities for 
fraud that currently exist with respect to intangibles paradigm 
 
 325. ROLAND BARTHES, CAMERA LUCIDA:  REFLECTIONS ON PHOTOGRAPHY 89 (Richard 
Howard trans., 1980). 
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discourse and company framing.  This would in turn help make 
financial statements more transparent and reliable.326 
The SEC, too, has recognized that the notes to the financial statements 
can offer increased understanding and transparency of the underlying data.  
In its 2008 report on fair value accounting, the Chief Accountant’s Office 
recommended the introduction of “a new schedule (to be included in the 
notes of the financial statements) that would reconcile cash flows to 
comprehensive income.”327  This new statement “would be helpful because 
users have asked for information to help them understand how components 
of accrual accounting affect an entity’s comprehensive income and future 
cash flows.”328  More generally, the SEC has also noted that financial 
statement users and producers have each highlighted the value of 
increasing disclosures, including sensitivity analyses, projections of future 
values, and detailed discussion of both the inputs and valuation techniques 
employed in the financial statements.329  Regardless of the specificity of 
standards, increased disclosures allow users to select and analyze the data 
they believe to be valuable. 
Although, as shown in Part III.A., perfect valuation may be 
impossible, disclosure goes a long way to ameliorate the problems of 
choosing among competing valuations.  By disclosing alternatives and the 
facts underlying circumstances, users may (and are exhorted to) use the 
conditions they deem relevant in assessing the company’s overall financial 
condition.  While Arewa has shown the great need for more robust 
disclosure pertaining to intangibles, it applies equally to every area of 
valuation in accounting, including the infamous fair value standards. 
C. FAS 157 and Fair Value Accounting 
SFAS No. 157 does not itself require mark-to-market or fair 
value accounting.  Rather, other accounting standards in various 
ways require what is more broadly known as “fair value” 
accounting, of which mark-to-market accounting is a subset.  
SFAS No. 157 defines fair value, establishes a framework for 
measuring fair value in U.S. generally accepted accounting 
principles (“GAAP”), and requires expanded disclosures about 
fair value measurements.330 
Various government regulators, including the Office of the Controller 
of the Currency, acknowledge that fair value, while not perfect, is better 
 
 326. Arewa, supra note 14, at 95. 
 327. 2008 SEC Report, supra note 11, at 198 (emphasis added). 
 328. Id. 
 329. Id. at 151. 
 330. 2008 SEC Report, supra note 11, at 1 (emphasis added). 
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than its alternatives:  “[F]air value[] provides the best estimate of the value 
of many types of financial instruments as of the measurement date.  ‘While 
additional steps can and should be taken to enhance existing standards, the 
OCC believes that it is inappropriate to suspend current fair value 
measurement.’”331  Yet there remains a tremendous outcry to repeal fair 
value standards. 
Often portrayed as a single and very recent accounting change, “fair 
value” actually refers to a broad spectrum of accounting methods that have 
been long-debated and that were implemented largely in response to earlier 
financial scandals and crises, as discussed in section i of this Part.  Section 
ii distinguishes mark-to-market accounting from fair value accounting, and 
discusses why mark-to-market might actually be a misapplication of fair 
value accounting for some companies in recent reporting quarters.  Section 
iii frames the problem of finding alternatives to fair value. 
i. History of and Reasons for Fair Value Accounting 
John Poirier, then the SEC’s Acting Chief Accountant, offered the 
following as part of his 2009 testimony before Congress about mark-to-
market accounting: 
Previous generations, after considering the causes of financial 
crises experienced during their times, concluded that fair value 
accounting was an important tool to communicate investment 
values to capital market participants.  In particular, fair value was 
chosen after careful consideration, including consideration of the 
causes of previous financial crises and the tools that would best 
equip future generations when crises reemerged, such as we find 
ourselves in today. 
 
Although the use of fair value dates back many decades, the use 
of fair value measurement expanded significantly in 1975 due to 
concerns about the appropriate measurement attribute for 
securities. . . . 
 
The banking and savings and loan crisis of the 1980s further 
exposed challenges to the historic cost model of accounting for 
financial institutions.  Specifically, savings and loan institutions 
accepted short-term deposits and used these deposits to fund 
long-term fixed-rate (e.g., 30-year) mortgage loans, their primary 
asset.  In the late 1970s and early 1980s, interest rates were 
driven up by high inflation.  As a result, the "current value" of 
 
 331. John Poirier, U.S. regulator opposes suspending mark-to-market, REUTERS, Mar 11, 
2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/ousiv/idUSTRE52A7B020090311 (quoting Kevin 
Bailey, deputy comptroller of the currency). 
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assets in many cases was significantly less than the value of 
many reported liabilities, and these institutions were 
economically insolvent.  However, under the historic cost 
accounting model, these losses were often not reflected in 
financial statements, which reduced transparency about their 
solvency.332 
While this history is correct and well substantiated,333 and although it 
stands in stark contrast to media reports and commentary that fair value is 
new, even Poirier’s history is greatly abridged and unduly contemporary in 
its focus.  While some of this history was already discussed,334 here, I shall 
elaborate (although still not comprehensively) on the length and nature of 
the pre-1975 debate that brought us to fair value accounting standards. 
Financial records have existed in some form for at least 4000 years335 
and ancient philosophers grappled with the notion and problems of value in 
both exchange and wealth.336  Double entry bookkeeping dates to at least 
1299 AD,337 and must surely have included questions of valuation among 
its earliest users.  In terms of valuation leading to financial crises and 
eventual government response, an early and well-documented case is the 
South Sea Bubble of 1720.  Over approximately one month, the South Sea 
Company’s stock plummeted from £900 (having once been £1050) to £190 
per share in a panic where investors, fearing total loss, caused a run on and 
the failure of the company, with Parliament ultimately passing an act 
rescinding corporate charters in the absence of the monarch’s personal 
approval.338  This marked a suspension of “[t]he corporation as a common 
 
 332. Testimony Concerning Mark-to-Market Accounting:  Practices and Implications:  
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored 
Enterprises of the H. Comm. on Financial Services, 111th Cong. (Mar. 12, 2009) (statement 
of James L. Kroeker, Acting Chief Accountant of the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2009/ts031209jlk.htm 
(emphases added) (footnote omitted). 
 333. See, e.g., supra Part III.A. 
 334. Id. 
 335. THOMAS R. MARTIN, ANCIENT GREECE:  FROM PREHISTORIC TO HELLENISTIC TIMES 
24-25 (Yale Nota Bene 2000) (1996) (discussing evidence of accounting records dating to at 
least the ancient Minoans of approximately 2000 B.C.). 
 336. Whether one sees the ancient economy as similar to, analogous to, or very different 
from the modern concept of economics and finance, it is clear that many issues were of 
common concern then and now.  See M. I. FINLEY, THE ANCIENT ECONOMY (1973) 
(discussing the concept of finance and economics primarily in ancient Greece and the 
Roman Empire and arguing that although they had similar material concerns, the ancients 
were ultimately more concerned with status and self-sufficiency than economics in the 
modern sense).  But see WALTER SCHEIDEL AND SITTA VON REDEN, THE ANCIENT ECONOMY 
(2002) (examining how well the Finley thesis has lasted in the subsequent decades). 
 337. PREVITS & MERINO, supra note 22, at 3. 
 338. Id. at 23. 
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business form.”339  The corporate form had become popular to spread risk 
during periods of extensive colonization, beginning with corporate charters 
for English trade companies dating back to failed Roanoke in 1585 and the 
profitable East India Company in 1600.340  These early capital markets 
fueled many successful ventures, but the South Sea Bubble renewed desire 
for conservatism, skepticism of capital asset valuations, and also spurred 
the creation of the public accounting profession.341 
Soon after independence, America’s capital markets began to be 
regularized in 1792, when merchants and auctioneers met on Wall Street to 
establish consistent securities trading practices--no longer unorganized in 
various coffeehouses, but during prescribed hours under a nearby 
buttonwood tree.342  By the 1830s, however, some were concerned by the 
number of bank failures.343  Yet general corporation laws were taking hold 
around the growing nation and accountants were finding employment, 
especially in banks, as burgeoning capital markets fueled expanded 
capacity and risk taking.344  And these accountants were forced to confront 
the problem of valuation. 
Although some had sought to establish theoretical concerns in 
accounting as early as the sixteenth century,345 accounting was mostly the 
product of practical, not theoretical, concerns.  That is, until the movement 
in the early twentieth century to create a dominant theoretical framework 
for the profession in the U.S; which is not to say, however, that practical 
problems--especially valuation--were not of profound significance, or that 
these issues went completely unrecognized.  Throughout the creation and 
expansion of capital markets and businesses in the U.S., “the engine of 
corporate capitalism would begin to generate demand for expert financial 
and accounting advice.”346  Failures would invite blame, but accountants 
kept on, if unwittingly, developing the groundwork of competing theories 
of valuation. 
It was observed during this time, for instance, that Americans defined 
personal wealth as capital accumulation, i.e., net worth, while the English 
defined wealth in terms of income.347  Whether American accountants 
caused, contributed to, or simply responded to this phenomenon is 
debatable, but accountants certainly faced the problems of asset valuation, 
 
 339. Id. 
 340. Id. at 15. 
 341. Id. at 24. 
 342. Id. at 40. 
 343. Id. at 41. 
 344. Id. at 41-42. 
 345. Id. at 222. 
 346. Id. at 61. 
 347. Id. at 215. 
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regardless of the cause of its growing emphasis in America.348  After over 
100 years of rapid growth, by 1900 there was widespread and growing 
concern about misleading, inflated capital asset valuation by the promoters 
of securities.349 
Even while questions of valuation grew more important, accountants 
struggled not only over how to value assets, but what assets were in the 
first place.350  Related to this was a concern that went directly back to 
capital markets:  the proper level of capitalization, i.e., stock value versus 
asset value.351  This formative period was also when accountants began to 
move towards some consensus that “some departure from [historical or 
original] cost was essential if the balance sheet was to reflect the ‘true 
financial condition,’” as through depreciation and amortization.352 
Panics in 1837, 1842, 1857, 1874, and 1893353 no doubt further shook 
confidence in valuation.  However, it was the panic of 1907, noted already, 
that served most conveniently for the emerging and still-formalizing public 
accounting profession to argue for reform, as well as its own expertise in 
financial reporting.354  Although CPAs had limited success in these efforts, 
the wake of 1929’s monumental crash opened wide the regulatory door 
through which the profession would transform itself. 
The years between 1907 and 1929 are important to valuation theory 
because this is when accounting was seeking to formulate its theoretical 
foundations, and valuation was of central importance to this effort.  This 
included, in its broadest terms, Paton arguing entity theory against pure 
proprietary theory.355  More specifically, seminal debates included contests 
over the dollar as a unit of measurement (~1918);356 par versus no-par stock 
and the earnings accounting manipulations possible under each (~1917-
28);357 and even the valuation of intangibles (~1922).358 
Throughout these formative years of the modern U.S. economy and 
financial system, a variety of valuation techniques were in active use, 
including historical cost, replacement cost, and “price-level” (a form of fair 
value) accounting.359  Although historical cost would come to experience 
 
 348. Id. 
 349. Id. at 216. 
 350. Id. at 216-17. 
 351. Id. at 216. 
 352. Id. at 218. 
 353. See id. at 67, 69, 72, 96, 109, 111, 182 (noting these episodes). 
 354. CAREY, Vol. 1, supra note 12, at 55-56. 
 355. “The emphasis of this treatise . . . lies in a revision of the broad outlines of the 
proprietary theory of accounts.”  PATON, supra note 235, at iv. 
 356. PREVITS & MERINO, supra note 22, at 262. 
 357. Id. at 263-64. 
 358. See PATON, supra note 235, at 307-32 (dedicating a whole chapter to discussion of 
goodwill and other intangibles). 
 359. PREVITS & MERINO, supra note 22, at 267. 
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somewhat greater prominence, but never exclusivity, its problems became 
more apparent after it contributed to significant economic problems, 
eventually leading to the renewed use of fair value in the 1970s and 1980s, 
as discussed above by SEC Acting Chief Accountant John Poirier. 
Current accounting standards compel both fair value and historical 
cost accounting, in different circumstances, under the “mixed-attribute 
model.”360  Some assets, for instance, are commonly valued at the lower of 
cost or fair, i.e., market, value; thus, both valuations are maintained by the 
reporting entity, yet potentially reported differently in different periods, 
making the asset valuation incomparable across periods.361 
Like fair value, historical cost accounting is not a single method, but a 
range of possible methods, all of which are anchored in, but also depart 
from, simply recording historical prices.  Nor does historical cost 
accounting necessarily promote comparability because of differences in 
when cost was measured (e.g., $50 in 1950 is quite different from $50 
today), different impairment testing or calculation and artificial (if still 
justifiable) adjustments such as depreciation and amortization, which may 
themselves be calculated in various ways.362  Further, historical cost is 
susceptible to general price fluctuations between or even within periods.  
We generally think of this as inflation, but it may also work in the opposite 
direction, as when assets were “in effect being written up by deflation” 
between 1875 and 1900.363  Nor is it obvious that historical cost reflects 
actual economic conditions.  Depreciation is applicable only to historical 
cost accounting, yet “[d]epreciation accounting offered no help to 
managers when buying or replacing machines,” especially during periods 
of rapid innovation and obsolescence, as occurred during the first half of 
the twentieth century, even as depreciation began to become accepted 
among the profession.364 
Both “historical cost” and “fair value” accounting refer to a range of 
valuation methods.  Neither is absolutely better than the other, or free of 
subjectivity.  One rampant misconception is that mark-to-market 
accounting is synonymous with fair value accounting, instead of being a 
subset thereof.  That misconception is what the next section seeks to 
disabuse.  Instead of being the definition of fair value accounting, mark-to-
market is but one point along the fair value spectrum. 
 
 360. SEC Report, supra note 11, at 27. 
 361. Id. 
 362. Id. at 27. 
 363. PREVITS & MERINO, supra note 22, at 125 (emphasis in original). 
 364. Id. at 163. 
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ii. Contemporary Standards:  Fair Value was Never (Necessarily) 
Mark-to-Market 
Two points are a necessary preface to a discussion of current fair 
value accounting standards:  (1) FAS 157 does not create, establish, 
mandate, expand, or otherwise instantiate fair value accounting, it merely 
clarifies the standards already in effect; and (2) mark-to-market accounting 
is a subset of fair value accounting, and is not compelled under all 
circumstances as the calculation of fair value.  I shall soon elaborate on 
these points, but turn quickly first to a discussion of the recent history and 
existing landscape of fair value accounting. 
Valuation, as discussed in the last section, was a perennially contested 
idea in the twentieth century.  Persistent inflation following World War II 
served to spur further debate, especially from the 1960s onward.365  There 
are two dimensions of this debate:  specific valuation techniques, i.e., cost 
or value, and the relative importance of particular financial statements, i.e., 
balance sheet or income statement.366  Thus one can reach conclusions by 
way of theory of valuation, on the basis of the importance of an individual 
financial statement, or some combination of both.  The mixed-attribute 
model of U.S. financial reporting in turn reinforces the value of an 
integrated set of financial statements, where no single statement is 
inherently privileged.367 
The upward valuation of assets had been quite common during the 
1920s, but was “virtually extinct” by 1940 on the basis that such write-ups 
were “arbitrary,” especially in the typical cases of using appraised values 
for fixed assets and intangibles.368  The valuation of securities, however, 
had by the 1970s proved to be sometimes drastically unrealistic where 
trading values were far below original cost.369  Unclear guidance, 
specifically as to whether firms that had written down securities which had 
now recovered their value could now write them back up, prompted the 
FASB to issue SFAS No. 12, Accounting for Certain Marketable 
Securities, in December 1975.370  This statement clarified that all 
marketable securities were to be valued at the lower of cost or market 
values.371  Reaction to the savings and loan crisis, interest rate deregulation 
 
 365. PREVITS & MERINO, supra note 22, at 384. 
 366. Id. 
 367. The income statement’s death to the balance sheet has long been predicted, as has 
the demise of both of them to the statement of cash flows, yet no single statement has 
actually been crowned ruler by analysts.  See id. at 384-85, 387. 
 368. SEC Report, supra note 11, at 34-35. 
 369. Id. at 35. 
 370. Id.  See also SFAS 12 Accounting for Certain Marketable Securities (indicating it is 
now fully superseded by SFAS No. 115, ¶ 124). 
 371. Id. 
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in the 1980s, increased used of derivative financial instruments in the 
1990s, and numerous other factors led to a hodge-podge of additional 
statements mandating or allowing for fair value accounting.372 
By September 2006, when FAS 157 was issued, there was a desperate 
need for clarification of the numerous standards calling for or otherwise 
affecting the practice of fair value accounting.373  All told, FAS 157 
amended or superseded four APB opinions, thirty-seven FAS Statements, 
and numerous other formal interpretations and other documents.374  FAS 
157, instead of mandating a major change, clarified 35 years of prior, 
confusing, and sometimes conflicting statements about fair value 
accounting, which had been used in various ways throughout that period of 
time.  FAS 157 “only provides guidance on how to estimate fair value,” 
and is not a statement that requires it.375  To repeal FAS 157 would not roll 
back the requirement of fair value accounting, but merely remove the 
guidance on how to go about determining it. 
Mark-to-market accounting, almost uniformly vilified of late, is not a 
requirement of FAS 157 either, nor is it synonymous with fair value.  
“SFAS No. 157 does not itself require mark-to-market or fair value 
accounting.  Rather, other accounting standards in various ways require 
what is more broadly known as ‘fair value’ accounting, of which mark-to-
market accounting is a subset.”376  Although FAS 157 establishes a 
hierarchy of valuation techniques, at which “quoted prices (unadjusted) in 
active markets” are given primacy as “Level 1 inputs”377 it is not clear that 
so-called “toxic” assets’ markets have truly been active and, in any case, 
“[c]ompany-specific information should be factored into fair value 
measurement when relevant information is not observable in the market,”378 
including “the company’s expectation regarding market participant 
assumptions.”379  FAS 157 makes abundantly clear that, while market prices 
are preferred, they may not always be the best source of fair value:  “A 
quoted price in an active market provides the most reliable evidence of fair 
 
 372. 2008 SEC Report, supra note 11, at 35-38. 
 373. See SFAS 157, Reason for Issuing This Statement (noting that “prior to this 
statement there were different definitions of fair value and limited guidance for applying 
those definitions in GAAP” and that “these differences created inconsistencies that added to 
the complexity of applying GAAP.”). 
 374. Id. at 87-145 (detailing the documents SFAS 157 affects). See also Status of 
Statement No. 157, http://www.fasb.org/ st/status/statpg157.shtml (listing current status of 
157 documents). 
 375. 2008 SEC Report, supra note 11, at 3. 
 376. Id. at 1 (emphasis added). 
 377. Fin. Acct. Standards Board, Statement of Fin. Acct. Standards No. 157, Fair Value 
Measurements, at FAS157-11 ¶ 22. 
 378. 2008 SEC Report, supra note 11, at 23. 
 379. Id. at 51. 
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value . . . .”380  But, “fair value may be measured using an alternative 
pricing method . . . as a practical expedient,”381 and “[i]n some situations, a 
quoted price in an active market might not represent fair value at the 
measurement date.”382 
Although FAS 157 is widely criticized, it is for clarification purposes 
and its suspension would merely remove the guidance it offers on fair value 
measurement and disclosure, without removing the extant requirements to 
use fair value accounting already “embedded in numerous other 
standards.”383  Moreover, within this guidance are details and examples of 
the many circumstances in which fair value accounting will not equate to 
mark-to-market accounting.  The SEC explicitly chastised, inter alia, the 
misinterpretations of FAS 157 to require mark-to-market accounting, 
especially in distressed markets, as financial institutions have faced since 
late 2007: 
From the various recent public dialogues over fair value 
accounting, one area of concern appears to be a possible lack of 
understanding surrounding the concept of “fair value” and its 
application in the accounting literature.  For example, in addition 
to a misconception among some that SFAS No. 157 itself 
requires fair value accounting, other misconceptions are that the 
requirements in SFAS No. 157 apply only to instances where a 
market price cannot be determined, or that SFAS No. 157 
requires preparers to use observable prices in inactive or 
disorderly markets, neither of which is accurate.384 
No markets could better be described as “inactive or disorderly” than 
the markets for securitized mortgages in 2008, yet many continued to 
interpret FAS 157 to require market valuations. 
It is also important to remember the extent to which fair value is used, 
and this is far less than many reports would lead us to believe.  Even in 
financial institutions (which have more items subject to fair value 
accounting than most entities do) “less than a majority of assets and 
liabilities” are subject to fair value, and “a significantly smaller population 
of instruments” are valued with mark-to-market methods.385  Ultimately, it 
appears that “fair value accounting was not a primary underlying cause of 
the 2008 bank failures” and even in “failed banks that did recognize sizable 
fair value losses, it does not appear that the reporting of these losses was 
 
 380. Statement of Fin. Acct. Standards No. 157, supra note 378, at FAS157-11 ¶ 24. 
 381. Id. ¶ 25. 
 382. Id. ¶ 26. 
 383. 2008 SEC Report, supra note 11, at 171. 
 384. Id. at 172 (emphasis added). 
 385. 2008 SEC Report, supra note 11, at 43. 
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the reason the bank failed.”386  Instead of accounting leading to massive 
devaluation, it is more likely that “the marketplace factored in losses for 
these banks that had not been recognized in U.S. GAAP reported 
income.”387 
iii. Alternatives to Fair Value? 
Even if fair value accounting is in need of repeal, upsetting decades 
(not months) of accounting standards, we are not left with a clear road to 
improved accuracy and transparency.  If we were to retreat from fair value 
accounting, the obvious candidate for valuing assets is historical cost 
accounting.  Historical cost, then, is simple and objective to compute, 
right?  Well, first we must consider what basis we should use.  FASB and 
IASB have been working together to discuss measurement alternatives, but 
they do not even use the terms “historical cost” and “fair value” because, 
according to the SEC, “there is little common understanding of these 
terms.”388  It is far more precise to talk of a “time frame” in which to orient 
measurement:  past, present, or future value.389  Even within a particular 
time frame, however, we face the question of what basis to use, i.e., 
whether to use entry prices, exit prices, or some sort of modified figure.390  
And even within these choices there may be finer choices to be made, such 
as whether present entry prices should be based on replacement of identical 
assets, equivalent assets, assets capable of the same output or capacity, 
etc.391 
 The problem of using the general terms of historical cost versus fair 
value include that “the same general term can refer to a number of different 
bases . . . lead[ing] to miscommunication and misunderstanding.”392  
Another problem with discussing historical cost and fair value as different 
paradigms for financial reporting is that financial reporting in the U.S. 
simultaneously uses both historical cost and fair value.393  U.S. GAAP is 
structured to produce an integrated set of financial statements, including (1) 
a balance sheet, (2) income statement, (3) cash flows statement, and (4) 
changes in equity.394  As the SEC Report instructs: 
 
 386. Id. at 97. 
 387. Id. (emphasis added). 
 388. 2008 SEC Report, supra note 11, at 174. 
 389. See id. at 173-74 (comparing FASB and IASB in various time frames). 
 390. Id. 
 391. Id. 
 392. Id. at 174. 
 393. Id. at 175.  See also Arewa, supra note 14, at 67 (discussing debates over 
accounting rules over the last century). 
 394. The amount and variety of information that financial reporting should provide about 
an entity require several financial statements.  FASB Statement of Financial Accounting 
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Each financial statement provides different types of information, 
but the statements are interrelated in that they “reflect different 
aspects of the same transactions or other events affecting an 
entity,” as well as complementary in that “none is likely to serve 
only a single purpose or provide all the financial statement 
information that is useful for a particular kind of assessment or 
decision.”395 
A shift to “pure” historical cost or fair value paradigms would 
undermine the framework of an integrated set of financial statements.  A 
pure historical cost model would give primacy to the income statement, 
which would convey the value added by the financial statement issuer, 
while the balance sheet would merely represent the matching of income to 
its historical costs.396  On the other hand, a shift to pure fair value reporting 
would make the balance sheet the most important indicator of value, while 
the income statement merely captured the changes in balance sheet 
accounts from year to year.397  Although it is not simple, the primary virtue 
of a mixed framework is that it offers four related depictions of the issuer’s 
underlying economic activity during the period. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Mark-to-market accounting may be partially responsible for recent 
fluctuations in asset values but, even if true, these accounting changes came 
about precisely because historical cost was causing firms to hide bad loans 
at other times, under different circumstances.398  What are we to make, 
then, of the current financial crisis and accounting’s alleged role in it?  
Something does not make sense.  “Maybe the banks are just counting 
wrong”399 after all.  But what “regulator” is responsible for telling the banks 
of their accounting errors? 
 
Concepts (SFAC) No. 5, Recognition and Measurement in Financial Statements of Business 
Enterprises 14 (1984).  A full set of financial statements for a period should show:  (1) 
financial position at the end of the period, (2) earnings (net income) for the period, (3) 
comprehensive income (total non-owner changes in equity) for the period, (4) cash flows 
during the period, and (5) investments by and distributions to owners during the period.  Id.  
Information about earnings, comprehensive income, cash flows, and transactions with 
owners have in common that they are different kinds of information about the effects of 
transactions and other events and circumstances that change assets and liabilities during a 
period.  Id.  See also SEC Report, supra note 11 at 16 (referencing SFAC No. 5, ¶¶ 39-41 
and 55-57). 
 395. 2008 SEC Report, supra note 11, at 16 (quoting SFAC No. 5, ¶ 23). 
 396. Id. at 176. 
 397. Id. 
 398. See Berlau, supra note 52, at A15 (discussing how accounting reforms affected the 
economic crisis that began in 2008). 
 399. Id. 
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One current problem is that when companies do make write-downs 
under fair value accounting, the write-down itself triggers further 
devaluation, like a run on banks, to a point probably much lower than the 
assets are actually worth.  Reactionary legal changes to accounting, 
however, overlook the underlying problems.  The lack of genuine 
regulation (either market, self, or government) keeps accounting stuck in an 
ever-deepening cycle of scandal-“reform”-scandal.  The attack on fair 
value accounting is but the most recent chapter of this story, even while it 
relies on an idealized view of accounting’s precision and objectivity. 
A lot of people say fair value accounting (and especially mark-to-
market valuation) is terrible, but it is hardly obvious that it is worse than its 
alternatives.  Assuming, arguendo, that fair value accounting (instead of a 
mere bank run, as the SEC contends)400 did lead, or at least contributed, to 
financial crisis, we have no idea in what ways other accounting methods 
would have restructured or exploited incentives and their effects given the 
same underlying economic conditions.  We do, however, know that other 
accounting methods have contributed to prior financial crises.  Yes, fair 
value accounting brings with it certain problems, but so does historical cost 
accounting, which is why we have moved toward fair value accounting in 
the first place.401 
Accounting also languishes in a state of non-regulation where 
competing, yet entrenched and sometimes cooperative interests vie for both 
power and blamelessness.  There are three paradigms for regulation:  
government, self, and market.  Accounting suffers because none of these 
paradigms dominate the industry, which suffers from the worst aspects of 
each.  Accounting and accountants are thus themselves unaccountable, but 
this is a function of conflicted regulatory interests, not an absence of actors 
in the regulatory enterprise.  Crisis may well be “regulation-blind,” 
occurring regardless of the regulatory landscape,402 but we cannot afford to 
ignore the failed organization of accounting. 
Even if a proper regulatory framework were in place, accounting is 
also far less concrete than most (experts and non-experts alike) believe or 
hope.  This, too, puts accounting in a difficult, if not impossible, position, 
for it can never live up to the expectations many have for it.  Unlike the 
systemic market perspectives of economics and finance, accounting is 
inherently individualistic and, as a result, subjective.  Instead of trying to 
hide or eliminate this aspect of accounting, accountants, regulators, and 
lawmakers should seek to reclaim the role of judgment and artistry in 
 
 400. 2008 SEC Report, supra note 11, at 3. 
 401. Sorkin, supra note 2 (noting that the purpose of FAS 157 was to make the market 
more transparent and efficient). 
 402. See Galli & Mingardi, supra note 178 (making the argument that lax regulation was 
not the cause of the economic crisis that began in 2008). 
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accounting, for this is what gives accounting the basis to evolve and remain 
relevant in light of constantly changing economic operating environments. 
No method of accounting is a perfect representation of anything, and 
this is exacerbated by the fact that even the most sophisticated investors, 
including institutional investors, have stopped rigorously analyzing data 
and take the company's financials at face value, instead of mining all the 
information available in them by digging deep enough.403  This was true 
even of Enron, where some had identified looming problems based on the 
company’s financial statements, yet this went largely unnoticed.404  
Accounting is biased and individualistic, not systemic, in its perspective.  
Acknowledging accounting’s limitations takes it off the pedestal of science, 
but it also points to the need for transparency (through disclosure) more 
than trumped up rhetoric of precision and objectivity. 
Transparency should remain the primary goal of financial accounting.  
However, the primary mechanism of transparency in financial reporting is 
not uniform reporting, but robust disclosure requirements.  In the absence 
of rigorous disclosure, even the strictest standards serve only as a shroud, 
especially as incentives adapt and compliance becomes, inevitably, 
“creative.”405 
Accounting’s low point as a profession (if that is in fact now) is not a 
function of fair value as a recent and colossal mistake, but a function of 
poor incentives and bad publicity, largely a function of the profession’s 
own rhetoric of science and objectivity, eschewing its prior (and more 
accurate) position of judgment and artistry.  The result has been an 
increasingly unrealistic expectation of accounting’s truth and objectivity, 
leading to inevitable disappointment and blame in the wake of accounting 
problems.  On top of this, the conflicted regulatory interests affecting 
accounting’s professional organization lead to a lack of accountability and 
a glut of blame shifting when the public cries out against the profession.  
Proposed legislative “reforms” do not address the most fundamental issues 
of accounting. 
Accounting’s substance should be less centralized and allow for more 
diversity in presentation, coupled with increased disclosure requirements.  
Accounting should focus less on uniformity and more on judgment.  
Emphasizing accounting’s reliance on judgment need not soften public 
expectations of accountants, but may reintroduce genuine accountability 
among accountants themselves. 
 
 403. See Macey, supra note 48, at 345-46 (discussing the phenomenon of sophisticated 
investors not investigating accounting data that is provided to them). 
 404. Id. 
 405. See Cunningham, supra note 216, at 1424 (describing what constitutes creative 
methods of compliance). 
